🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <gall-0704981548440001@usrts1m9.uwinnipeg.ca>, gall@uwinnipeg.ca 
(Norman Gall) wrote:

>In article <6gdvgb$mcj$1@usenet87.supernews.com>, HiThere@outtatown.com
>(HiThere) wrote:
>
>> In article <gall-0704981304270001@usrts1m7.uwinnipeg.ca>, gall@uwinnipeg.ca 
>> (Norman Gall) wrote:
>
>> >The sanctions are, but the threat of force is present before (just as it
>> >is in the case of forcing landowners to not consider sexual orientation in
>> >deliberations as to whom they will rent). Denying someone a fair shake
>> >(without adequate grounds) is prejudice and an initiation of force akin to
>> >entering into a contract in bad faith.
>
>> How is it *bad faith* when the terms of the proposed contract haven't even 
>> been discussed? 
>
>I think this is too narrow a view. We have to look to the background in
>which the proposed contract exists - contracts are not negotiated in a
>vacuum.
>
>> It's bad faith if the bigot says he will not 
>> discriminate, or leads someone to believe he won't--but it is simple honesty 
>> if he states that he will. 
>
>But my point is that everyone has a moral responsibility to given everyone
>else a fair shake and it is too important to let large numbers of people
>opt out.
>

See the *relevance* thread.

>> The assumption that he won't discriminate is an 
>> assumption that is--if anything--based on terms set beforehand, by 
>> others--with no regard to the honesty or personally held values of the bigot.
>
>That's right, and without it, life become uncessarily complicated.  We
>also have the idea that everyone will obey the criminal law and we don't
>care whether they even know what they've done is a crime.
>

I'm not sure *complication factor* is a core determinant :-)

>> > I would argue that you owe them the moral
>> >duty of trating them at all times as an end-in-themselves rther than a
>> >means to an end; this would require treating them fairly.  And that they
>> >simply 'don't like fags' isn't good enough.
>
>> But isn't the applicant treating the potential employer as a means to an 
>> end--and what's unfair about that? 
>
>Well, we'd have to do a lot of Kant to convince you that it is always
>unfair to treat someone as a means to an end.  I'll drop it.
>

Yes we likely would, and we'd have a problem there, for sure :-). Dropped.

>> Should an employee be forced to work for a bigot?
>
>If they have a contract, they have to discharge the contract. If the bigot
>lets them out, ok.  All employment contracts expire and/or have escape
>clauses else it is slavery - and I'd bet even you think the law should not
>uphold contracts such as these.
>

Oh, I heartily agree--but I am for the equivalent latitude on _both_ sides of 
the employment equation.

>> >> >However, this is an argument against the CCC in whole. 
>> >
>> >> Yep
>> >
>> >> > We have laws
>> >> >requiring people to tell the truth when questioned by police and in a
>> >> >court of law. Are you arguing that all of these laws are unjustified?
>> >
>> >> No.
>> >
>> >How do you reconcile asserting an argument that questions the authority of
>> >the CCC *and* say that you are not arguing against laws which are
>> >contained therein? This is prima facie contradictory.
>
>> No, it's not. Right and wrong exist independant of the CCC.
>
>But we aren't talking about right and wrong here - we're talking about
>authority - which is really what your argument boils down to. If the CCC
>has authority and  your argument is an argument against is in toto (as you
>say above) *no* criminal law can be justified. Well, the law might be
>morally justified, but the Crown cannot enforce it since you say the CCC
>has no authority. This in effect neuters the CCC.
>

It _should_, I would argue. I think the present Charter is a very flawed 
document, even when I agree with some of the results. (See Leoni)

>> >But this is a danger in any system that is democratic to any extent.  Only
>> >in some sort of totalitarian regime that bought the notion that the gov't
>> >has no authority to tell anyone what to do would this not be a danger.
>
>> There is an non-totalitarian alternative--and that is to constitutionally 
>> limit the extent and power of government to it's core function of protecting 
>> people against the initiation of force.
>
>But then we have to have the People or the Court decide what counts as
>force and you are in the same conundrum again. If the People decide that
>refusing to rent to someone on non-economic grounds constitutes force,
>you've got what we have now (somewhat). If the People decide that swatting
>your wife in the mouth when she 'talks back' does not constitute force -
>somehting like spanking a child, maybe? - then you've got a mighty big
>problem on your hands.
>


Oh, I think we can objectively establish what *initiation of force* is. Don't 
you? (see the other thread and answer there, I think)

>> My overall point is that although it 
>> can be argued that there is a proper role for gov't (although David Freidman 
>> puts a telling case to the contrary in his *Machinery of Freedom* {much data 
>> available on the web})--you are right that this is a danger in democratic 
>> systems because such sytems can become effectively totalitarian by majority 
>> fiat.
>
>And as such are no different or better than what we have now.
>

As such, sorta _are_ what we have now.

>> >> >So what? Unless you are questioning the idea of passing laws writ large,
>> >> >this missed the point entirely.
>> >
>> >> Not exactly, but I am questioning any number of laws writ large--but not 
>> >> bevcause they _are_ writ large, There are other criteria.
>> >
>> >Well yes.  It seems to me that the criteria that you are using is whether
>> >the law 'tells people what to do'. But even regulative law does this.  "If
>> >yu want to get married, do this."
> 
>> No, that's not the criteria, The criteria is whether or not the law 
>> inhibits action when what they are doing is not an initiation of force. 
>
>See above - what consitutes an application of force?
>

See other thread on *positive obligations* and *rights*.

>> I do 
>> not support the government asserting regulations on what is a *proper* 
>> marriage, for instance--I think they should saty out of it.
>
>I'd agree with you here. but for utterly different reasons.
>

I'll take the agreement, LOL. (_Are_ the reasons so different???)
 
>
>Norm Gall
>

Ron