Article View: alt.security.ripem
Article #39Re: RSAREF and RIPEM now available via anonymous FTP
From: David Sternlight
Date: Fri, 08 Jan 1993 16:56
Date: Fri, 08 Jan 1993 16:56
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In article <1993Jan8.065938.6024@qualcomm.com> karn@servo.qualcomm.com (Phil Karn) writes: > >That's the theory. In practice, the line of accountability of the >bureaucrats making the decisions is awfully long and thin. NSA calls >the shots on crypto export decisions. Their obsession with secrecy is >legion, and they need not explain the reasons behind a decision to >anyone. The phrase "national security" is the most you'll get. Let's >face it -- that's the de-facto "root password" to the protections of >the Constitution. > >This may nominally be a democracy, but doesn't this type of secret >policymaking remind you just a little of the former USSR? Remember >that the standard excuse for denying Soviet citizens the right to >emigrate was that they carry "state secrets" from their service in the >military. Pretty soon I expect Mr. Sternlight to argue that anyone who >knows how to write a cipher should need an exit visa to leave the US. First, Phil makes a personal reference that's part of the unfair attempt by some in this discussion to demonize me and my views. I stated very clearly that I would recoil from such things, and now Phil is putting words in my mouth that I'd argue for them. Shame, Phil! Now to the substance. There's a very difficult issue in an area where not only is a decision about whether something is classified is involved, but also where the issues in the decision are themselves classified. In the intelligence community this is sometimes referred to as a "sources and methods" issue. Obviously it's difficult to "explain their decision to anyone" in cases of this kind. But it is false to assert that "they need not explain the reasons behind a decision to anyone." First, there are congressional oversight committees, and believe me they take their job very seriously. A complaint to the right committee will get a decision reviewed by them. It will be done in secret, since the issues are classified, and one may hear only the result, but it will be done. Second, there are standing oversight committees reporting to the President. A former boss of mine who in a previous life was an expert in NSA policy issues in the Pentagon, was made a member of the NSA oversight board when he went back to civilian life (he was a political appointee while in the Pentagon, and part of civilian oversight--see below). He watched over just such issues as those we're discussing, closely. Third, there is a vigorous "Inspector General" program in the intelligence agencies, and enough bureaucratic in-fighting and difference of opinion about just such issues as those we're discussing that one can expect some informal regulatory process here. Fourth, the intelligence and military communities are intensely integrated with civilian oversight--not only the heads of agencies, but also many key policy makers and administrators. Most are "political appointees" responsible to the President in power. In particular, the head of the CIA is a civilian Presidential appointee, and the NSA is controlled both by the head of the CIA (through the Intelligence Community mechanism) by a civilian policy maker at Assistant Secretary level in the Pentagon, and by the Defense Secretary. All are Presidential appointees, confirmed by the Senate after careful hearings. It's not at all monolithic, and attempts to demonize the NSA or the Government, just because one doesn't understand what's going on are extremely wrong-headed. Having said that, I also agree that strong public scrutiny of current and proposed laws and regulations is essential to the democratic process, as is vigorous defense of civil rights. My own rule of thumb here is Mark Twain's old aphorism: "Trust everyone and always cut the cards." The U.S. is not the former USSR, and such comparisions are odious. Now to my story. This was told to me by my former boss, who was there. When Bernie Schriever was head of the Strategic Air Command, he was briefed on our nuclear war plans. The briefing was in a several-story high room, with enormous charts rolled down from the ceiling. During the briefing, he was shown targets, weapons assignments, damage assessments, etc. He asked: "What if the winds shift?" "Well, if that happens, x thousand Bulgarians, y thousand Hungarians, (etc.) will die." (Note--the quotes aren't exact.) Schriever replied "Any plan that causes the deaths of thousands of civilians in countries we aren't at war with is no plan at all." and sent them back to work. A second story: J. Edgar Hoover is generally demonized, especially by liberals. But a reading of the Congressional hearings about Nixon's COINTELPRO plan to use Gestapo-like intelligence tactics for domestic surveillance shows that the reason the "Houston Plan" wasn't adopted was that Hoover resisted it tooth and nail, and on Constitutional grounds. Whatever else he may have done, for that Hoover saved the Constitution and with respect to that particular issue he was a hero in my book. NIxon's people tried to use every device of the bureaucratic despot to thwart him. Despite threats, blandishments, offers of personal rewards, etc. Hoover put his body and that of the Bureau on the line on that one. (Note: those who really disliked Hoover have argued that it was a simple "turf" issue, but the record shows clearly that Hoover's concerns were Constitutional, not "turf." At one point the White House wanted the FBI to run the thing rather than the proposed Houston group, but Hoover rejected that out of hand.) My point is that the Government isn't monolithic, and that there are people in the decision-making apparatus that are concerned about the same issues as you and I, and in similar ways. Demonizing people and institutions doesn't add any light to these issues. Rational discussion does. David -- David Sternlight RIPEM Public Key on server -- Consider it an envelope for your e-mail
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Newsgroups: alt.security.ripem,sci.crypt Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!zaphod.mps.ohio-state.edu!usc!cs.utexas.edu!qt.cs.utexas.edu!yale.edu!spool.mu.edu!umn.edu!csus.edu!netcom.com!strnlght From: strnlght@netcom.com (David Sternlight) Subject: Re: RSAREF and RIPEM now available via anonymous FTP Message-ID: <1993Jan8.165638.12844@netcom.com> Organization: Netcom - Online Communication Services (408 241-9760 guest) References: <1993Jan07.205645.21688@convex.com> <1993Jan7.230612.12564@netcom.com> <1993Jan8.065938.6024@qualcomm.com> Date: Fri, 8 Jan 1993 16:56:38 GMT Lines: 121