🚀 go-pugleaf

Belgrade. June 3rd 1999

 Moral intervention 

 There should not have been any kind of war. This is not any kind 
of war. This is only an example of
 desperately good cooperation between local and international 
stupidity and insolence, and both sides
 have agreed to lie and pretend that this is a real war over 
Kosovo. What is real are the vast masses
 of Albanian refugees and the destruction of Serbia, but these are 
also the least important issue, for
 Milosevic as well as for Nato. 

 Milosevic accepts and endures the destruction of Serbia with as 
much calmness and serenity as Nato
 endures the refugee disaster which obviously flared up with the 
air strikes. Milosevic has already
 passed every test of brutality with flying colours many times, 
and proved that even the most massive
 suffering and destruction, Serb or non-Serb, leaves him perfectly 
stone cold. He knew, he must have
 been precisely informed about effect of the Nato air strikes and 
been pleased by the prospect. He
 realised that this would give him the opportunity to purify 
Kosovo more completely than any other
 course of action. While Nato is bombing Serbia to protect Kosovo 
Albanians, it doesn't take much to
 explain to Serb troops that all Albanians are enemies and that 
expulsion is the best and most humane
 thing to happen to them. Albanians are becoming a legitimate 
target for Milosevic, just as Nato
 considers Novi Sad's bridges, television studios, Milosevic's 
residence or various government offices
 as legitimate targets, while civilian casualties need not be 
mentioned. If the West failed in Bosnia, if it
 reacted too little or too late, this time it has obviously gone 
too far. This affair is too soon and to
 strong, badly explained, destructive but inefficient, that is to 
say totally counterproductive. Let us
 remember that the air strikes did not begin because of a 
humanitarian catastrophe, which did not
 actually exist at the time, but because Belgrade had rejected the 
plan defined in Rambouillet and
 Paris and because it had refused to invite Nato troops to come 
peacefully to Kosovo. That plan was
 perhaps optimal for both Serbs and Albanians: it was certainly 
much better than what they have at
 the moment, but it was in reality an ultimatum. The dictates were 
too obvious, everything came at a
 rush, pressure was of the essence, moderate Albanians were thrown 
out of the game, the West
 demanded that Kosovo Liberation Army representatives sign the 
agreement, at least formally, only to
 expose Milosevic to the threat of military intervention. It 
seemed that Americans and Britons had a
 terrible itch to begin raining down those bombs. 

 The initial idea of bombing as a way of forcing Milosevic to 
accept negotiations and the ultimatum
 was quickly replaced by a new goal, and subsequently a way to 
provide for the safe repatriation of
 refugees. It was later explained that Serbia had had Operation 
Horseshoe to expel the Kosovo
 Albanians, but in the beginning, both General Wesley Clark and 
the head of the Kosovo Verification
 Mission, General Walker, were claiming to be shocked and 
surprised by the size of the exodus. This
 means that they did not know of any plan, but Milosevic 
subsequently offered them humanitarian
 catastrophe as an excuse. 

 In any case, the refugees became, quite understandably, the 
central topic. Hideous scenes from the
 Macedonian camps flooded television screens, driving all other 
issues out of consideration. Those
 issues should have been considered earlier: once it began it was 
no longer important who had made
 what mistake at the beginning or who had not done what. The Nato 
intervention began to be
 regarded as some kind of punitive expedition and the only issue 
for the Western public was its
 inefficiency. Serbia was accorded the status and treatment of 
Nazi Germany. The issue of whether
 to deploy ground troops became a major moral dilemma, advocated 
by moralists and opposed mainly
 for pragmatic reasons. Spokesmen for Nato and the Pentagon 
usually have no difficulty in
 proclaiming anything the bombs hit as a legitimate military 
target. The routine regrets about civilian
 casualties are hardly necessary at all. Serbian citizens are 
regarded as being fantastically loyal to
 their Fuhrer and few remember their three months of 
demonstrations against the very same person. 

 Thus a picture has been assembled of intervention from the moral 
high ground, although it's not going
 particularly well and has certainly lasted much longer than 
envisaged, but nobody seriously questions
 the premise that Nato is some kind of Hand of God, meting out 
justice to the most notorious criminal
 in Europe. But given that we didn't want to lie on behalf of 
Milosevic or Serbian national interests,
 there's no reason for us to lie on behalf of Clinton, Blair, 
Nato, the Kosovo Liberation Army or
 Albanian interests. This means that we must admit that the image 
of moral intervention is not so
 simple as some Western broadcasters might make it seem. In fact 
this air campaign keeps presenting
 new and very serious moral dilemmas for which no one had been 
prepared. The West claims to have
 intervened quite unselfishly, in the name of humanity only and 
not in the interests of any particular
 country. The launching of military forces has always required a 
specific state reason, certainly selfish
 and rarely related to any morality. Both Milosevic and the KLA 
took up arms for the traditional
 reasons, waging war over territory, while the West interfered for 
reasons of morality, a preventive
 action. Throughout all this Nato is not aiming to give support to 
the KLA, nor is anyone offering
 anything more than autonomy to Albanians; no one wants to punish 
the Serbian people and even
 Milosevic himself is not officially a target. Perhaps the 
humanitarian situation has not been improved,
 the withdrawal of the verification mission and the beginning of 
the air campaign created the
 conditions for true catastrophe for the Kosovo Albanians, but 
still the Western officials can do
 nothing but keep proclaiming their good intentions and noble aims 
which, as it were, have turned into
 something quite different. 

 Of course we should be very suspicious when we hear politicians 
appealing to morality. I wouldn't
 like to compare Milosevic's moral profile to any of his Western 
colleagues, but neither do they seem
 to me people who communicate regularly with a Higher Force, 
although in this case they claim as
 much. Are there not some other and harsher attacks on their moral 
sensitivity around the globe at the
 moment? Didn't they miss the opportunity for moral intervention 
in Bosnia for years? Isn't the
 disaster of the Kurds comparable to that of the Albanians? At the 
time when the KLA leaders at
 Rambouillet were being promoted to responsible statesmen, the 
Kurdish leader Ocalan was
 kidnapped and extradited to Turkey with the assistance of Western 
intelligence services. However,
 the Lord is summoned as a regular guest on CNN only because of 
Kosovo, Milosevic and the
 Albanians. 

 The problem with this adventure of Nato's is that there are no 
other apparent reasons for it than the
 moral one. But as the consequences have turned out to be 
predictably catastrophic, I can only
 conclude that the Western leaders were less interested in local 
reasons and the Kosovo problem itself
 than they were in their own public. The discredited Clinton, for 
example, need just such a war as this,
 and had hoped for a better outcome. So once everything began to 
go wrong, Western leaders and
 media began to defend their moral intervention with a mountain of 
lies, as though infected by
 Slobodan Milosevic and his propaganda. 

 We have never seen the West in such a miserable role, and it must 
have astounded those few liberal
 and sober-minded people in Serbia who know that there is no other 
road than that towards Europe
 and the West. After this experience, the most difficult question 
will no longer be how to emulate the
 West, but why. Who could cope with such a ghastly question in a 
demolished country? Who could
 offer any sensible answer? With this kind of intervention Nato 
has gone a long way to rehabilitating
 Milosevic himself, which is no small feat, and worse still 
Milosevic stands a good chance of emerging
 from this undefeated. 

 Everything about this campaign has turned out to be wrong: the 
grasp of the problem, the setting of
 goals, the assessment of the situation and the methods applied. 
The air strikes have not only proved to
 be inadequate, but have themselves presented moral problems. 
Firstly, what kind of war morality is
 this when one side takes almost no risk of human casualties? Who 
can believe the sincerity of the
 Western leaders' grievances about the refugee disaster if the 
bombing proceeds under the completely
 racist premise that one American life is more valuable than a 
million Serbian or Albanian lives?
 Cruise missiles fire from far away are a direct reflection of 
disgust for the misfortune of the people
 on the ground, despite the expectation that the missiles should 
establish some moral order. 

 In addition to their enormous technical advantage, these bombs 
falling from the stratosphere relieve
 the other side of any respect for any concerns. 

 Milosevic is not inclined to respect concerns anyway, but if his 
army in Kosovo really uses Albanians
 as human shields, this doesn't even look like a major crime in 
these circumstances. Who can expect
 any army to agree to be sitting ducks for Nato missiles without 
trying to protect itself in any way. 

 Finally, Nato's regrets about civilian casualties are too 
frequently expressed. In this perfectly unfair
 war of technology against people, the targets really must be 
military and the precision absolute. Every
 civilian casualty in Serbia today looks much more innocent than 
it would if this were a traditional war
 with casualties on both sides. In addition, very few people are 
able to believe that Nato makes so
 many mistakes and that this is not a strategy of causing panic 
and a feeling of insecurity among the
 population. 

 Nato has already been morally defeated in this moral 
intervention. An official, albeit implicit,
 admission of that defeat is beginning to emerge as Nato cites its 
very credibility as the basic reason to
 continue bombing. Nato, they say, must not be defeated. The 
largest military alliance in history has
 gone to war for the first time. It is a war against an 
economically exhausted and otherwise
 underdeveloped country which has already been eaten away from 
within. And yet it has reached the
 point where Nato must not be defeated. It's as though they are 
saying yes, we've blown it, we
 shouldn't have got into this, but since we're here we have to win 
something. It is not to be permitted
 that someone like Milosevic emerges as winner. 

 As for me, I admit I'm horrified by such a possibility, but I can 
see that Nato deserves defeat. If
 Milosevic does emerge as winner, which looks quite probable, 
we'll wonder how we will be able to
 live in such a Serbia. If Nato, which represents the leading 
countries of the world still proclaims itself
 victor after all, we'll wonder what kind of world we live in. 
There can scarcely be a positive outcome.
 The damage appears universal and irreparable, no matter from 
where you look at it. From Pristina,
 from Tirana, from Skopje, Podgorica, Belgrade. Nor can we be 
happy that the war has turned out to
 be a mistake, both for Europe and America, although they are, 
formally, our enemies. All of us who
 have been touched by this war can now choose only whether we 
would prefer to be unhappy locally
 or globally. And what about post-war reconstruction? Let's not 
count our chickens before they hatch.

                                                                
Stojan Cerovic
                                                               
Vreme columnist
                                             this article was 
written for Rec magazine