🚀 go-pugleaf

From article <16577@megaron.cs.arizona.edu>, by mike@cs.arizona.edu (Mike Coffin):
>...  They point out that Searle's "axiom" that syntax cannot
>give rise to semantics is (a) not at all obvious and (b) begs the
>question.  Searle's only response to this is that it's "true by
>definition" (what definition?) or "rather obvious" (to whom?). ...

Perhaps he has more of a response than that.  He has an argument
that seems to be intended to bear on this point, which begins:
"As with any logical truth, one can quickly see that it is true,
because one gets inconsistencies if one tries to imagine the
converse."  However, there appear to be no inconsistencies
exhibited in what follows this.  There are also some tricky
shifts in wording involved: sometimes the disputed relation
between syntax and semantics is "constitutive of" and sometimes
just "is".
				Greg, lee@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu