🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <gall-0704981351160001@usrts1m7.uwinnipeg.ca>, gall@uwinnipeg.ca (Norman Gall) wrote:
>In article <6gdo4d$jq6$1@usenet88.supernews.com>, HiThere@outtatown.com
>(HiThere) wrote:
>
>> In article <gall-0704980053300001@usrts1m7.uwinnipeg.ca>, gall@uwinnipeg.ca 
>> (Norman Gall) wrote:
>
>> >You are confusing logical relevance which contains a consideration for the
>> >context and purpose of the argument (which is independent of persons) and
>> >personal relevance (otherwise known as personal stake or interest) which
>> >is as you say it is.
>
>> Relevance in the issue of discrimination relating to employment is not 
>> independant of persons, even logically. You made a reference in an earlier 
>> post to the difference between liking ice cream and discriminating on the 
>> basis of, say, sexual preference--stating the former was purely personal and 
>> the latter not. I disagree.
>
>Well, hold on.  I still think you are confusing a number of things. The
>latter is not purely personal *in certain contexts* (and still independent
>of how the people feel) - those contexts being political.  The right to be
>treated fairly is clearly independent of how persons feel - that is why we
>have a court system.
>

Fair and honestly are two different things. An attribute like *fairness* begs 
about a million purely subjective questions.

>If we are talking about whether I should be your friend, I'd probably say
>that if I dismissed you solely on the grounds that you sometimes sleep
>with men, I'd be an asshole and leave it at that. The idea that one would
>so dismiss and entire person on those grounds is morall reprehensible, but
>hardly a matter for public policy. However, employment is not *just* a
>private matter and never has been.  We have labour laws to ensure that
>person with power do not take advantage of those who do not *when there is
>no other recourse for the person with little power*.  We aren't talking
>about single and individual contracts here. We are talking about broad
>social attitudes and effects.  If it were just one guy in Calgary that ran
>a bookstore that wasn't hiring gays, this wouldn't be an issue. It would
>still be wrong, but the harm done to all would approach zero. When we have
>large segments of the population doing it, we have a public problem.
>

I'm interested in the magic number when morality changes :-)

>> Say I put an ad in the paper looking for a mate, or a person to fill a job 
>> position. In both cases, I am stating that I am open to a relationship and 
>> looking for one--but it would be premature to say that I *have* one.
>
>Again, these are not analogous situations. Employment is not a private
> contract.
>

No? It should be.

>> Someone answers either ad. They are also stating that they are open to a 
>> relationship, and that they may wish one--but it would be premature to say 
>> that there _is_ a relationship. Indeed, the issue betweent the parties is 
>> *whether or not there will _be_ a relationship*.
>
>No, the issue is whether there will be a further relationship. Insofar as
>you are human beings and citizens of the same country you have certain
>responsibilities and rights. We are not amoral data points before we enter
>into contracts. I'd argue that such creature would be unable to enter
>contracts.
>

Amoral, no. Holding differing morality, yes. Specifically, not every _should_ 
needs a law attached to it.


>> A person who wants me to hire them (or to be my romantic partner) does not 
>> _have_ a relationship with me. They *wish* a relationship, perhaps--but that 
>> is all. If I say *no* for whatever reason, there _was_ no relationship--it 
>> never got that far. It failed in the negotiation stage, the same as if they 
>> say *no* in the negotiation stage.
>
>My argument applies here as well.
>

true--but it doesn't apply any better :-)

>> Any decision I (or the potential lover/employee) make _before- the 
>> relationship is entered into is _personal_. I am sure you wouldn't suggest 
>> that I have to accept all or any given comers--regardless of suitability (on 
>> my terms)--in a romantic relationship--why would you state that I must
>need to 
>> dismiss criteria I think important in the employment relationship? 
>
>But you can be wrong in your selection of criteria.  This is the
>distinction between taste and logical relevance.  It is logically relevant
>to any argument about rights that we talk about moral agents. If you feel
>that you can enter into a contract with an infant, you are simply wrong
>(and not just from a legal standpoint).
>

No kidding--but we are talking about adults here.

>> Note that I 
>> said *must need* and not *should*. I think it is wrong to be a bigot--but I 
>> support no legal sanction for such errors..
>
>well, it depends on where and if that bigotry manifests itself in decsions
>which are public concerns.  There is (what I consider) an unassailable
>argument that sexual relations between consenting adults is a private
>concern.  I maintain - and especially now - that there is ample evidence
>that employment is a public concern.
>

Is there? Again--what is the magic number when morality changes?

>> In the romantic or employment arena, any potential lover or employee has the 
>> right not to enter into the relationship for _any_ reason they see fit--no 
>> matter how it affects my interests, and properly so--and the reasons on
>either 
>> side may fall short of satisfying a personal moral view. Why is it different 
>> on the employer issue, on the employer side?  As I said, my objection is
>broad 
>> enough that I think the Charter addresses this poorly.
>
>I do not concur. As I said, employment is a public concern and the right
>to be given a fair and reasonable shake is one that we should use the
>coercive power of the law to maintain. There are public responsibilities
>to being an employer and giving the potential employee this fair shake is
>one to which the employer can be and should be held.
> 
>> As to dispensing with *all laws*...I don't argue for that, but I do
>argue that 
>> laws should properly only be sanctions against the initiation of 
>> aggression/the instigation of force. 
>
>Once again, I disagree that not hiring someone on the irrelevant ground
>that they are not heterosexual *is not* economic coercion. 

How can simply not giving someone something they didn't have in the first 
place be coercion? What about freedom of association, also?

> Seeing that
>employers have the responsibility to do much harm if they do so in a
>widespread fashion (which has happened in the past and continues today),
>i.e. such persons find it unreasonably difficult to find a job, it becomes
>a public matter.
>
>As well, it is not in keeping with the idea of a free society that persons
>need to hide or suffer their irrelevant situations just on the grounds
>that someone doesn't like them. Physicans cannot turn patients away *just*
>because they dislike them.  The responsibility they have is public.
>Similarly for employers.
>

Well, no-one said life would be easy--or that all people will be fair. I've 
never expected either. I actually think physicians _should_ be able to turn 
patients away--_if_ they have not taken the Hippocratic oath, but the oath 
should be voluntary. I think, for instance, that a Doctor (or other 
individuals) should be able to say to a bigot *there is a price for your 
attitude--and it is this: I won't help you.*

>Now, I would like to point out that there *might* be relevant grounds for
>not hiring someone just because they are not heterosexual: E.g., sex
>counsellors who will deal exclusively with het couples should probably be
>het and have had some experience in the matter.
>

Might help :-)

>But on a related topic, why should I not be allowed to apply force to
>someone just on the grounds that I dislike them? Isn't this a private
>matter as well?
>
No--again I refer to the principle against the *initiation of force*.

>> Laws that do not fit this criteria I 
>> thing are best handled in other arenas. By the way--I don't know if you are 
>> familiar with it, but I highly recommend Bruno Leoni's book *Freedom & the 
>> Law*, Nash, Los Angeles, 1961/1972 on the issues regarding this area. Leoni 
>> was the Professor of Legal Theory and the Theory of the State at the 
>> University of  Pavia, where he was also Chair of the faculty of Poli/Sci. 
>> He lectured at Oxford, Manchester, Yale and U Virginia. How about you maybe 
>> suggest a similarly relevant reading for me?
>
>Sure. A few off the top of my head include
>
>   Green, Leslie. (1988) The authority of the State. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
>
>Les was educated at Queen's in Kingston and at Oxford under Raz. He is
>Professor of Philosophy at York University and Professor of Law at Osgoode
>Hall Law School. He's held positions of Dept Chair and Chair of the Grad
>programmes in both depts. As well, he's been faculty at UCLA and Oxford in
>the past.
>
>These two guys obviously need no introduction:
>
>   Raz, Joseph. (1990). Authority. New York: New York University Press.
>
>   Raz, Joseph. (1979). The authority of law : essays on law and morality. 
>      Oxford : Clarendon Press.
>
>   Raz, Joseph. (1970). The concept of a legal system; an introduction to the 
>      theory of legal system. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
>
>   Hart, H. L. A. (1961). The concept of law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
>
>

Thank you.

>>  Also, please excuse my tone in  earlier posts--you clearly did not deserve 
>> it.
>
>Don't worry about it. We all get a little cranky and if people think
>professional thinkers in the Academy don't use ad hominems right to their
>interlocutors faces from time to time, they've got an overly romantic
>view.
>

Agreed, accepted. I'm enjoying this.

>For what its worth, I think you;'ve got the only position mention on this
>topic with any plausibility, consistency, or worth.  These other view are
>non-starters.
>

Thank you, Sir. In my own regard, I actually agree wth you. Understand there 
is also a reason that I am generally confining my debate here to the points 
_you_ raise.

>Cheers,
>Norm Gall
>