🚀 go-pugleaf

[Martin Taylor 950302 13:00]
>Bill Powers (950203.1420 MST)
+Bill Leach 950301.20:30 EST

Me, quoted by Bill P.:
>      I infer from the rest of your posting that by "inference" you
>     imply perceptions at the program level only.
>
>     I'll go along with that if you want.  Doesn't matter to me how we
>     use the words, provided that we can use them in a mutually
>     understood manner.
>
>I don't really need to be humored.

I had no intention of doing so. Sorry if you took it that way.  I only
proposed to accept your terminology because it should ease discussion if
we had such an agreement.

>I think there is a serious point here that goes beyond word usage.

Your posting makes it clear that there is.  Let's try to generate a discussion
on that point.

I take "perception" to represent the output of a perceptual function.  But
"perception of" is something else again.  "Perception of" is an assertion by
an an outside agent (i.e. another perceptual system, whether in the same
hierarchy or another) whose input is not only the perceptual signal, but also
some aspect of the "real" world.  "Perception of" is a statement that some
perceptual signal correlates with some other perception of the real world.

So, I say that if I have a perceptual input function that most of the time
produces a high output when there is an apple in view, then I have a"perception
of" appleness.  But that's irrelevant to the perceptual function that
generates the "appleness" signal.  Those labels are applied from outside.
The same applies to the perceptual signal (if any) for "rottenness."  And
if I happen to have in my hierarchy a PIF that gives a strong output in
the presence of rotten apples, but not of rotten grapes, I claim that I
truly perceive a rotten apple--whether or not it is a scented plastic
imitation.  The facts of the real world are never known to me, but my
perceptions may change when new sensory data come available.  What I
perceive NOW is truly what I perceive.

And this is where I strongly disagree with Bill L., who seems to argue
that I cannot "perceive" anything that is not true in the real world:

+I have more than once 'hefted' a "wax apple" to discover that it was not
+a "real apple"... this is, it was not then perception which to me is
+"appleness".
+
+You in essence made Bill P.'s point in disagreeing with him.

In fact, I thought I was agreeing with him in all respects except for the
scope of the word "inference."  I think both Bill P. and I would at least
agree that whether we perceive something or not cannot be determined by
the facts of what exists in "reality."  Perception is an unknowable
transformation on reality (though it can be constrained).

Now, what should we understand by "inference?"  That's where the serious
discussion lies, because obviously the result of the inferencing process,
as well as much of what enters into that process, is perception.  But
a process that says "I perceive red. I perceive round. I perceive dark
small line protruding from round... Therefore I have an apple" is quite
different from perceiving an apple.

I can't pursue this now.  I have another meeting that started 3 minutes ago.

But it should perhaps be pursued.

Martin