🚀 go-pugleaf

I can't believe (actually I can; we're people) the number of times the
word 'understand(s)' has appeared in articles in this and related
threads in the context of "this/that/theotherthing does/doesnot
UNDERSTAND" without any two people having the same idea of what it means
to understand. There are a handful of people arguing a handful of
different points with a handful of different ideas of what it is to
understand. This is why definitions are usually provided at the
beginnings of discussions like this (presumably in the article that
starts it all)--so just this sort of thing doesn't happen.

It was pointed out that Searle is just going by his intuitive idea of
what we mean when we say we 'understand'. But WE DON'T ALL MEAN EXACTLY
THE SAME THING. I can't believe anyone out there actually thinks that
the word 'understand' isn't open for a fair amount of interpretation.
But we're all giving it our own interpretation, especially the two
groups in the two sides of the argument.

We need a definition for 'understand'. I realize that you can't define
everything exactly. But if we can't get an exact definition, we at least
need features or characteristics. In other words, we need things which
provide a test for understanding. (One was suggested a while ago, but it
doesn't satisfy the purpose I'm suggesting it for:) We need to agree on
what type of behavior we can label as behavior which identifies
understanding because then we can discuss whether or not such and such a
system will produce this behavior. OTHERWISE, WE ARE ARGUING AT AN
IMPASSE.

Recently, the argument was rephrased slightly:

In article <GILHAM.90Jan6100241@cassius.csl.sri.com> gilham@csl.sri.com (Fred Gilham) writes:
>You mention three processes:  1) what AI programs do, 2) algorithmic
>computing, and 3) human thinking.  However, there are at most two
>distinct processes here.  That is, AI programs + hardware + some
>intelligent being to interpret the results = algorithmic computing.
>This is a basic concept.  There are no programs that run on computers
>that are not algorithmic.
>
>The question is whether 2 and 3 are equivalent.  The strong AI
>position is that they are.  It claims that if a computer system could
>pass the Turing test, it would be doing 3 by doing 2.  Searle's
>argument says that if he himself could pass the Turing test with a
>system composed of rules in books, he would know that he is still not
>doing 3.  If he is not, then what is?  Because his procedure with the

The strong AI position is actually a little more general (as I
understand it) because 2 can do 3, but might also be able to do things
which 3 can't.

"he would know that he is still not doing 3." WHAT?!?!

How in the world does he know what 3 is?! If he knows what 3 (human
thinking) is, then why doesn't he publish a book and we can give all the
psychologists in the world something else to do!

-Karl		kpfleger@phoenix.princeton.edu
		kpfleger@pucc