🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <11965@venera.isi.edu> smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu.UUCP (Stephen Smoliar) writes:
>In article <a6UG02ww89FI01@amdahl.uts.amdahl.com> kp@amdahl.uts.amdahl.com (Ken
>Presting) writes:
>>
>>I would deny that the interrelationship of semantics with more general
>>cognitive features makes it either impossible or unproductive to define
>>semantics in isolation from the rest of cognition.  I see the situation
>>of semantics as similar to knowledge representation, motor control, or
>>syntactic competence.  We should analyze them separately at first, then
>>consider the interfaces, and proceed from there to a full system.  It's
>>OK, of course, to work in parallel on all these, just don't rule out the
>>serial approach.
>>
>The impression I get is that your fundamental concern is with employing
>appropriate forms of symbol systems as abstractions for natural systems.
> . . .   This is, essentialy,
>a good, healthy, modular approach to software development.
>
> . . . I am prepared to argue that we are still so far from
>implementing intelligent behavior that any attempt to approach it in
>terms of modules . . . MAY . . .  mislead us.

No need to argue!  I think we are so far from implementing intelligent
behavior that every attempt to date *has* misled us.  Some have been led
out of the field altogether, by what I consider the most impressive
implementations.  :-(

I have no disagreement at all with your cautions on the implementation
of semantics.  Staying with the software cycle metaphor, I would
say I confine my attention to application analysis rather than design,
if you will grant that "application analysis" in the context of AI
includes the philosophy of mind and language.  In this context, formal
semantics has the indispensable function of precisely specifying some
of the information we'll want in the eventual application.

There is also a role for formal semantics in the "software verification"
phase, although the role is indirect.  Some significant portions of
human behavior are typically explained by claiming that the person in
question understands a language.  We need to pay some attention to
the definition of 'understanding' and devising "test cases" which will
evoke behavior from a computer which are difficult to explain *without*
admitting that the computer understands.  My rough defintion of
'understanding' as 'knowledge of semantics' is intended as an effort in
this direction.  I doubt that this definition is complete, but it's a
reasonable first approximation.

Let me now return to the Chinese Room.  I think that Searle's arguments
show *nothing* about the limitations of so-called symbolic or algorithmic
processing.  Personally, I find it difficult to distinguish (on any
philosophical grounds) between algorithmic and any other kind of
processing.  The Differential Analyser was not only analog, but also
mechanical, yet its input graph is one commonplace notation for specifying
a function.  On the other hand, I find it amusing to imagine a plugboard
as an expression in a formal syntax, yet that was a preferred technique
for programming the early digital machines (such as ENIAC).

However, once the CR is extricated from its context in Searle's argument,
I find that a fascinating conclusion can be drawn from it:  It is
possible for a Turing test to be passed by a computer, without thereby
evoking behavior which demonstrates understanding.  Now, to accomplish
this astonishing feat of incompetence in test methodology, it is necessary
to empty one's mind of all daily experience and ascend to refined heights
of art and philosophy.  But it is possible.  Just don't ask the machine
about the weather, or any other real, contemporary event.

This conclusion is probably not revelatory to many here, but it should not
be overlooked.  If the formal view of semantics is useful in getting
something of value out of the Chinese Room debate, then it is a
remarkable tool indeed ...

I have attempted here (and in previous posts) to show that understanding
is a legitimate design goal for AI, and that objective tests can be
relevant to establishing the presence or absence of understanding.  The
CR shows the negative case, the positive case is admittedly more
difficult.  I would be very interested to hear any disagreements.