🚀 go-pugleaf

To: alt.hypnosis
From: steve.crabtree

In article <DLB.92Dec14103144@fanny.wash.inmet.com>
dlb@fanny.wash.inmet.com (David Barton) writes

DB> In article <231.3473.uupcb@synapse.org> steve.crabtree@synapse.org
DB> (Steve Crabtree) writes:

DB>    The same thought has occurred to me. If there is no unique brain
DB>    state which underlies what appears to be a unique set of
DB>    behavioural phenomena, you're left with the options of denying the
DB>    existence of hypnosis and accusing people of acting, assuming that
DB>    the states of the brain can change without affecting EEG, or with
DB>    the tantalizing possibility that hypnosis may act not on brain
DB>    but on mind (soul etc.)

DB> This may simply reflect the narrowness of your definition of what
DB> "hypnosis" is.  If trance behavior is seen as a natural phenomena,
DB> part of everyday life and occuring to everyone several times a day,
DB> and that a formal induction is simply a mechanism for gaining access
DB> to this natural skill, then some of this dilemma goes away.

I accept your broadening of the definition, but I'm not sure how it
helps unless you're suggesting that (for these informally induced
trances) there are detectable EEG changes accompanied by the same
suggestibility characteristic of a more formally induced trance.

If so, why does a formally induced trance not show these EEG changes? Is
it possible that they sometimes accompany a hypnotic trance but are not
part of whatever fundamentally constitutes a hypnotic trance?

I'd agree that it's more parsimonious to argue that changes in the
brain do take place which are not observed; is it possible to falsify
this hypothesis?

                << Experimental details omitted >>

DB> I would GREATLY appreciate more infomation about this procedure.
DB> Time, place, participants, and any sponsoring organization would be a
DB> good start.

The presentation was an informal (i.e. not sponsored) presentation at
the annual conference for the Society for Psychical Research in
September 1991. I will have to dig out the other details for you.

DB> Explicitly stating hypotheses
DB> and the expected results of the experiment, and what it means (in the
DB> example above) for a sketch to be a "remarkable match" is difficult in
DB> any rigorous way.

I think these problems have been successfully addressed in the blind
judging procedures used for Ganzfeld experiments etc. Tends to
understate the closeness of good matches, but is still sufficient to
show effects.