🚀 go-pugleaf

kp@uts.amdahl.com (Ken Presting) writes:

>The divergence of the model from the real system means that for any
>person, at any time, the model would diverge significantly from that
>person's states (assuming that the brain is significantly chaotic, for the
>purpose of discussion).  So it's not just that the numerical model can't
>simulate me or you, it can't simulate *anybody*, *ever*.  So if we want to
>claim that the simulation is close enough to brain function to be
>simulated thought, then we have to show that the chaotic aspects of brain
>function are inessential to thought.

However, if the brain is sufficiently chaotic, we would have to assume that
a "perfect duplicate" (such as might come out of a matter duplicator) would
immediately diverge from the original.  I fail to see how that matters.
Would the duplicate therefore not be thinking?  Would he/she not be the
same as the original?  I suspect the answer to the first question is no,
for the duplicate would still function in the same manner as the original,
who, we can only assume, thinks.  I also suspect that the answer to the
second is no.  The duplicate would cease being the same as the original at
the point of duplication.  They would be substantially the same, to be
sure, but start to differ almost immediately.

I don't feel that the issue is the simulation of any given personality, but
rather whether a simulation could have thought processes as close to yours
as yours are to mine.

- Scott
------------------------------
Scott Hankin  (hankin@osf.org)
Open Software Foundation