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From: x <daleyl@peak.org>
Subject: Background on CUBA IN THE MIDDLE EAST
Date: Thursday, September 13, 2001 8:36 PM

Castro was loaned money by Arafat and other stories
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Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2001 20:04:40 EDT
From: LavozdeCubaLibre@aol.com

  CUBA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

 A Brief Chronology

 By Domingo Amuchastegui[1]

 INTRODUCTION

 After a close relationship with Middle Eastern groups and countries for
forty
 years, Cuba enjoys today an exceptional position in the region with
embassies
 in almost all countries, and with a wide variety of political connections
 within the ruling elites. Castro is engaged in a growing process of
enlarging
 bilateral trade, financial assistance, involvement in joint ventures, and
 cooperation projects, as well as in diplomatic cooperation in the
 international system.

 The context has changed over the years. While the priorities are not to
 channel weapons to groups within the region, there are still some
specialized
 military assistance, training and cooperation, especially with the PLO. Yet
 Cuba's priorities now are to obtain investments, economic cooperation, and
tr
 ade opportunities from Iran, Algeria, Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, and
 others.

 For U.S. interests, the closeness of the relationship with Iraq and some of
 the more militant terrorist groups in the Middle East is troublesome. Can
 Cuba be used to carry out terrorist acts against U.S. targets? Is there any
 cooperation between Sadam Hussein and Castro in the development of chemical
 and bacteriological weapons? What remains from the close cooperation
between
 Castro and the more militant terrorist groups in the region? These and
other
 questions are of critical importance to the security of the United States.
 Cuba's proximity to the U.S., the continuous flow of immigrants from the
 island and the increased travel from and to Cuba should make Castro's
 relationships a troublesome and worrysome issue to U.S. policymakers.

 The Middle East and North Africa have been extremely important to Castro's
 foreign policy since 1959. It remains today as a region of special priority
 in Castro's redesign of his foreign policy after the collapse of Cuba's
 alliance with the former Soviet Union. Actually, there is not one single
 aspect of Castro's foreign policy in which the Middle East does not become
 important as:

 1) A region connected to Cuba's non-aligned interests and policies.

 2) An area where Cuba laid the foundations for the deployment of regular
 military forces and the establishment of military cooperation over the last
 40 years.

 3) A region from where to gain knowledge/connections/influence with
 "liberation movements" throughout Africa and the Middle East.

 4) A base for triangular operations in connection with
 Intelligence/subversive activities in Latin America.

 5) A source of influence with Arab communities in Latin America and the
 Caribbean.

 6) A region in which trade, loans, cooperation, and diplomatic support has
 become very important, especially in the 1990's.

 7) After Vietnam, a virtual laboratory, in the military field, in
particular
 since the Six Day War (1967), for updating and upgrading Cuba's military
 capabilities, including technological and operational capacities.

 8) A region where the Arab-Islamic states are extremely important due to
 their voting power within the UN system for Cuba's multilateral diplomacy.

 It is within such a context that the relevance of the Middle East for
Cuba's
 foreign policy should be understood. The following chronology is only meant
 to be illustrative of the depth and closesness of Cuba�?Ts long-standing
 relationships with states, leaders, and groups in this troubled region.

 Top

 CHRONOLOGY

 1959-1963

 * Relations developed with Gamal Abdel Nasser; Cuba joined the Non-Aligned
 Movement, sponsored by India, Yugoslavia, and Egypt. Efforts to buy weapons
 from Egypt failed.

 * The Cuban government sent Captain José Ramón Fernández (currently
 vicepresident of the Cuban government) to Israel in the summer of 1959 to
 negotiate the purchase of light weaponry and artillery, but no agreement
was
 reached. Instead, signficant civilian assistance was granted by Israel to
 Cuba for more than 10 years in the field of citrus cultivation and
diplomatic
 relations were normal until 1973.

 * Raúl Castro and Che Guevara visited Cairo and established contacts with
 African liberation movements stationed in and supported by Cairo. Both
Cuban
 leaders visited Gaza and expressed support for the Palestinian cause.

 * Initial relations established with Baghdad under Karim Kassem. The Cuban
 government sent Commander William Galvez to purchase light weaponry, tanks
 and artillery. No agreement was reached.

 * Castro established relations with the Algerian FLN through Paris and
Rabat;
 official and public support was extended, large quantities of weapons were
 shipped to the FLN through Morocco (1960-1961); provided shelter, medical
and
 educational services were provided in Cuba for wounded Algerians; political
 and military cooperation in the fields of counter-intelligence and
 intelligence were initiated. First Cuban deployment of regular military
 forces in support of the Algerian government against the Moroccan
aggression
 of 1963. These forces remain to train the Algerian army for more than a
year.


 1964-1967

 * With considerable hesitation and reluctance, Nasser cooperated with Che
 Guevara during his guerrilla operation in Congo-Kinshasa (former Zaire) in
 1965.

 * Cuba welcomed the founding of the PLO. First contacts with Palestinian
 FATAH between 1965 (Algiers) and 1966-67 (Damascus).

 * The Tricontinental Conference was held in Havana in January, 1966 to
adopt
 a common political strategy against colonialism, neocolonialism, and
 imperialism.

 * Cuba sent weapons via Cairo, to the NLF in Southern Yemen. Cuban agents
 were sent on fact-finding missions to North and South Yemen (1967- 1968);

 * Fidel Castro and other Cuban officials privately criticized in very harsh
 terms the shameful performance of the Egyptian leadership during the Six
Day
 War in 1967. The war, as such, was thoroughly studied by the Cuban Armed
 Forces;


 * Cuba and Syria developed a close alliance and supported FATAH and the
 Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF).

 1968-1975

 * Cuba continued its military and political support for FATAH after the
 Syrians broke with the latter, and, later on, Cuban support was granted to
 other Palestinian organizations (Popular and Democratic fronts).

 * Cuba sent military instructors and advisors into Palestinian bases in
 Jordan to train Palestinian fedayeen (1968); first high-level delegation
from
 FATAH-PLO visited Cuba (1970).

 * Several missions sent to Southern Yemen to support NLF / FATAH Ismail
 internally and externally, both politically and militarily.

 * The Soviet Union and Cuba increased military and civilian cooperation
with
 Southern Yemen (PDRY).

 * Cuba commenced political and military cooperation with Somalia's Siad
Barre
 (1969).

 * Economic cooperation began with Libya in 1974, after serious bilateral
 tensions between 1969 and 1973.

 * Closer connections with FATAH-PLO and other Palestinian organizations
were
 reinforced, including training of Latin American guerrillas in Lebanon;

 military support included counter-intelligence and intelligence training.

 * Arafat visited Cuba in 1974.

 * Arab and Non-Aligned countries pressured Cuba to break relations with
 Israel in 1973 and sponsor U.N. Resolution on Zionism "as a form of racial
 discrimination."

 * Cuba provided military support and personnel to Syria during the Yom
Kippur
 War (1973-1975).

 * Cuba joined with Algeria and Libya on a diplomatic/political offensive in
 support of Frente POLISARIO (People's Front for the Liberation of Western
 Sahara and Río del Oro); later on provided military cooperation , medical
 services, and other forms of assistance.

 1976-1982

 * Cuba avoided any public condemnation of Syria's military intervention in
 Lebanon, although privately they did so in strong terms.

 * Cuba supported the so-called "Steadfastness Front" against the U.S.
backed
 Camp David accord.

 * Additional military and political support provided to the Palestinian
 cause; Arafat attended the 6th Non-Aligned Conference in Havana (1979).

 * At this stage, significant hard currency loans (tens of million) had been
 facilitated by Arafat-PLO to the Cuban government under very soft terms;
Cuba
 granted diplomatic and political support to Arafat during the 1982 Israeli
 invasion of Lebanon. In the 1980s, Cuban universities were graduating
 hundreds of Palestinian students in various fields, especially from medical
 schools.

 * The Aden (Southe Yemen) regime decided to support the Ethiopian radical
 officers commanded by Mengistu Haile Mariam, sending Yemeni military units
in
 support of the latter against Somali aggression, and asking the Cubans to
do
 the same. Cuba joined in, first with a group of officers headed by General
 Arnaldo Ochoa, a move that was followed later on by the deployment of large
 Cuban forces against the Somali invasion. Also as part of the alliance with
 the Aden regime, Cuba granted some small-scale support to the Dhofaris in
 their armed struggle against the monarchy in Oman until the late 1970s.

 * As part of Cuba's alliance with Mengistu Haile Mariam's regime in
Ethiopia,
 the Cuban leadership decided to engage in active political and military
 support for more than 10 years to the Liberation Movement of Southern Sudan
 headed by John Garang against the Arab-Muslim regime in Khartoum (until
today
 there are no diplomatic relations between Khartoum and Havana).

 * Cuba developed closer ties with Iraq in various areas (medical services,
 construction projects, grants and loans).

 * Cuban military advisory to Iraq in different fields began in the mid
1970s
 (it was cancelled after the Iraq invasion of Iran in late 1980).

 * Cuba cooperated with Libya in the political founding of the World MATHABA
 in Tripoli, to provide political support and coordinate revolutionary
 movements throughout the world. Cuba supported also Lybia's stand on Chad
and
 in its support to the FRENTE POLISARIO.

 * Despite its close links with Baghdad, Cuba recognized and praised the
 Iranian Revolution, although with no significant increase in bilateral
ties.
 Once Iraq attacked Iran, Cuba withdrew its military advisors from Baghdad
and
 adopted a position of official impartiality, though more sympathetic to
 Baghdad, due to its past relations.

 * Castro granted political recognition to the revolution in Afghanistan in
 1978, but internecine conflict and civil war prevented any strengthening of
 bilateral relations. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 disrupted
 Cuba's Non-Aligned policies at a time when Castro was chairman of the NL
 Movement. While publicly supporting Moscow, Fidel Castro was very critical
of
 the Soviet invasion, something that was bitterly discussed with Soviet
 officials.

 1983-1991

 * Declining economic cooperation between Cuba and Libya.

 * New ties of alliance between Algeria and Libya with Morocco cut-off any
 further direct support from Cuba to FPOLISARIO.

 * Libyan support to Latin American revolutionary movements, especially in
 Central America and the whole of the World MATHABA project, declined
rapidly
 after the U.S.bombing of Tripoli in 1986; Cubans increasingly distant until
 MATHABA's last meeting in 1990 in Tripoli, where the termination of the
 Libyan project was pretty obvious for all the participants, including the
 Cuban delegation.

 * The Palestinian Intifada increases Cuba�?Ts support for
 Arafat and the PLO, both diplomatic and military.

 * Cuba starts exploring other possibilities for increased diplomatic
 recognition and economic ties in the region, including Saudi Arabia (two
 Cuban ambassadors were sent for that purpose, but with no significant
 success); the Gulf States, Jordan, Turkey (with much better results:
 embassies were finally established in Kuwait, Turkey, Qatar, and Jordan);
and
 even Israel (with no official success, but with promising inroads within
the
 private sector and some political/religious forces).

 * After the violent collapse of the Aden regime, the death of Fatah Ismail,
 andthe reunification with North Yemen, Cuban authorities negotiated with
the
 government of Sanaa from which bilateral relations continued to develop,
 including areas of economic and political cooperation.

 * After the negotiations leading to the establishment of the Palestinian
 National Authority, Cuban-Palestinian military cooperation was enhanced,
 including the areas of counter-intelligence and intelligence.

 * Cuba condemned Iraq for its invasion and annexation of Kuwait, supporting
 the latter's sovereignty; it also condemned U.S. military operations in the
 Gulf and abstained from supporting the bulk of the sanctions imposed on
 Baghdad. A Cuban military delegation was sent to Iraq to learn and share
what
 was considered vital information and experiences from U.S. combat
operations
 in Kuwait and Iraq.

 1992-1999

 * Embassies were opened in Qatar, Turkey, Tunisia and Jordan; trade and
joint
 ventures were developed. Diplomatic ties and trade relationships have
 increased discreetly with Egypt and Libya; Qatar supported Cuba in the 1999
 sessions on Human Rights at Geneva.

 * A high-level PLO military delegation including the new head of
Intelligence
 paid a non-public visit to Cuba.

  *  Israeli firms provided capital, technology and markets to Cuba in the
 field of citrus cultivation and exports; religious and political
delegations
 visited were exchanged..

 * Lebanon's normalization in the 1990's allowed Cuba to reach important
 financial and trade agreements, including Lebanese participation in joint
 ventures and in establishing a branch of the Fransabank in Havana. Nabih
Berri, in 1998, the Chairman of the
 Lebanese parliament paid a long and successful, visit to Cuba during the
 month of Ramadan, and more recently Adnan Kassar, president of the
Fransabank and the International Chamber
 of Commerce paid an official visit to Havana.

 * Iranian-Cuban relations have increased after several high-ranking
 delegations from Iran visited Cuba: the Vice-President, the Minister of
 Foreign Relations, the Minister of Public Health, and the Minister of
Social
 Assistance. The Cuban Minister of Public Health visited Iran in 1998. In
the
 last two years the number of Cuban doctors, paramedics, and medical
services
 hired by Teheran have increased, together with additional purchases of
Cuban
 pharmaceuticals and biotechnology products. A recent agreement (1999) was
 signed, establishing Cuba's assistance in setting up social security/social
 assistance networks in Iran.

 * The recent election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika (April 1999) as President of
 Algeria, opens new opportunities for Cuba, given Bouteflika's close
 relationship with the Cuban government for more than 40 years.

 * PLO leaders continue to have close relations with the Cuban leadership,
 having access to specialized military and intelligence training, either in
 Cuba or Palestinian territory, and in the sharing of intelligence.

 * Cuba continues to actively undermine U.S. policies in the Middle East and
 North Africa in primarily three ways: a) Portraying U.S. actions and
 diplomacy in the region as those of an aggressor, seeking to impose
hegemony
 by force such as the recurrent attacks on Iraq, violation of sovereign
rights
 (no-fly zones), the perpetuation of unjustified economic sanctions to
 countries in the region (Iraq, Iran, Syria), open political intervention
and
 the use of brutal force as acts of retaliation (the Bin Laden
 case/Yugoslavia); b) portraying the U.S. as the main obstacle to a peaceful
 settlement of the Israel/Palestine and the Gulf conflicts, and c)
 discrediting U.S. policies, especially by gaining support for Cuba's agenda
 at the U.N. These Anti-American views and policies are conveyed as a
 systematic message through a network of Cuban embassies in most countries
of
 the region, at the U.N. and its multilateral system plus Cuban embassies
and
 missions throughout the Western Hemisphere and other significant
 non-governmental political and cultural channels.

 Top

 GLOSSARY

  1. FLN. Front de Libération National,
 the political and military organization that led the war of national
 liberation against French colonial rule between 1954 and 1962. Ruling
 political party until the 1980s in Algeria.

  2. PLO. Palestine Liberation
 Organization, founded in Cairo, in 1964, under the auspices of Egypt (then
 known as the United Arab Republic) to serve Nasser's manipulations of the
 Palestinian cause, composed mostly of conservative Palestinian
intellectuals
 and bureaucrats serving Arab governments. An instrument of Nasser's foreign
 policy until the June War of 1967, when the old PLO leadership collapsed to
 be replaced by FATEH's leadership headed by Arafat.

  3. FATEH. Acronym for Palestine
 National Liberation Movement, founded in 1959 by younger generations of
 Palestinians that had experienced the defeats of 1948 and 1956, strongly
 committed to a radical nationalist platform to fight for Palestine and
 against Arab intervention and manipulations of the Palestinian problem.
 Mostly an underground and not legally recognized organization until the
June
 War in 1967; it transformed itself into the most powerful and influential
 party inside Palestinian and Arab politics, controlling the PLO effectively
 since 1969, when Arafat becomes its chairman.

 4. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The most important branch
 of the Arab Nationalist Movement (known as the ANM, created in the 1950s as
 radical followers of Nasser). After the June War of 1967 splitting away
from
 Nasser and focusing on building a more radical alternative within the
 Palestinians under the name of Popular Front, led by George Habash; a later
 off-spring, in 1969, was the Democratic Front led by Nayef Hawatmeh.
Strongly
 based in Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, and the Gulf, until 1970 heavily engaged
in
 terrorist methods. After 1970 dropped such tactics, became more active and
 open across the occupied territories and southern Lebanon, adopting
 Marxist-Leninist ideology.

  5. Frente POLISARIO. Frente Popular de Liberación del Sagía el Hamra y
Río
 del Oro, inspired by the ANM tradition and the Algerian FLN, created to
fight
 against the Spanish-Morrocan-Mauritinian arrangements to split the former
 colony of Saguía el Hamra/Río del Oro (known as Western Sahara) between
the
 two African states. Enjoyed active support from Algeria and Libya together
 with a considerable number of African states until the 1980s.

  6. NFL. National Front for the Liberation of South Yemen, another
important,
 and successful, branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement. Created in 1962 in
 the course of the revolution in North Yemen, against the monarchy and
 supported by Nasser. Expanded to the south of Yemen and began armed
struggle
 against British colonial occupation and local feudal lords (sultans and
 sheikhs). Broke with Nasser in 1966-1967 and finally forced the British to
 negotiate and evacuate Aden, followed by the defeat of the local feudal
 lords. Since 1965 it has had very close relations with Cuba. Main leader
was
 Abdel Fatah Ismail. Internecine conflicts sine the late 1970s eventually
led
 to open civil war in 1990 and the collapse of the regime, the death of
Fatah
 Ismail, and integration with the north under the control of the government
in
 Sanaa.

  7. World MATHABA. A Libyan project from the late 1970s to promote
political,
 financial, and military support for revolutionary movements throughout the
 world. Ghaddafi called on other "revolutionary governments" to support this
 project, which Cuba did although with extreme caution and distrust. Cuba
 could not refuse to join due to the fact that its major allies in Latin
 America, Africa, the Middle East, and even the Soviet Union had accepted to
 participate and that many of them were benefitting from Libya's abundant
 financial support. Although governments -like the case of Cuba- took part
at
 the level of political deliberations and to coordinate common actions in
the
 diplomatic and political fields, MATHABA was something else: essentially a
 tool in the hands of the Libyans to project their individual goals and
agenda
 (Ghaddafi's Green Book, to reward his supporters, and to undermine his
 enemies). Financial and military assistance was never a collective
decision,
 but responded for the most part to bilateral arrangements between
Ghaddafi's
 regime and individual organizations, some of which resorted, at different
 stages, to terrorist methods like the IRA and ETA. Insurgencies in Central
 America, like the Sandinistas and others, were privileged beneficiaries
along
 with the African National Congress, FRENTE POLISARIO, and others. Cuban
 leaders were always anxious to counterbalance Libyan attempts for
unilateral
 actions, to influence Cuban allies or about Ghaddafi's hostility toward
 well-known Cuban allies such as Arafat. The dominant perception among Cuban
 leaders was that Ghaddafi posed too many unnecessary security risks
vis-� -vis the U.S. and too many
 complications within Cuban alliances.

  8. People's Liberation Movement of Southern Sudan. The final outcome of
 different secessionist movements in southern Sudan during the 1960s and
early
 1970s (like the Anya-Nyas) fighting against Arab-Islamic control of the
 central government, allocation of resources, and religious, political, and
 ethnic intolerance.

  9. Eritrean Liberation Front. The most influential Eritrean organization
 fighting for secession from Ethiopia in the 1960s, actively supported by
the
 Syrian regime since 1965. Various internal divisions developed later on
until
 the late 1970s, when a new front was built based on very different domestic
 and external alliances and, eventually led the Eritreans to victory. Cuba's
 support to Mengistu Haile Mariam's regime in 1978 meant the cessation of
 previous Cuban backing to the Eritrean cause.

 10. PDRY. People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, official name adopted by
the
 Southern Yemeni independent republic.

 11. Gamal Abdel Nasser. A colonel in the Egyptian army, member of the Free
 Officers Movement formed after the defeat in 1948 at the hands of the
 newly-born state of Israel. Led the revolution that overthrew the monarchy
in
 1952. Undertook signficant economic, social, and political transformations,
 setting much of the basic tenets and role-model of Arab nationalsm after
 WWII. Co-founder of the Neutralist countries in 1956 and of the Non-Aligned
 Movement in 1961. Defeated by Israel in 1948, 1956, and 1967.

 12. Karim Kassem. A colonel in the Iraqi army and, at the beginning, a
 follower of Nasser. Led the revolution against the monarchy in 1958. A
rival
 of Nasser later on, a bloody military coup inspired and mostly led by the
 Arab BAATH party, a strong and influential inter-Arab nationalist movement
in
 the Middle East, overthrew him in 1963.

 Top

 BIBLIOGRAPHY


 A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY ON CUBA'S POLICIES AND ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND
 NORTH AFRICA


  1. Anderson, Jon Lee (1997). Che
 Guevara: A Revolutionary Life, New York, Grove Press.

  2. Baez, Luis (1996). Secreto de
 Generales, Ciudad de La Habana, Ediciones SI-MAR, S.A.

  3. B'nai B'rith (1982). "PLO Activities in Latin America," New York,
 Anti-Defamation League.

  4. Campbell, John C. "Soviet Policy in the Middle East." Current History
Num.80 (January 1981).

  5. Durch, William J. ""The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle East:
 From Algeria to Angola."

 Studies in Comparative Communism, Num.
 XI (Spring-Summer 1978).

  6. The Economist Foreign Report.
 "Castro's First Middle East Adventure: Part II."15 March, 1978.

  7. Erisman, Michael H. (1985). Cuba's International Relations: The
 Anatomy of a Nationalistic Foreign Policy,Boulder, Westview.

  8. Eran, Oded. "Soviet Middle East
 Policy: 1967-1973,"Rabinovich, Itamar and Haim Shaked, eds. (1978). From
June to October: The Middle East
 Between 1967 and 1973, New Brunswick, Transaction Books.

  9. Falk, Pamela S. (1986). Cuban
 Foreign Policy: Caribbean Tempest, Massanchussets/Toronto,

 D.C. Heath and Company.

 10. Fernández, Damián (1988). Cuba's
 Foreign Policy in the Middle East, Boulder, Westview Press. 11. Karol, K.S.
 (1971). Guerrillas in Power, London,
 Jonathan Cape.

 12. Legum, Colim and Haim Shaked, eds. (1977-1980). The Middle East
Contemporary Survey.
 Vols. IIII, New York, Holmes and Meir.

 13. "Relations Between the palestinian Terrorists and Cuba." Reprinted from
<
 I style="mso-bidi-font-style: normal">PLO in Lebanon: Selected Documents.
Israeli, Raphael,
 ed., London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983.

 14. Siljander, Mark. "The Palestine Liberation Organization in Central
 America."Mmeo., October 1983.

 15. U.S. Department of State. "The Sandinistas and the Middle Eastern
 Radicals."Washington D.C., August 1985.

 16. Viotti, Paul R. "Politics in the Yemens and the Horn of Africa:
 Constraints on a Super Power."Mark V. Kauppi and R. craig Nations, eds. The
Soviet Union and the Middle east in
 the 1980s. Lexington, D.C. Heath, 1983.

 Top

 [1] Mr. Amuchastegui is a research associate at the Institute for Cuban and
 Cuban-American Studies and a Doctoral candidate at the School of
 International Studies, University of Miami. He was aprofessor at the Higher
 Institute of International Relations in Havana; Guest Professor at the
Cuban
 National Defense College; Senior Researcher at Cuba's Center for Studies of
 Africa and the Middle East; and Intelligence Analyst and Head of the
 Organization Department at the Tricontinental Organization in the 1960s and
 1970s. He traveled extensively through North Africa and the Middle East. He
 edited Palestine: Crisis and
 Revolution (Havana, 1970); Palestine:
 Dimensions of a Conflict (Havana, 1988); Sociology and Politics in Israel
(Havana, 1990); and is the author of
 Contemporary History of Asia and
 Africa (Four Volumes, Havana, 1984-1988), together with several other books
 and articles. He was a direct or indirect participant in most of the
 developments described herein until 1993.
  >>


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