🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <gall-0804981336070001@usrts2m3.uwinnipeg.ca>, gall@uwinnipeg.ca (Norman Gall) wrote:
>In article <6gfokd$b7$1@usenet87.supernews.com>, HiThere@outtatown.com
>(HiThere) wrote:
>

>
>However, this then places the burden of moral disapprobation in the hands
>of people who actually care. While we probably both think that everyne
>*should* care, I think that this is too egregious an infraction to entrust
>to the masses.
>

But this gets us into the old double-bind, doesn't it. If people (the 
masses) are not capable of proper action (caring enough or properly and 
acting accordingly), then they are also not capable of electing or forming a 
legitimate and proper government (which acts accordingly). If they _are_ 
capable of right action, then the State mechanism is not needed.

>> This solution (other than allowing the 
>> defensive act--but not penalizing those who do not join the boycott) places 
>> few if any demands on the State while allowing individuals, in a very passive
> 
>> manner, to exact (and possibly later withdraw) a sanction that we both see as
> 
>> _very_dear_. In a sense (although I don't think this attribute necesarily 
>> makes it a better choice of sanction) it's the classic *eye for an eye* with 
>> the added finesse of not requiring the boycotter or the State to initiate 
>> force. There is no positive obligation on _anyone_.
>
>
>But again, I don't see the lack of an obligation as a virtue.  

You weren't kidding about Kant, were you? :-)

> We *do*
>have positive oligations and it is immoral to shirk them. 

The statement *man must [insert obligation]* presupposes an *if [insert 
desired result] which begs the question *desired by who?*

From where comes the authority that must needs the duty?


> The seriousness
>of the moral infraction is the guide to whether the State should become
>involved. In this case I think it passes the test.
>

In light of my points--or perhaps in spite of them, please explain.

>Norm Gall
>

Thanks

Ron