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Article #319Re: Authorizing Address Space
From: Binyamin Dissen
Date: Mon, 05 Sep 2005 17:05
Date: Mon, 05 Sep 2005 17:05
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3163 bytes
On Mon, 5 Sep 2005 12:51:09 -0400 "Edward E. Jaffe" <edjaffe@phoenixsoftware.com> wrote: :>Binyamin Dissen wrote: :>>If running as an SVC/PC, why? :>Why what? Make the other TCBs non-dispatchable? Of course, it depends on :>what you're doing. But, many authorized activities affect the entire :>address space. For example, setting/resetting bits in the JSCB (e.g., :>JSCBPASS), setting/resetting AX values, etc. Such changes in the address :>space should not be exposed to code that might be running in :>unauthorized TCBs. Managing the dispatchability of unauthorized TCBs is :>key to maintaining MVS integrity in such an environment. This is :>precisely what TSO/E does any time you run a program or command on the :>authorized "leg" of the TMP. (See bit TCBAREQ in TCBNDSP3.) I question whether anyone should be doing any of these functions, i.e., temporarily setting the AX or setting JSCBPASS, in such a routine. Can you give me a business case? The major reason TSO does it is because the client APF program will get control in key 8 and the unauthorized tasks would be able to manipulate the storage owned by the authorized task. -- Binyamin Dissen <bdissen@dissensoftware.com> http://www.dissensoftware.com Director, Dissen Software, Bar & Grill - Israel Should you use the mailblocks package and expect a response from me, you should preauthorize the dissensoftware.com domain. I very rarely bother responding to challenge/response systems, especially those from irresponsible companies.
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From: Binyamin Dissen <bdissen@dissensoftware.com>
Newsgroups: bit.listserv.asm370
Subject: Re: Authorizing Address Space
Date: Mon, 5 Sep 2005 20:05:00 +0300
Organization: DISSEN Software, Bar & Grill - Israel Ltd.
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