🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <GILHAM.90Jan5103910@cassius.csl.sri.com>, gilham@csl.sri.com (Fred
Gilham) writes:

> If one claims that the ``system'' somehow understands Chinese, Searle
> says that you can do away with the books and paper, and memorize the
> rules.  The person doing the manipulation will still not understand
> Chinese, and there is no other physical entity left to be a candidate
               ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> for understanding.
  ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

I may be departing from the orthodox strong AI position for saying
this, but it seems to me that it is not *physical entities* that can be
said to understand or not to understand, but *running programs*. Since a
program has to run on some physical entity, such as a brain, or a
computer, then you may wonder what difference does it make whether one
associates an understanding mind with the physical entity or with the
running program. Well, the biggest difference is that there may be
more than one mind associated with a single physical entity. I don't
see how Searle's tactic of doing away with the books and paper and
memorizing the rules himself changes anything; there are still two
programs running: the one hard-wired into Searle's brain, which of
course doesn't understand, and the one programmed into the rules he
memorized, which may or may not understand.

In order for Searle's argument against the systems reply to have any
force, he needs to show that it is impossible for more than one system
(candidate for understanding, as you put it) to be associated with a
given physical entity. He seems to take the one-to-one correspondence
between minds and physical entities for granted, although it is certainly
not obvious to me.

Daryl McCullough
The Crux of the Bisquit is the Apostrophe