🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <f6xk02b078qO01@amdahl.uts.amdahl.com> kp@amdahl.uts.amdahl.com (Ken Presting) writes:
|Here is the original argument under discussion:
|
|  1. Systems with an appropriate causal structure think.
|  2. Programs are a way of formally specifying causal structures.
|  3. Physical systems implement programs.
|  4. Physical systems which implement the appropriate program think.
|
|I have been arguing that this argument is unsound because (2) is false.
|By no means do I dispute the conclusion, though of course others would.

[quotes from David Chalmers and Marty Brilliant omitted]

|These objections seem to grant at least a part of my point - some of the
|characteristics of some causal systems cannot be specified by programs.

Since the essence of your point is the lack of infinite precision,
you could just as well say that the characteristics of some systems
cannot be perceived.  But you haven't given any reasons to suppose
that this prohibits intelligence or consciousness, only omniscience.

|then it must be shown that what is called "noise" is irrelevant to
|consciousness (or thinking).  Fluctuations that seem to be "noise" may
|have significant consequences in a chaotic system.

If I'm trying to choose between nearly-equally-preferred alternatives,
fluctuations may tip the balance, but IMO the "thought" aspect here
lies in the ability to evaluate utility reasonably well, not in the 
ability to evaluate it perfectly.  Internal and external
fluctuations also affect my ability to carry out my intentions, but that
doesn't [in itself!] make me unintelligent or non-conscious, just
not omnipotent.

|It's not enough to do fast and accurate calculations; the calculations
|must remain fast no matter how accurate the simulation has to be.  Every

This seems to imply that speed can make the difference between
thought and non-thought, but none of your points 1-4 mention speed. 

-David West     dhw@iti.org