🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <90Feb12.205915est.10612@ephemeral.ai.toronto.edu> radford@ai.toronto.edu (Radford Neal) writes:
>In article <d74702yL871701@amdahl.uts.amdahl.com> kp@amdahl.uts.amdahl.com (Ken Presting) writes:
>
>>Searle has carefully separated the CR example from the rest of his
>>argument about AI, and I want to follow him in that.  The CR does a great
>>job of splitting out one human capacity from the rest of thinking.  Searle
>>wants to focus on learning meanings...
>
>I think this is one of the places where Searle goes seriously wrong. 
>"Meanings" have no meaning outside the context of consciousness in general.
>
>To illustrate, let's consider the question of whether an air traffic control
>computer understands the meaning of the word "airplane".  . . .
>
>The answer is: Who cares? . . .

Agreed.  Of course, an air traffic control computer does not have to be
conscious to work well.


>Now consider a computer that is said to understand the words "love", "fear",
>and "courage". It is clear to me that any entity that truely understands
>these words has the moral status of a "person". Conversely, I would not
>consider any entity to have such moral status if it didn't understand, to
>at least some degree, at least some such concepts.

I think you are on the right track here, but I would put more emphasis on
concepts such as "promise", "truth", "due process", and a lot of others.
In general, the question "What qualities require that we grant human
rights to an organism" is high on my list of important philosphical issues
related to AI.

>Given this, it is perverse to discuss in isolation the question of whether
>the computer really understands "love", "fear", or "courage". The answer
>hinges on the whole question of whether the computer is a person, a question
>which we will answer in accord with our empathic sense. I will believe the
                                         ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>computer is a person, and understands those important words, if and only if 
>I recognize in it the essential attributes that make my own life valuable.

I disagree strongly on this point.  I don't believe there is any such
"sense", although I would grant that there are emotions which do a similar
job.  These emotions are very important, but I think we are going to need
rational grounds to make judgments such as who or what has human rights.
I wouldn't trust my, your, or anybody else's emotions on these questions.

>Unlike the question of whether the air traffic control computer understands
>"airplane", this question has real implications - a computer that is a 
>person has the moral rights and responsibilities of a person, with all that 
>implies for our actions. I don't think this question can be answered by
>sort of debate that accompanies the Chinese Room Problem.

Well, here we are discussing that very question in regard to the Chinese
Room!  I'm glad you brought it up.

Here is why I think the Chinese Room is a valuable contribution to AI.
Turing's test isolated conversation from all the other forms of human
behavior, and allowed AI research to concentrate its attention.  It did
not *force* researchers to concentrate on language, of course - that
would have been stupid.  Searle's Chinese Room allows us to focus even
more clearly on one aspect of human language use.  Again, it does not
force anybody to do anything, and is not intended to do so.  Humans not
only can pronounce words and respond to words, they can also understand.
Perhaps you will agree that those who state problems also contribute to
a project, though not always as significantly as those who solve the
problems.

You have pointed out that the ability to understand certain words may be
necessary if moral standing is to be granted to computers.  Searle has
argued that it is impossible for computers to understand any words at all.
I have argued that programs can contain enough information to allow for
understanding, which does not solve Searle's problem.  But is does show
that Searle has not proved the problem unsolvable.