🚀 go-pugleaf

On Wed, 3 Dec 1997 13:59:36 -0500 Jason Seidel said:
>> > >I guess what I consider existential freedom to be is the embodiment of
>> > >agency. I.e., not only are we instruments that vibrate in response to
>> > >the contingencies of the environment, but that we have an ability to
>> > >internally reflect and choose. In other words, that there is an actual
>> > >ability to "will" the strengthening or weakening of response
>> > >contingencies by both internal reflection and the *choice* of
>> > >experiencing or repeating certain environmental relations.
>
>You responded:
>> You may believe it.  I may want to
>believe it. But we can't know this....Is this the way it REALLY is?  Who
>> knows.  This brings us to Skinner.  Since we cannot know this, it seems
>> like a good idea to begin by being as objective as possible in our
>> analysis.
>
But if free chioce is a pernicious illusion (explanatory fiction) then it may b
e a hindrence to living well.  When i noted that Skinner failed to appreciate t
he importance of constructed meanings for people I did not mean to imply that h
e was wrong in attempting to substitute his own language game.  I meant that he
 failed to appreciate how aversive his message was to the population at large.
 I think that his language game may be more beneficial than the ones based on "
selves" "will" and "individuals".  However, the process of changing the languag
e game is far more involved than just writing Walden 2 or demonstrating the eff
ectiveness of the technology.  However, that failure can be explained within Sk
inner's framework: change in a community of language (verbal behavior) can be a
versive to the members of that community.


>I think that one point of existentialism is to seek a world beyond
>actual contingencies. That by believing in possibilities, and acting on
>them, we cause the possibilities to exist rather than maintaining what
>the current contingencies are. In that way, behaviorism and cognitivism
>can be existential and humanistic theories. I think that this is why we
>don't necessarily have to be "objective as possible in our analysis." We
>can start from the patient's subjective experience (I'm not talking
>theoretically, but practically or clinically). How do they conceive of
>the contingencies? What do they want or need the contingencies to be? Do
>they have any *hope* for change? How can that hope be translated into
>action toward the goal and/or a new understanding and feeling about the
>experience? This is all done without reference to Kantian
>"things-in-themselves" or "objectivity" as most therapy (effective and
>ineffective) is.

I still think that we do more than unfold the horizon of our clients.  We do ma
ke value judgements and foster changes in belief systems.  Given that, I think
those changes should be made in reference to objective (in the weak sense descr
ibed in my prior post) standards.  Frequently this involves an accurate assessm
ent of what the actual contingencies are and convincing the client that these
are affecting their behavior.  I do think this has to be done without reference
 to "things in themselves" - Kant is still a modern philosopher and believes in
those sorts of things.  Moving into intersubjective philosophies we can have
an objectivity more valid than our individual subjectivities without having dir
ect contact with uncontaminated, pure reality.

>
>> Such a tactic would be the most
>> parsimonious because it can be documented.
>
>Chevy Geo Metros are "the most parsimonious" too. Do you want to drive
>one of those? I bet not. Occam's razor is a rule to do science by, not
>to live life by. I am arguing that science is not a method to live by or
>to understand human experience by, but a method to understand the world
>of objects and relationships between objects by.

The metro may be parsimoneous, which is one criterion for good theory, but is
it sufficient?  This is the other requirement.  If the Geo is, then the leather
 seats and CD player of existentialism are a pleasant luxury but superfluous.
(Obviously I'm not saying that existentialism feels good; any Becket play will
put that to rest.  But it does have this sense of luxury compared to behavioris
m.  Again, is that the way to evaluate theories?

>
>
>> I believe this now brings
>> us to the main reason why there are opposing camps.  Most do not
>> understand the others' theory.  Why?  Because they don't read it!
>
>I agree with this. But I'd also say that many people I've met who do
>align themselves with a camp haven't even carefully read *that* camp's
>literature!

Both points are true.  Likewise, many who are familiar with the opposit camp ar
e arguing against the writers from some time ago.  Many anti-positivists argue
against positive formulations of a generation or two back and vice versa.  It i
s difficult to keep current.

>> Furthermore, aside from being baseless, your argument implies that you
>> are not acknowledging the gravity and the power of the theory; that you
>> are making light of something you seem to not comprehend.
>
>What do you mean "baseless." On what base should my argument stand.
>Certainly not an objective base, since this is what I'm arguing against.
>I acknowledge both the gravity and power of a science of human behavior.
>That is why I'm so vigorously arguing against it as the Uber-theory. Not
>that order and quantification (etc.) aren't useful, but that other ways
>of approaching human experience are useful as well.

I think that getting out of the subject-object split would resolve this point a
s well.  Neither exist...


>
>  Given the unique historys of each individual organism (people
>> included), I am not clear why we should invoke this concept of
>> "thingness" into the equation.
>
>Because "thingness" is a prerequisite for any scientific practice!
>
>Jean said:
>Like has been mentioned before, his was a theory to describe what
>> was going on.  The data in accord with his theory is overwhelming.  If
>> you are looking for explanations, I am afraid you will be disappointed.
>
>The point of science is to explain or understand. Watson said the point
>of psychology is to control and predict behavior. Skinner's claim (if it
>is so) that he was only trying to describe, as if he was coming up with
>nothing more than a vocabulary and "let's stop there" is disingenuous.
>Isn't the point of Skinner's science of description to delimit behaviors
>as objects of scrutiny which can then be measured and predicted? From
>the attempt to measure and predict, we get causal explanations of what
>caused what to happen (i.e., "why"). Why else do science?
>
>> If you think Skinner was offering explanations, you need to read (or
>> re-read) the primary sources.
>
>Bosh, and likewise, poppycock.
>
>Jean said:
>> His work was very
>> influential in helping us to recognize how important our environment is
>> to our behavior.
>
>Sounds like "explanation" to me.

I would agree that Skinner has an epistemology and ontology despite his desire
to remain "theory-free".  Even if they remain implicit they are still there and
 can be identify through careful analysis.  Skinner's work is clearly about con
trol.  the alternate position is not defensible.  Indeed his reform emphasis is
 based on the notion that since we are already always controlled, then we shoul
d be sure that we  are controlled in ways that maximize societal benefit.  Wald
en Two is full of this sort of idea.

Ken
URI