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Article #310Re: Authorizing Address Space
From: Binyamin Dissen
Date: Mon, 05 Sep 2005 15:06
Date: Mon, 05 Sep 2005 15:06
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On Mon, 5 Sep 2005 10:46:21 -0700 Paul V DAngelo <essteam@juno.com> wrote: :>I have a client who would like me to develop a presentation on an :>Authorizing Address Space. :>I suggested simply writting an SVC that switches Authorizations instead :>of and address space. :>That Suggestion was fround upon. :>They are building this facility to alow Vendor Products and As well As :>IBM products :>to issues Authorized Services where I the Vendor does not usually/easily :>permit it. Such as? :>The customer would like to develop a cross memory environment; :>issue a Program Call Instruction form a vendor product address space to :>thecustomers :>Authorizing Server Address Space and allow the caller to be in :>Supervisor State key xx or APF Authorized. Why can't they simply APF authorize those programs that require it? :>I believe an SVC could be developed to accomplished this, but I suspect :>theres more to this that :>what they are telling me. Could be done as a PC as well. But...... :>My first question is when the Cross Memory Program is executed, it would :>Sets the APF Authorization bit :>and return. WHo IS in the APF state, The entire Calling Address Space or :>only the invoking TCB ? APF applies to a job step task. But........ :>Can anyone on the list speak to the pros vs cons of developing an :>Authorizing SVC :>against an Authorizing Address Space. It is usually very wrong to set APF from an uncontrolled environment (not loaded from APF authorized libraries). The service should be encapsulated. :>I also suspect that Some Security Checking would be done in this Address :>Space, :>since that was the first concept they had me explore. How will they verify an uncontrolled environment? -- Binyamin Dissen <bdissen@dissensoftware.com> http://www.dissensoftware.com Director, Dissen Software, Bar & Grill - Israel Should you use the mailblocks package and expect a response from me, you should preauthorize the dissensoftware.com domain. I very rarely bother responding to challenge/response systems, especially those from irresponsible companies.
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From: Binyamin Dissen <bdissen@dissensoftware.com>
Newsgroups: bit.listserv.asm370
Subject: Re: Authorizing Address Space
Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2005 18:06:12 +0300
Organization: DISSEN Software, Bar & Grill - Israel Ltd.
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