🚀 go-pugleaf

"If a tree falls in the forest and nobody hears it, does it
make a sound ?"

No.

It seems that the debate over Searle's article and definitions of
"understanding" is revolving around the various positions one can
take on the above question.

Some are arguing that "understanding" is a *property* of a system.
Clearly "making a sound" is not a *property* of the (falling) tree.
It is a property of the *interaction* of the falling-tree-system
with the external frame (physical world) in which it is embedded.

"Understanding" also is an interaction with the understanding-system
and an external frame in which it is embedded (or considered embedded
for analysis purposes).

It seems possible then, to come to two conclusions about "understanding"
similar to the two conlusions about the tree.

(A) understanding is some "independent" pattern (of outputs or behavior)
projected onto the external frame. or

(B) understanding is a *relation* between the understanding-system and
an *observing* system, described in the external frame.

Taking view A leads one to say "Yes" to the tree question and
accept that a Turing-like test could be a legitimate test for
understanding.

Taking view B leads one to say "No" to the tree question and to
hold that any definition of "understanding" must include, explicitly,
the *observer* and the external frame in which the two systems are
embedded and in which the relation (understanding) is being defined.

Do people really believe that "understanding" can be defined without
reference to things *external* to the system (i.e. external frame of
reference and an observing system) ??

David.