🚀 go-pugleaf

[From Bruce Abbott (990502.1000 EST)]

>Bill Powers (990502.0326 MDT) --
>
>Bruce Abbott (990501.1330 EST)

>>In asserting that this implication is surprising, you have begged the
>>question of whether this is in fact an implication of Simon's statement.  In
>>fact it is not, and your assertion that it is, merely raises yet another
>>straw man for you to vanquish.

>I was trying to say something a little complicated and it may not have come
>out right. I'll try again.

O.K.

>If Simon's statement was as Fred Nickols quoted it:
>
>"Complex actions can reflect complexity in the acting entity's environment
>and do not necessarily reflect a corresponding complexity in the acting
>entity's internal organization."
>
>... with the "can" and "not necessarily", then the only way in which
>Simon's observation would introduce some new element would be for us to
>interpret it as meaning the apparent complexities of behavior DO represent
>ONLY complexities of the environment. Any other interpretation makes his
>insight banal.

To stave off further confusion about what Simon said, I've posted the
relevant portion of _The Sciences of the Artifical_.

>If we interpreted it to mean that some unknown fraction of the complexities
>of behavior reflect complexities in the environment, and the rest (how much
>also being unknown, of course) represent complexities inside the organism,
>the "insight" would fall rather flat, since it would then be essentially
>self-evident. "Some part of the complexities of behavior, from 0 to 100
>percent, reflects complexities in the environment." That's an insight?

I think you'll find that what Simon actually _did_ say is more interesting.

>>Simon stated that complexity in observed
>>behavior may reflect the complexity of the environment rather than
>>complexity in the organism.  There is nothing in that statement to imply
>>that _all_ complexities of behavior are due to environmental complexities,
>>and certainly the statement says nothing one way or another about whether or
>>not part or all of the observed behavior is or is not produced spontaneously
>>by the organism.
>
>The same thing applies to your way of putting it. When you say "may", you
>allow for the possibility "may not." I assume that you would not be
>claiming an insight for Simon if he were referring to the "may not"
>alternative. The only claim worth special attention would be a claim that
>the environment IS responsible for all or nearly all of the complexity. If
>he meant only that some unknown part of the complexity is due to the
>environment, between 0 and 100%, he wouldn't have been saying much.

Again, see Simon's actual writing.

>>Before we get "surprised" by an implication, be should first be careful to
>>establish that it actually _is_ an implication.
>
>That's what I am doing.

Yeah, but now is a little late.  You should have laid out your thinking in
your previous post rather than begging the question.

>>Second point:  In his little ant example, Simon assumed that the ant had and
>>maintained the goal of reaching its nest.  So at least with respect to that
>>variable, the reference was assumed to be fixed.

>>Third point:  References change for some reason.  If the ant temporarily
>>changes its heading reference as required to navigate around a pebble, that
>>change, which adds complexity to the ant's path, was necessitated by the
>>presence of the obstruction in the ant's path, and therefore can be
>>attributed to complexity (presence of obstructions) in the environment,
>>interacting with what may be a relatively simple organization within the
>>ant.

>Nothing external "necessitated" a change in the reference heading.

Oh, brother, here it comes.

>A lump
>of rock lying on the ground can't "necessitate" anything; it can't do
>anything at all but lie there.

Because the rock blocked the ant's path along its heading, it was necessary
for the ant to change its heading if the ant were to continue making
progress toward its nest.  That's what "necessitated" means, Bill.  Please
don't waste my time and everyone else's with silly arguments about my use of
words.  My meaning was plain enough; not only that, but I have caught you
using similar phrases in the past.  Let's stick to the real issues.

The change in path can't be attributed to
>"complexity." Complexity is not an agency, a variable, or a function: it's
>a subjective opinion in an observer. "Gee, that path looks complex."

Nobody said that the change in path was due to complexity.

>The real relationships involved are exact and quantitative, like all
>macroscopic physical relationships. As in the Crowd program, the paths
>taken by an ant are consequences of the behavior of control systems in the
>ant and any active disturbances in the environment. At any moment, the
>direction is determined by the momentary goals inside the ant and the
>momentary states of the ant's perceptions, the perceptions being affected
>equally by the ant's actions and the state of the environment. This seems
>to be a concise and accurate way of stating the PCT intepretation of
>observations.

Wonderful -- that's my view, too.  But the ant would not have to change
direction, despite all its control systems and controlled variables, were
there no barriers to its forward progress toward its nest.  The complexity
of its path resides in the multiplicity of barriers to its forward progress
-- that is, in the complexity of the environment.

>In this interpretation, we do not have "complexities" affecting
>"complexities." We don't have objects "necessitating" actions. All we have
>are relationships among variables. You're defending a superficial way of
>representing and understanding behavior as if it has some sort of
>scientific meaning.

See above.  This argument sound good on the surface, but it is based on a
purposful misinterpretation of my words.

>Why not attribute the change in reference heading equally to the ant? The
>ant could have changed its reference heading to the left, to the right, or
>not at all (it could have climbed over the obstacle without deviating to
>the left or right). One can argue that it is the ant's internal complexity
>that allows it to circumvent the simple passive obstacle. The "complexity"
>represented by A rock resting on the ground, it seems to me, is no greater
>than the "complexity" represented by an adjustment of six legs each with
>three or four degrees of freedom so as to turn the ant's body to propel it
>to the left, right, or over the rock while continuing to track the trail
>home (or however it gets there).

A single rock in the ant's path does not constitute complexity, nor does it
require much in the way of complexity in the ant's circuitry to handle the
ant's movements -- just a few simple ECUs.

>>Given the assumption that the ant is attempting to reach its nest, one
>>would not expect it to "spontaneously" reset this reference for no reason
>>and head off in another direction.

>That's begging the question, too, isn't it?

No.

>You'rew simply assuming that
>there are no spontaneous changes in the reference direction, and then
>deducing that any changes in direction of movement must be due to external
>forces, which is what you just assumed.

I never said that any changes in direction must be due to external "forces."
I thought I made my actual position clear in a previous post.

>If the ant's reference is to head
>home, it can't also "spontaneously" not have the goal of heading home. But
>of course if it's not bound by your assumption, it _can_ "spontaneously"
>head in some other direction. You're assuming that the reference does not
>change, and then using this assumption to "deduce" that environmental
>complexities must have caused any changes in path. The assumption that the
>reference direction doesn't change seems to imply that something can change
>the ant's direction of movement without the ant's changing the reference
>direction.

One can assume that the ant still has a reference for being in its nest,
even if it must temporarily reset its heading reference in order to navigate
around a pebble.

>In the Crowd program, apropos of this, the reference direction of movement
>is affected by error signals in the destination-seeking, obstacle-avoiding,
>and person-following control systems, simultaneously.

Yeah, that's what I noted myself in an earlier post.  Now you here introduce
it as if you think it will come as something of a surprise to me.

>How do you know an ant can have a reference level of "heading for the
>nest?" Its actual reference level might be "keep the ant-scent increasing."
>This trail could lead in a complex winding path back toward the nest, thus
>accounting for the ant's ending up at the nest without the ant's having any
>perception of "home" or a spatial direction toward home. The same winding
>path might produce the impression in the observer that the ant is avoiding
>obstacles, when in fact it is the trail that avoids obstacles. Or perhaps
>an "obstacle" is identified by the fact that the ant's path deviates when
>the ant nears some object, whereas when the path doesn't change, and the
>ant goes right over a similar object, the object is not recognized as an
>obstacle.

Irrelevant, for reasons given in a previous post.  I'm not going to continue
repeating myself.

>>A real ant may of course change its
>>heading because, for example, it chances upon an odor trail that it prefers
>>to follow, but Simon was presenting a simple example in order to make a
>>point about the fact that complexity of behavior need not result from a
>>complex organization of system, and in that context, introducing these other
>>possibilies that may distract the ant would serve only to muddy the point
>>the example was intended to illustrate.


>But his basic assumption is probably wrong. The "odor trail that it prefers
>to follow" (on the ground and airborne) probably IS the way home. The ant
>has no mysterious sense that can tell it where the nest, well over its
>horizon of visibility after a foot or so of travel, is, unless it can use
>stellar navigation, solar navigation, polarization of skylight, large
>landmarks like plants and trees, and so forth. It doesn't just magically
>know where the nest is.

Asked and answered.

>I have always found analyses like Simon's irritating, because they use
>terms with no particular definition and seem to imply relationships that
>exist without any particular mechanism. Words like "complexity" sound
>impressive, but don't actually mean anything useful. I'm reminded of
>Ashby's "Law of Requisite Variety" which, by the way, says that the
>"variety" of behavior must always _match_ the variety of the environment
>being controlled, and so contradicts Simon. Excuse me -- MAY contradict
>Simon, depending on whether we take the "may" or "may not" route.

Now that I've posted it, take a look at what Simon actually did say.  Maybe
you will find it more to your liking.

Regards,

Bruce