🚀 go-pugleaf

I have been following the discussion of free will vs. determinism, 
randomness vs. hidden order, etc., with some interest and I have a 
question for those involved.

Might these distinctions be a matter of degree rather than kind?

For instance, might free will be those actions for which the simplest
predictive model CAPABLE OF BEING RUN TO COMPLETION IN A TIME 
PROPORTIONATE TO THE SCALE OF ACTIVITY (busy beavers aren't acceptable
models for real phenomena!), requires an amount of information of
near the same magnitude as that contained in the system itself?

Might a pseudo-random sequence effectively achieve true randomality
if in addition to meeting all standard distribution criteria, its
period of repetition is beyond the capacity of the fastest available 
computing device running for a period comparable to the age of the
universe?

We exist in a finite domain which constrains both the rate at which
information propagates (relativity) and the accuracy with which any
object can be modeled (quantum mechanics).  In such a domain, there
are practical limits on computability far more severe than those
usually stipulated by Complexity Theorists.  The practical limitations
of physical systems may be sufficient to transform distinctions of
degree into usefully symbolizeable distinctions of kind.