Article View: comp.admin.policy
Article #89Re: Policy regarding Crack
From: Christopher Davis
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 1992 23:29
Date: Thu, 27 Aug 1992 23:29
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Wes> == Wes Morgan <morgan@ms.uky.edu>
First, I think we're in violent agreement, just talking past each other
a bit. My main point was that preventing Crack use on your systems
doesn't stop the Evil Ones from taking your file elsewhere (not
something I think you'd argue against ;-) and that to protect *your*
systems, the only real method is to protect your passwords through
proactive (npasswd, etc), reactive (Crack), and preventative (shadow)
methods.
Wes> Why, then, should our assistance be restricted to reactive
Wes> functions? If I can take steps to prevent potential problems
Wes> WITHOUT affecting my core mission (Engineering education, in my
Wes> case), why *shouldn't* I do so?
No reason at all.
Wes> I believe that I, as a sysadmin, have a certain obligation to the
Wes> other systems using our common network(s). Why should I allow my
Wes> system to be used as a 'forward base' from which to attack other
Wes> systems? Should I adopt an attitude such as "well, he's not
Wes> cracking MY password file, so I don't care"? If I found someone
Wes> attempting to crack the password file for kragar.eff.org, wouldn't
Wes> you want me to notify you? If so, why shouldn't I prevent it in
Wes> the first place, if such a goal is (relatively) attaniable?
I agree that preventing this behavior is important, just that it's not
sufficient. One of the rules on our systems is that using them to
attack other systems is prohibited, and certainly I'd notify you if I
found someone cracking your password file, as much as I'd like you to
notify me if someone were cracking one of mine.
Again, however, if they take it off to their quiet corner of the
computing world to crack it, neither of us will ever know, so it
behooves us to take advantage of various protective methods...
(Hopefully this thread will give some of the novice system
administrators you referred to in the sections I deleted a chance to
learn more about what they can do to protect their machines.)
--
Christopher Davis * ckd@eff.org * System Administrator, EFF * +1 617 864 0665
``Ed Gruberman, you fail to grasp Ti Kwan Leep.
Approach me that you might see.'' -- The Master
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Newsgroups: comp.admin.policy,alt.comp.acad-freedom.talk Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!cs.utexas.edu!usc!sol.ctr.columbia.edu!eff!ckd From: ckd@eff.org (Christopher Davis) Subject: Re: Policy regarding Crack In-Reply-To: morgan@ms.uky.edu's message of 27 Aug 92 15:58:13 GMT Message-ID: <CKD.92Aug27192908@loiosh.eff.org> Sender: usenet@eff.org (NNTP News Poster) Nntp-Posting-Host: loiosh.eff.org Organization: Electronic Frontier Foundation Tech Central References: <1992Aug26.170825.29391@m.cs.uiuc.edu> <1992Aug26.174017.1077@ms.uky.edu> <CKD.92Aug26221743@loiosh.eff.org> <1992Aug27.115813.28741@ms.uky.edu> Date: Thu, 27 Aug 1992 23:29:10 GMT Lines: 43