🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <gall-0904981202050001@usrts1m4.uwinnipeg.ca>, gall@uwinnipeg.ca 
(Norman Gall) wrote:
>In article <6gh0mu$gv3$1@usenet49.supernews.com>, HiThere@outtatown.com
>(HiThere) wrote:
>
>> In article <gall-0804981332120001@usrts2m3.uwinnipeg.ca>, gall@uwinnipeg.ca 
>> (Norman Gall) wrote:

>> I thought tht's what I was saying :-)--and that is why neither the 
>> stereotypical right or left have a sufficient answer. 
>
>Right. But I think both sides subscribe to the notion that gov't has the
>authority to

>
They do. i don't.

>> The question, though, is 
>> whether one has a right to the unearned (which returns me to my criteria of 
>> questioning the righteousness of imposing positive obligations). By what 
>> authority?
>
>Well, the authority of gov't - but I don't buy the dichotomy 'earned' v.
>'unearned'.  This fails to account for the moral aspect: 'deserved' v.
>'undeserved' is more useful. You can now argue that getting a fair shake
>isn't deserved, but it is certainly not an easy row to hoe.
>

Deserved though, by what quantifiers?

>> >I simply do not think that we need to rely on a subjective standard of
>> >fairness. We have simple and complex notions of fairness and commonplace
>> >ones.  Given a guy a fair shake is one of them. Logical relevance is
>> >another one.
>> >
>> >> Honesty at least lets me clearly know where I stand.
>> >
>> >But if you find you are standing out in front of firing squad, your only
>> >solace is knowing what killed you.
>
>> Caveat emptor and contract law are sufficient here, I think.
>
>But the Law of Contracts fails to ensure that the playing field is even
>before we start negotiations - which has always been my beef.
>

Even? You and I were born sorta smart. That's not even. I know stronger people 
than me, lots of them. That's not even. Plenty of folks are prettier--that's 
not even. People have desires of differents strengths, for the achievement of 
differing things--and that's not even. I don't have a problem with an uneven 
playing field. I'll take the end I was born with.


>> >Too simple.  If the bigotted storekeep runs a company where there are many
>> >other sources for what he sells, very very few people will be harmed at
>> >all.  If she is the lone source of a product, many many people can be
>> >harmed. So it is the total amount of harm caused - not the harm caused to
>> >a single person.
> 
>> Name a lone source of _any_ product that does not maintain its monopoly 
>> position exactly _through_ the power of government. 
>
>Grocery store in Asshole, MB. 

Sorry, I meant coercive monopolies that exist where there is sufficient market 
to support more than one competitor.


> Drug companies *don't* have a monopoly on
>their drugs except by law, but if there gov't couldn't make them release
>patents after so long, they'd be monopolies. 

Monopolies on products they invented, like Disney owns Mickey. But I can 
always go for Road Runner, and I can always try another therapy. I support the 
notion of intellectual property.


>I could go on. Laissez-faire
>capitalism isn't teh panacea. 
>

Oh shit, no. It's sure no guarantee of everybody doing well. All it does is 
prevent the instigation of force.


>> >> >> > Again, these are not analogous situations. Employment is not a
> private
>> >> >> > contract.
>> >
>> >> >> No? It should be.
>> >
>> >> >Why?
>> >
>> >> Freedom of association and property rights for two quick benchmarks. 
>> >
>> >Neither of which are (nor should be) absolute.
> 
>> Why should they not be absolute for those who have not instigated coercion?.
>
>Why *should* they?  You're the guy telling me that we can't interfere with
>people's lives. I say that the criterion to use is whether actions tend to
>cause harm (of all kinds - societal and personal). Yours seems to be just
>personal. Why is harm to a third party irrelevant?
> 
>> >> Understand, I am not baiting here, but employment ceased to be private in 
>> >> Germany and the Soviet Union, too. Some improvement. 
>> >
>> >Post hoc ergo prompter hoc. Employment is already a public issue here and
>> >thigs are better qua employment than when it was more private.
> 
>> Again, that is clairvoyance at work. How do we _know_ what might have
>been had 
>> another course been chosen? Simple expediency is not sufficient to make your 
>> case.
>
>No, it is reasonable people using their experience and judgement.  we
>already know that these thigns cause harm and we are not allowing epople
>to do it - just in the same way that we know that driving down sidewalks
>causes harm to people, so we disallow it.
>
>No more clairvoyance is needed in this case than when we divine that
>bashing someone's head in with a log will kill them.
>
>
>> >> Common ground :-)--but isn't the problem (among other things) one of 
>> >> *subjectivity* as regards majority decisions.
>> >
>> >I don't think so.  Without spending any real time explaining it, my
>> >argument for moral objectivity (vice moral relativism) is that for the
>> >most part many difference in moral systems (be they cultural or personal)
>> >are not grave enough to count as ones in which the law is morally required
>> >to become involved. Some are.  So, subjectivity in those decisions which
>> >do not matter to the law are fine to be left to majority conscience. Those
>> >that do matter cannot be left up to majority rule but must be compared
>> >against reason.
> 
>> But *compared against reason* ultimately presupposes _not objective_ does it 
>> not, given that we both do not hold to moral relativism? 
>
>Not at all. Compared against the immutable objective standards of reason
>presupposes only moral objectivism that we are dealing with human beings.
>
>> You are trying to  
>> make the case that State action is objectively required here--but I don't yet
> 
>> see the evidence. Mind you, I am thinking about your points with as open
>a mind 
>> as I can muster, so I continue to ponder. I still think the double-bind 
>> applies--how do you argue that folks who can't make a right decision can
>elect 
>> a legitimate government? Even if the vote is only involving *those who care*,
> 
>> those who care can still care wrongly.
>
>Of course, and I'd have to say that this is what governement is all
>about.  If we have a manifestly corrupt populace, I think we're all
>fucked.  But I don't think we have one.  Once we decide which principles
>we will ultimately use to guide our laws, then we let the chips fall where
>they (logically) fall.
>
>> >This could be.  I think the acid test is whether we can prevent more harm
>> >by regulating certain decisions (liek we do for the criminal law) or
>> >allowing *acts* to sort themselves out.
> 
>> Utilitarianism? (not casting aspersions--just asking)
>
>Yep. Deontological reasoning to sort out which principles should be
>adopted and utilitarian considerations to sort out the hard cases.
>
>> >> *Deserved* based on what? Maybe forcing the bigot to hire the gay person 
>> >> prevented him from--for instance--hiring a physically challenged person. 
>> >
>> >Perhaps, but I am not advocating hiring anyone just on the grounds that
>> >the applicant is gay
>> 
>> I knew that :-)
>> 
>> , but that the employer *not* dismiss the possibility
>> >of hiring her *just* on the groudsn that she is gay.
>> 
>> I would _ask_ that, but not _require_ it.
>
>But why not? It is irrelevant and causes the applicant a great deal of
>*undeserved* heartache.
>
>> >I maintain that everyone has the reasonable expectation of being treated
>> >fairly - and that there are subjective views of fairness doesn't detract
>> >from the objective, dispassionate view of fairness. 
> 
>> You make this reference often, and I'm not purposely obtuse here, but I don't
> 
>> understand how you arrive at what you mean by an *objective, dispassionate 
>> view of fairness*.
>
>If we look to modern theories of informal logic, we find a number of
>considerations of  te notion of relevance.  My argument is that logical
>relevance (vice taste) *is* objective, dispassionate, and the most
>rigorous form of fairness one can hope for.  Now my feminist colleguse
>want me to include all kinds of historical and power-based considerations
>in this determination, but on this we concur - far too subjective and
>contentious to be useful.  Logical relevance gets out of the mess.  And
>when it doesn't we look to general harm to make a decision.
>
>
>> >Of course I can simply ask why not placing an obligation is a sound
>> >criterion, but we have now a problem with the notion of rights.  Why this
>> >one and not another?
>> >
>> 
>> This right (freedom from the initiation of force) is based on one's ownership
> 
>> of one's own life--not imposing an obligation leaves the ownership intact. 
>
>Well, I think we've got some pretty contentious issues here.
>
>> Imposing an obligation is taking ownership _from_ a person. I don't see that 
>> as justified unless and until the person has acted to establish their 
>> acceptance of different terms (_by_ instigating force). In that case, I grant
> 
>> _only them_ their terms as a defensive act.
>
>> >So what? All this is predicated on is the British Common Law distinction
>> >between acts and omissions. There are tons of arguments (some of whicha e
>> >actually plausible) arging that in many many cases there is no difference
>> >at all.
> 
>> But all of the arguments for not holding a difference between acts and 
>> ommissions or placing an obligation rely on the acceptance of the concept 
>> concept of duty, do they not? I reject the idea of involuntary duty since the
> 
>> authority has not yet been demonstrated to my satisfaction. I await, though.
>
>You'll be waiting a while. :)  Green's book concludes that there is no
>such thing as the authority of the State, but that it is a political
>virtue to accept it.
>
>> >> Rights are something different from mere legal permissions.
>> >
>> >Quite right - they are legal obligations.
> 
>> Authority?
>
>Us to Gov't by virtue of our desire for peace.
>
>> (PS...this is not directly on the thread at this point--we've expanded the 
>> scope far beyond that, and I don't mean to impose, but should we/may we take 
>> this to email and continue? I have no problem with discussing this here, by 
>> the way--but I don't know if others will be finding it so useful they don't 
>> mind the extra headers :-). _I_ am finding the discussion very useful
>and I am 
>> very interested.) 
>
>Let's do that then.
>
>Cheers,
>n
>