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IBM�s Gluttony For Punishment With PCs


It certainly has not been a secret that International Business Machines has 
never had any faith in the personal computer.  Even when it was first released 
in 1981, IBM felt that these machines would never overshadow the mainstream 
mainframe operations that IBM has always dominated.  This would be only their 
first mistake.

The most basic PC in �81 would cost an average consumer $5000.00, which 
certainly didn�t make Commodore and Apple nervous of loosing any market share. 
 Even though it was touted as being the revolution business was waiting for, 
IBM itself didn�t buy in.  It was created with old technology from Intel on 
the 8088/8086 processor, and a cryptic operating system produced by a then 
small basement operation known as Microsoft, although Bill Gates has not been 
seen sending any big thank you cards in IBM�s direction.  If IBM believed that 
the PC would become such a commodity then, as it is today, the industry would 
sure look different.

Abandoning the specifications of ISA to the public domain, IBM went on their 
merry way to release the AT computer among many sprouting competitors.  The 
AT, based now on an Intel 80286 processor, was a service nightmare for IBM.  
Thousands of crashed CMS brand Hard Drives were dumped in the bay offshore 
from IBM�s Boca Raton research centre by disgruntled customers.

The decline would continue with the release of IBM�s PCjr.  A novel concept 
in computing technology - design a hamstrung machine that expands like an 
AS/400.  IBM would soon learn that their midrange concepts did not apply too 
well to the PC world (as infantile as it was).  The concept of a cordless 
infra red keyboard was exciting enough if you liked to type at the proper 
angle to have the holes line up with the infra red receiver.  This got harder 
as you moved further away from the machine.  IBM�s MCGA standard which was 
supported by maybe 3 or 4 software products and even found it�s way into the 
windows operating system later on, never got recognized as an achievement.  A 
full blown system would see the size of the box almost triple!  You could add 
side cars, top cars, even an undercar module.  Of course, some could only be 
used if other modules were present, and even had to be stacked in a certain 
order which never seemed to get mentioned in the instructions or the 
advertising.

Now IBM had a surge of brilliance to redeem it�s market from the �Clones� by 
releasing a brand new architecture know as MicroChannel.  Again IBM applied 
it�s mainframe background to design a more advanced architecture and forced us 
to look at the ugly blobs known and marketed as PS/2.  But this architecture 
was closed and patented.  The Cloners could not create a duplicate without 
paying licencing fees to Big Blue.  Even third party add on manufacturers had 
to pay to produce upgrade cards for the MicroChannel architecture.  This was a 
wonderful Idea other than they never took advantage of half of the great and 
exciting benefits in the MicroChannel architecture (not even with the OS/2 
operating system!!).  They also chose to use ESDI hard disk technology.  This 
is after IDE was practically chosen as an industry standard for PC machines.  
With IDE on the Market, who wants a revamped MFM/RLL based hard disk?  The 
least they could have done if they were scrounging around for expensive 
non-standard equipment to justify charging the ridiculous prices, was to go 
with SCSI.  SCSI was barely known to Macintosh users at this time.  Even today 
the enormous benefits of MCA, and it�s load balancing, and it�s superior 
bandwidth continue to go untapped.  The cloners were still smarter.  They 
combated MCA with a new public standard which was EISA.  That record didn�t 
get much play either, though they proved time again that EISA could beat MCA 
hands down performing day to day tasks.

IBM gave the breath of life to the Monolith we call Microsoft today 
(sometimes Microsquish, Muckrosift, Microslop, etc.).  Even when they had a 
chance to build a partnership to give IBM a share of the PC operating system 
market with OS/2, IBM blew that opportunity apart.  They did however keep the 
rights to OS/2 and have managed to create more marketing literature, 
advertisements, brochures, and presentations than any other product marketed 
in history to achieve only a nominal amount of sales.  And now IBM has it on 
the books to cancel the OS/2 operating system if major improvements in its 
market share are not seen soon.  They are also trying to produce the Taligent 
operating system jointly with Apple Computer to run on the PowerPC Platform 
(but we won�t see any of that until the end of �96).  IBM originally released 
the PowerPC workstations in summer of �94 (as part of the Risc6000 family).  
In November of �94, it was said that they would hold back the release of their 
PC level PowerPCs until the availability of the PowerPC version of OS/2, which 
was called for Q1 �95.  IBM really had egg on their faces when in late Q1, 
early Q2 �95, they released the higher end PC level PowerPC machines with no 
OS/2.  The PowerPC version of OS/2 is now expected sometime in Q1 of �96.  
Apple ran away with the PowerPC market after moving close to 400,000 units in 
Q4 of �94.  That is great for any PC manufacturer.

I do have to give IBM credit in one area of Computing, and that is the 
Notebook.  After many failed attempts at luggables, the ThinkPad was truly 
ingenious.  Why it took them 15 years to release the TrackPoint to the public 
(That is the number of years that it sat in a lab), I cannot say, but it is 
certainly one of the better mouse alternatives going on the market today.  Of 
course the supply of products has also been a problem for IBM.  This is 
another indication of their lack of commitment to the PC side of their 
business.  The 10.4 inch active matrix screens that IBM was so proud of, only 
had a yield of 1 usable screen for every 4 produced.  A 25% yield is certainly 
a far cry from IBM�s usual six sigma target for their own manufacturing 
plants.  Thus with a huge demand for ThinkPads, IBM could not deliver.  What 
made matters worse was that they forced the manufacturer of the screens to 
shut down production and re-engineer the process to double the yield.  For 
four months, IBM had only a trickle of screens until the process was complete. 
 Many of the potential buyers went to Toshiba and Compaq for their notebooks 
after waiting periods of up to 8 months for an IBM - even large corporate 
accounts were being turned away by IBM sales reps.  Early in �95 an earthquake 
leveled most of Kobe Japan.  You guessed it - that�s where the screen 
manufacturing plant was located.  While the plant only suffered minor damage 
and was off-line for less than two days, no shipments were able to go out from 
Kobe with any reliability for at least a month.  This caused a minor 
constraint on product availability.

Many People ask - �What about the PowerPC Notebooks?!?� - IBM has wanted to 
release PowerPC based Notebooks since early summer of �94.  However problems 
arose with internal politics.  It seems that the people responsible for 
notebooks were part of the Mobiles division.  The people designated to preside 
over the PowerPC chip within IBM was a group called PowerPartners.  While the 
Mobile people wanted to start designing a ThinkPad that would operate on the 
PowerPC, the PowerPartners group decided that they were the ones that should 
be in charge of such a project.  This internal conflict has never quite been 
resolved.

Compaq gained the Number one position for market share over IBM in late �94.  
This was done while broadcasting to IBM that they were going to take it.  In 
Mission statements from Compaq, they said that they wanted to have the largest 
market share.  In Spring of �94, a Compaq press release announced that their 
manufacturing was ramping up significantly.  In the late Summer of �94, 
another Compaq press release stated that they had significant overstock in 
most of their products.  IBM made a big statement in the fall of �94 with 
their new Aptiva model computers, which were actually multimedia versions of 
their PS/1 machines.  The machine won many awards, which IBM was not used to 
receiving for their desktop machines.  However, retailers were told around 
Mid-November that what they had in stock of the popular models was all that 
was left, and that more would not be available until Q1 �95.  Loving parents 
who wanted to have something under the tree spent the next month and a half 
flocking to Compaq.

I know that I have not mentioned much about the PS/1 series of computers; all 
that really needs to be said is that from �87 to �93, they were expensive and 
poorly equipped.  In most cases, a clone could be bought for half the price 
and provide twice the machine compared to an IBM PS/1.

It is painfully obvious that there is poor commitment on IBM�s part to jump 
with both feet into the PC industry.  They have been surrendering the lead to 
other companies throughout the past 15 years.  Even with Lou Gerstner trying 
to give IBM a cool image - with the dress down policy, the MTV advertisements 
that have a multicultural feel, 50,000 subscriptions for IBM managers to the 
famed Wired Magazine, and now the purchase of Lotus Development Corp. - IBM 
has not made the headway they have been looking for.  OS/2 is still failing 
despite the delays of Windows95. They still have mainframe focuses and 
concepts ruling the corporate structure.  Their entire structure is too bulky 
and cumbersome to produce timely decisions.  Divisionalizing and 
departmentalizing has made these problems worse (remember the 7 different 
logos used in early PS/2 equipment, because each department that designed a 
part of it had a different concept of which logo was better?).  Hopefully the 
influence of Big Blue will not crush the productive nature of Lotus, and it 
will be allowed to continue as a largely autonomous body.  Does the take over 
mean that they are becoming more serious about the PC side of their business?  
Maybe.  IBM is a major user of the Notes platform and may be looking for a way 
to get cheap licences, pick up a successful leading software product (which 
they have never had), and is trying more to secure a stake in the software 
world than hardware.  Meanwhile Lotus was desperate for an infusion of 
capital.  Thus there is potential for seriousness, but their track record is 
not encouraging.