🚀 go-pugleaf

Here's the text of a speech by David Kennedy, Director of the
California State Dept. of Water Resources.  It's worth reading
through, as an antidote to the left-wing hysteria about an Auburn
Dam. 

				 Statement of
			  David N. Kennedy, Director
			Department of Water Resources
			     State of California
				  Before the
			    House Subcommittee on
		       Water Resources and Environment
			      February 28, 1996

Ten years ago this month, the capital city of California was only hours away
from unparalleled flood devastation. Just a couple of more inches of rain on
the already-saturated watershed would have resulted in higher releases from
Folsom Dam into the lower American River and would likely have caused a levee
failure that would have flooded adjacent homes, businesses, and schools to
depths of 10 feet or more. Many lives would have been lost, and damages would
have been in the billions of dollars.

Numerous studies have been done in the subsequent ten years. Three major
points -- that were not understood in 1986 -- are now clear:

1. THE AMERICAN RIVER IS BIGGER THAN WE THOUGHT
          Quite simply, the American River is a bigger river than was thought
          when Folsom Dam was constructed in the early 1950s. For example, the
          total amount of floodwater flowing into Folsom Reservoir during the
          peak six day inflow period of the 1986 flood was 160,000 acre-feet
          more than the reservoir was designed to handle. A 200-year storm
          would exceed the design capability by nearly 800,000 acre-feet over
          the same period.
2. OVERTOPPING THE LEVEES IS THE MAJOR RISK
          A large storm would put more water into the system than Folsom
          Reservoir and the downstream channel could handle. The extra water
          would overtop the levees and then erode a hole through which
          floodwater would pour onto the extensive area protected by the
          levees.
3. CATASTROPHIC LOSS OF LIFE AND BILLIONS IN PROPERTY DAMAGE WOULD RESULT FROM
LEVEE FAILURE
          The area lying below the levees covers over 100,000 acres and
          consists of more than 160,000 homes and structures, 400,000
          residents and $37 billion in developed property. If flood flows in
          the American River were to overtop a levee in the Sacramento urban
          area, the results would be devastating. Economic damage estimates
          range from $7 to $16 billion, with depths of flooding up to 20
          feet. Hundreds of public facilities, including schools, hospitals,
          care facilities, colleges, water treatment plants, electric utility
          substations, fire stations, police stations, government offices, and
          transportation systems would be damaged and disrupted. Because of a
          lack of warning time on the American River system, the nature of a
          levee break and the difficulty in evacuating residents, some deaths
          and many injuries would be expected. The near term and long-term
          disruption to the regional economy, public utilities, and government
          would be severe.
The central question before you today is not whether Sacramento needs
significantly higher flood protection as soon as possible, but rather "What is
the best means to achieve it?" After ten years of study by federal, State and
local agencies, the State of California has concluded that the solution is to
build a flood detention dam, which will provide 500-year protection for the
area's residents and property. This recommendation makes the most sense from
the perspectives of public safety, cost effectiveness, and environmental
considerations for the entire watershed.

To put this level of protection in perspective, it is worthwhile to consider
the Dutch experience, where their nation suffered enormous loss of life and
damage in the 1953 floods. Following that disaster, they resolved to do
"whatever it took" to keep such a disaster from happening again. Their minimum
standard for flood protection is now 1,200-year, with the level increasing to
3,000-years for the major rivers.

In the remainder of my testimony today, I will briefly describe what we have
been doing within the Sacramento region to address the flood threat --
particularly during the four years since our previous attempt to obtain
authorization for a flood control project. I will also discuss the reasons for
selecting the detention dam as the nonfederal sponsors' preferred plan;
explain why our recommendation changed from the 200-year dry dam in 1992 to
the 500-year dry dam; compare the proposed project to other flood control
projects, both existing and under construction; and relate to the recommended
plan "lessons learned" from the 1993 Midwest floods, the 1995 California
floods, and the recent flooding in Oregon. Before going further, however, it
is necessary to provide some background information.

Sacramento sits at the confluence of two major rivers, the Sacramento and the
American. The Sacramento River is the State's largest river, whose watershed
produces nearly one-half of all the runoff in Northern California. Lake
Shasta, located 310 river miles upstream of Sacramento, provides seasonally
reserved space to moderate flood flows on the Sacramento River. The American
River is the Sacramento River's second largest tributary. It drains a
watershed covering 2,100 square miles. In contrast to the Sacramento's
watershed, the American River watershed is relatively short and steep,
descending over 10,000 feet in about 100 miles before reaching a 110,000-acre
floodplain that covers much of urban Sacramento. Consequently, the flood
threats to this floodplain tend to arise quickly.
The American River currently has dedicated flood storage only in Folsom
Reservoir, which is situated on the doorstep of the floodplain immediately
east of urban Sacramento. Folsom is designed to release floodwaters at a
maximum rate of 115,000 cubic feet per second down a 23-mile floodway to the
American River's confluence with the Sacramento River. Over its last 11 miles,
the floodway narrows and is bounded by high earthen levees as the river
channel winds through a highly developed portion of the city.

When Folsom Dam was constructed by the Corps of Engineers in the 1950s, it was
believed to provide 250-year flood protection for the Sacramento area. Just 10
years ago, rainstorms in the watershed almost caused a flood of disastrous
proportions. The 1986 storm, in conjunction with other large storms which had
occurred over the previous 25 years, changed the hydrologic understanding of
the area. Reevaluations of hydrologic conditions within the watershed have now
documented that Folsom Reservoir affords only an 80-year level of flood
protection.

The realization of the high flood risk and the disastrous consequences of a
levee failure prompted local, State and federal agencies to study the problem
and to make plans to significantly increase Sacramento's level of flood
protection. Local entities did not just sit back and wait for the "long-term
fix," but have aggressively pursued a number of interim actions. Over the past
10 years, approximately $25 million has been expended for investigations and
$125 million has or will be spent on projects to improve flood protection for
the Sacramento region. The Sacramento Urban Area Levee Reconstruction Project
restored the structural integrity of over 30 miles of levees, cost shared
between the federal (Corps) and nonfederal (State and Sacramento Area Flood
Control Agency) cost-sharing partners. SAFCA has also implemented an interim
reoperation of Folsom Reservoir for more flood control space and projects to
raise levees in north and south Sacramento.

Following the February 1986 floods, a series of studies was conducted by the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, in cooperation with the State Reclamation Board
and SAFCA. They were designed to define the flood risks to the Sacramento
area, identify potential flood control measures, describe the most feasible
ones in detail, and define and present a flood control plan for the area.

The study sequence included a review of hydrologic data (1987), a Feasibility
Study (1988-1991), and a Supplemental Information Report (1992-1996). The
Supplemental Report was prepared to answer questions raised by Congress during
the 1992 authorization process, and reflects information and comments from
extensive review by both the public and government agencies. It is being
released this week for State and federal agency review.
The flood control alternatives described in the Supplemental Report were
developed by combining flood control measures from three categories: (1)
increasing outlet efficiency of Folsom Dam and Reservoir; (2) increasing flood
releases from Folsom Reservoir; and (3) increasing flood storage in the
American River Basin.

The Corps' economic analyses show the Detention Dam Plan yields the maximum
net economic benefit of all alternatives. It consequently was designated by
the Corps as the National Economic Development plan. The nonfederal
cost-sharing sponsors (SAFCA Board and The Reclamation Board) have likewise
identified the Detention Dam Plan as the locally preferred plan because:
    o The Detention Dam Plan significantly reduces the flood risk in
      Sacramento to a level commensurate with other large cities such as
      St. Louis and Kansas City.
    o It is the most cost effective and provides the highest level of economic
      benefit.
    o It can pass the Standard Project Flood (recognized as the standard for
      protection of urban areas, approximately a 225-year event on the
      American River) with about 95 percent reliability (as opposed to about
      63 percent reliability for the Stepped Release Plan).
    o It provides a high level of protection without additional dependence on
      the levee system, and thus is considered the safest and most reliable of
      the three alternatives.
    o It minimizes environmental impacts both upstream and downstream of the
      dam.

As part of Congress' 1992 direction to the Corps to reevaluate flood control
options for the American River Basin, the Secretary of the Army was directed
to solicit the views of the National Academy of Engineering with respect to
certain technical and policy issues. The NAE's findings included the following
points:
    o Confirmed the validity of the Corps' hydrologic analysis and
      assumptions.
    o Emphasized there is enough information to make a decision: the time is
      _now_ to proceed with a solution.
    o Agreed that the American River has more potential for flood runoff than
      anyone thought at the time Folsom Dam and Reservoir was built.
    o Pointed out uncertainty in data -- who knows if the _last_ 40 years
      (with more and bigger floods) might not be a truer picture of the
      average than the previous 40 years (the period of record used for
      designing Folsom Dam).
The proposed departure in 1992 from the NED plan (which was then estimated to
provide 400-year protection) to the 200-year locally preferred plan was an
attempt by nonfederal sponsors to find a compromise which would secure
environmental support and ensure authorization of a project. The planning
process which followed the failed attempt at authorization in 1992 included
taking a closer look at the range of alternatives available, as well as
seeking the advice of the NAE. This new analysis led the Corps, the State, and
SAFCA to conclude that the Detention Dam is the optimum plan for providing
flood protection.

It is worth noting that there is a striking parallel between the proposed
Flood Detention Dam Project on the American River and the Santa Ana Mainstem
Project in Southern California -- which was authorized in WRDA of 1986. Both
have similar sized watersheds draining toward floodplains of about 100,000
acres which are at extreme risk. The solutions for both include additional
peak flow detention capability and downstream channel work as key elements of
the projects. The total project cost for Santa Ana is $1.33 billion, and the
net annual benefits are about $50 million -- compared to $0.95 billion and $70
million, respectively, for the American River Project. Annual federal
appropriations for Santa Ana peaked at about $70 million this year, and that
Project is scheduled to be nearing completion at about the time the American
River Project would be entering the peak construction period -- if it is
authorized in 1996.

Some "lessons learned" from the 1993 Mississippi and Missouri River flooding
are to carefully assess what is at risk, and provide appropriate levels of
flood protection. While there were billions of dollars in damage spread over
nine states, the damage and loss of life would have been much higher had major
metropolitan areas such as St. Louis and Kansas City not had 500-year
protection for their downtown areas. Similarly, although early estimates of
flood damage in the Portland area range into the hundreds of millions, the
estimate for damages _prevented_ by flood control works on the Willamette
River are nearly $3 billion. That is the type of "return on investment" we
believe is appropriate for Sacramento.

One final point concerns operation and management of an Auburn Dam facility. I
understand Congressman Doolittle's authorization bill for the project will
include a provision that the project be turned over to the State for
management purposes. The Governor supports this provision, both because of his
desire -- first stated as part of the water policy framework of 1992 -- to
provide for an integrated water supply infrastructure, and to assure
management of project lands so as to maximize environmental values. The State
already owns and operates a number of large reservoirs and the Governor has
supported State management of the federal Central Valley Project.
-- 
"Nada burra la chamaca." A.G.
Opinions expressed are mine, not my employer or news host.
rfinch@toe.cs.berkeley.edu