🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <d74702yL871701@amdahl.uts.amdahl.com> kp@amdahl.uts.amdahl.com (Ken Presting) writes:

>Searle has carefully separated the CR example from the rest of his
>argument about AI, and I want to follow him in that.  The CR does a great
>job of splitting out one human capacity from the rest of thinking.  Searle
>wants to focus on learning meanings...

I think this is one of the places where Searle goes seriously wrong. 
"Meanings" have no meaning outside the context of consciousness in general.

To illustrate, let's consider the question of whether an air traffic control
computer understands the meaning of the word "airplane". Certainly, we
wouldn't say it understood "airplane" if it, say, issued instructions to
pilots that would make sense only on the assumption that airplanes can
fly under water. But, asks the skeptic, even if it does a wonderfull job
of air traffic control, does it really understand the word "airplane"?

The answer is: Who cares? If turning over air traffic control to the computer
reduces the number of accidents, I (and I presume everyone else) am all in 
favour of doing so. Debating whether the computer understands the word
"airplane" is something best left to those incapable of doing anything useful 
with their time.

Now consider a computer that is said to understand the words "love", "fear",
and "courage". It is clear to me that any entity that truely understands
these words has the moral status of a "person". Conversely, I would not
consider any entity to have such moral status if it didn't understand, to
at least some degree, at least some such concepts. [ I will ignore here 
the problem of entities that are, perhaps, only embryonic or degenerate
persons, such as babies and the severly demented. ] 

Given this, it is perverse to discuss in isolation the question of whether
the computer really understands "love", "fear", or "courage". The answer
hinges on the whole question of whether the computer is a person, a question
which we will answer in accord with our empathic sense. I will believe the
computer is a person, and understands those important words, if and only if 
I recognize in it the essential attributes that make my own life valuable.

Unlike the question of whether the air traffic control computer understands
"airplane", this question has real implications - a computer that is a 
person has the moral rights and responsibilities of a person, with all that 
implies for our actions. I don't think this question can be answered by
sort of debate that accompanies the Chinese Room Problem.

    Radford Neal