🚀 go-pugleaf

In <4vlrs0$5fr$1@bushwire.mira.net.au> Mark Delany <markd@mira.net.au> writes:

>True. Furthermore they also send via third-party smtp servers.

I thought I mentioned that activity in my article. Anyway...

>[I write]
>>I think there are only 2 effective defences:

>Neither of which work if the mail has forged or bogus From: addresses
>and/or is sent from open 3rd-party mail servers.

The defences I talked about check the "From:" address on the message which
will be the same no matter through which SMTP server they bounced the mail,
so the defence is valid in that respect.

Use of bogus From: addresses will defeat the defence of course; they could
pretend to be any E-mail address they like. I guess they were just
considerate to send such easily-detectable messages. That's a joke, for
the humour-impaired.

Spammers are getting more sophisticated. At least, moneyworld is the
most so that I have seen.

>Of course forged headers are perfect for spam if your main goal is to
>get the recipient to read the body on the mail and click on a URL. The
>spammer doesn't need a reply mail, they don't even need to run an SMTP
>server - monyworld certainly weren't running one last time I looked.

Big spam causes a lot of hate mail which spammers don't want. They can
protect themselves from it reasonably easily.

One day a spammer will figure out that the Internet's hate mail can be
turned against itself. Like moneyworld the spammer will collect a
huge mailing list. Then they will randomise the addresses and turn
them into From: addresses on each message, causing recipients to
confuse the source of the messages. Everybody will be accusing everybody
else.

>>2. Have the mailer accept E-mail from that domain and silently bitbucket it.

>Any scheme you think up has to have wide-spread use to affect the
>moneyworlds of the world and, any such scheme is just as easy to work
>around.

Nah, I don't care whether the rest of the world filters them out effectively
so long as I can filter them out.

>The real answer requires technology and policy not (yet) available on the net.

In 2 words, cryptography and authentication. Since we can no longer trust
entities like IP addresses, TCP connections and mail From: addresses, we
need to add another level to the existing infrastructure which we can trust.

It will happen, eventually.

Nick.
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