🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <2602@cunixc.cc.columbia.edu> pnf@cunixa.cc.columbia.edu (Paul N Fahn) writes:
>In the recent article, the man in the Chinese room is Searle himself.
>One of his conclusions is that after being in the Chinese room, he still
>does not understand Chinese. He gives no arguments to support this 
>conclusion, but simply states it.

I suspect Searle feels no argument is needed.  I tend to agree.  I'm
pretty sure that if I were running the Chinese room I wouldn't
understand Chinese, at least not right away.  But if I eventually
managed to understand it, it wouldn't be just because I followed the
instructions in the book.  I'd have to try to figure it out somehow.
And I don't think even that would be possible.  How would I ever know
that some Chinese symbol meant "tree", for example?  [I think this
is why some people think giving the room a camera and so on might
make a big difference.]

>                                   Putting himself in the room is unfair
>because it puts Searle in an authoritative position to state what is
>or isn't being "understood". Anyone else trying to argue that perhaps
>the man does in fact understand Chinese is put at a structural dis-
>advantage because no one would know better than Searle himself whether
>or not he understands Chinese.

I think you've hit on a clever argument, but I don't think it really
works.  I don't think the appeal of the C.R. argument depends on
Searle being an authority about himself (and you don't seem to think
so either, as you say below).  Strictly speaking, there may be a
logical dependency on the person in the room being Searle, because
Searle does after all say it that way.  [Doesn't he?  I haven't
looked at it for a while.]  But the Room's not worth much if it
shows something only about Searle, and I don't think anyone who
finds the C.R. convincing interprets it that way.

>  I could just as easily say that I am in the Chinese room and that 
>after a period of time I do indeed understand Chinese. How could Searle 
>argue and tell me I don't? He would rightfully claim that my argument 
>is unfair.

Well, if you said "I would understand Chinese", I'd think you were
just wrong, for the reasons I indicated above.  Just following the
instructions wouldn't cause you to understand Chinese.  You'd have to
at least do some extra work trying to figure things out.

>Let's say Searle uses a third-person man in the room. He still states
>that the man does not understand Chinese after being in the room and
>therefore, computers cannot understand. The (unstated) appeal of the
>argument is "pretend you are in the room following the rules. you
>wouldn't understand Chinese, right?". 

Just so.

>                                       He is basically asking people to
>try to identify with a computer cpu and then conclude non-understanding.
>He doesn't state the argument this way because it is not a sound logical
>argument.

Well, there are some other parts to the argument which amount to
saying that if there's understanding anywhere it has to be in the
person.  In any case, whether it's a sound logical argument is one of
the issues in question, isn't it?  You seem to be saying that it's
sound if Searle is the person in the room and not otherwise.  But your
interpretation for making it sound also makes it trivial, and we're
still left with the question of whether the non-trivial version is
correct.  I don't think anyone agrees with Searle because they agree
with the trivial version or because they think "well, Searle would
know whether or not Searle would understand."

>The way the Chinese room problem *should* be presented is as an experiment:
>  Take a man who doesn't understand Chinese and put him in a room with all
>the necessary rules. Let him execute the rules, answering written questions
>put him by Chinese speakers. After two years we, the experimenters, gather
>our results: does the man understand Chinese?

That wouldn't be right, because the man could do arbitrary things in
the room, not just execute the instructions.  Nonetheless, I think
it's pretty clear the man would not understand Chinese.  If you think
the man might be able to translate Chinese to English or to explain in
English (or whatever his native language is) what someone said in
Chinese, a much better test than asking him to reply to Chinese in
Chinese, I'd like to hear any argument that makes that seem even
remotely plausible.

>  We can argue about the answer, and try to devise criteria which, if 
>satisfied, would convince us that he does or does not understand Chinese.
>This is the point of the Turing test.

The point of the Turing Test is not to answer whether a computer does
or does not understand but rather to substitute a different question
which we may find good enough.  That is, the whole point is to avoid
having to deal with the philosophical confusions, errors, and
prejudices that might otherwise come up.  But for anyone who cares
about anything other than the external behavior that can be
transmitted by typing, the TT isn't good enough.

>Searle however, simply states the results of the experiment as if it were a
>premise: the man does not understand Chinese. He is in fact using circular
>reasoning: because he does not understand Chinese, syntax is not enough to
>get semantics. But what is his reason for concluding the man does not 
>understand Chinese? simply his prior conviction that syntax is not enough 
>for semantics.

I conclude that the man in the Room, whether it's Searle or me or
anyone else who doesn't already understand Chinese, wouldn't
understand Chinese.  Well, I've tried to say something about that
above.  I don't have any conviction, prior or otherwise, that
syntax is not enough for semantics, so I don't think I'm using
one to reach my conclusion.  I don't think Searle is using that
either.

Ok, there isn't a logical argument here, but I don't think one's
necessary at this point.  Where the argument comes in is in trying
to show that if the person doesn't understand there isn't any
understanding going on at all.

>The need for an external test (Turing or otherwise) is due to the fact that
>we cannot directly know the man's internal mental state. While admitting 
>that the man passes the Turing test, Searle does not present some other 
>test which the man fails to pass. If Searle thinks that the Turing test 
>is inadequate, let him devise another and argue why the man would fail 
>this "better" test. "pretend you're the man" is not an adequate test.

I don't think we know enough to devise a good test for understanding
(in general) at this point.  However, if you want a test that the man
in the room would fail to pass, it's this: translate some Chinese into
English.  That's a variation of the TT, but it's not the variation
the Room is assumed to be able to pass.  Unfortunately, we can't do
the same sort of thing to see whether the man understands English
(or whatever the last language we got to is), and we can't do it
for the Room as a whole, because the room's supposed to understand
only Chinese.  So it doesn't really answer the basic question about
understanding.

>Basically, Searle's argument comes down to: "Pretend you're a 
>computer. Do you understand Chinese?"  

I think you're right here, more or less.

>Let us look at Searle's recent twist to the problem: the man memorizes
>the rules and answers Chinese questions in public. We the experimenters
>watch him do this for two years and then must decide whether he 
>understands Chinese. A lot of people would conclude that he does indeed
>understand Chinese, even if they "knew" that he was following rules.

No they wouldn't, because they'd sooner or later ask him to restate
some Chinese in another language.  Besides, you're assuming that a
lot of people would accept a Turing Test as adequate.  That's begging
the question as far as the C.R. is concerned.  Searle takes passing
the TT as an assumption and then aims to so that -- even so -- there's
no understanding.  Whether that's wrong -- whether there must be
understanding whenever the TT is passed -- can't just be assumed.