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Article #313Re: Authorizing Address Space
From: Binyamin Dissen
Date: Mon, 05 Sep 2005 16:05
Date: Mon, 05 Sep 2005 16:05
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4871 bytes
On Mon, 5 Sep 2005 11:22:18 -0700 Paul V DAngelo <essteam@juno.com> wrote: :>Some products do not allow Authorized Libraries or Functions. :>One that comes to mind is MQSeries on Z/os, MQ Does not allow Security :>Exits in :>a Channel Initizator to be Authorized. :>Having stated that, It was not disclosed to me what products or services :>they are talking about. :>I just happne to know About MQ. :>If the product does not allow An apf Authoried service to be used the :>installation :>needs to build there own environment, hence an Authorizing SVC. :>Customer may not be able to authorized there routines because the :>product exits be :>be in a Non Authorized State and the exit programs may loaded from a non :>authorized library. Then you use encapsulation. You code up the function that requires authorization and invoke it via PC or SVC. :>On Mon, 5 Sep 2005 18:06:12 +0300 Binyamin Dissen :><bdissen@dissensoftware.com> writes: :>> On Mon, 5 Sep 2005 10:46:21 -0700 Paul V DAngelo <essteam@juno.com> :>> wrote: :>> :>> :>I have a client who would like me to develop a presentation on an :>> :>Authorizing Address Space. :>> :>I suggested simply writting an SVC that switches Authorizations :>> instead :>> :>of and address space. :>> :>That Suggestion was fround upon. :>> :>They are building this facility to alow Vendor Products and As :>> well As :>> :>IBM products :>> :>to issues Authorized Services where I the Vendor does not :>> usually/easily :>> :>permit it. :>> :>> Such as? :>> :>> :>The customer would like to develop a cross memory environment; :>> :>issue a Program Call Instruction form a vendor product address :>> space to :>> :>thecustomers :>> :>Authorizing Server Address Space and allow the caller to be in :>> :>Supervisor State key xx or APF Authorized. :>> :>> Why can't they simply APF authorize those programs that require it? :>> :>> :>I believe an SVC could be developed to accomplished this, but I :>> suspect :>> :>theres more to this that :>> :>what they are telling me. :>> :>> Could be done as a PC as well. :>> :>> But...... :>> :>> :>My first question is when the Cross Memory Program is executed, :>> it would :>> :>Sets the APF Authorization bit :>> :>and return. WHo IS in the APF state, The entire Calling Address :>> Space or :>> :>only the invoking TCB ? :>> :>> APF applies to a job step task. :>> :>> But........ :>> :>> :>Can anyone on the list speak to the pros vs cons of developing an :>> :>Authorizing SVC :>> :>against an Authorizing Address Space. :>> :>> It is usually very wrong to set APF from an uncontrolled environment :>> (not :>> loaded from APF authorized libraries). :>> :>> The service should be encapsulated. :>> :>> :>I also suspect that Some Security Checking would be done in this :>> Address :>> :>Space, :>> :>since that was the first concept they had me explore. :>> :>> How will they verify an uncontrolled environment? -- Binyamin Dissen <bdissen@dissensoftware.com> http://www.dissensoftware.com Director, Dissen Software, Bar & Grill - Israel Should you use the mailblocks package and expect a response from me, you should preauthorize the dissensoftware.com domain. I very rarely bother responding to challenge/response systems, especially those from irresponsible companies.
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From: Binyamin Dissen <bdissen@dissensoftware.com>
Newsgroups: bit.listserv.asm370
Subject: Re: Authorizing Address Space
Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2005 19:05:11 +0300
Organization: DISSEN Software, Bar & Grill - Israel Ltd.
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