🚀 go-pugleaf

Hwa Jin Bae has written on Descartes; another and I have tried to correct
some of his misunderstandings.  This is my final contribution to the 
exchange.  M. Bae states that the discussion is becoming too philosophically
oriented for this group, if so, I apologize for wasting the readers' time.
The general problem is that M. Bae lacks an understanding of Descartes'
work and refuses to believe that others may be correct or have a better
grasp of Descartes.

In article <861@wrs.wrs.com>, hwajin@wrs.wrs.com (Hwa Jin Bae) writes:
> In article <14319@s.ms.uky.edu> rshelby@ms.uky.edu (Richard Shelby) writes:
> >This is definitely not Descartes' view; Descartes continually insisted
> >that the non-physical is simple and indivisible, hence cannot be broken
> >into parts (whether corresponding to physical parts or not).  
> Where did this point come up?  In any case, as irrelevant as it is to

The point came up because you said that Descartes searched for parts
of the mind analgous to parts of physical objects.

> our discussion, Descartes did argue that mind is non-physical and 
> thus served as a token of his existence -- he actually doubted

Mind did not serve as a token of his existence; it *is* his existence.

> the existence of all physical objects, but was unable to doubt the
> existence of himself as a thinking being.  However, he also realized

Descartes never "actually doubted" the existence of physical objects;
your phrasing shows a very shallow reading of the Meditations.

> that the dualism faces considerable philosophical problems -- especially
> that of "causal interaction".  He recognized that in many cases mind
> and body intermingle to form a kind of unit.  As much as he wanted
> to insist on the indivisibily of the mind, he had to devote great efforts to
> the problem of interaction between mind and body -- somewhat incompatible
> substances working together in mystical ways.  Is mind then truly
> indivisible?  He seems to have been quite confused.

No, you are confused.  Indivisibility does not imply non-interaction; it
simply implies a lack of parts.

> >Aristotle, on the other hand, did argue that a proper method of inquiry
> >for non-physical `objects' is the analysis of the object into constituents,
> >even if the constituents do not exist in reality.   . . .
> I still don't understand this fetish with Aristotle.  The emphasis

Aristotle is brought up because you keep imputing Aristotle's ideas
to Descates.

> of my original posting was on the dualistic methodology of Cartesian
> thinking systems.  I never even mentioned Aristotle.  . . .

> >Technically, Descartes thought only non-human living organisms were automata,
> >humans, he argued are something more (i.e. they have minds).
> Notice your misunderstanding: human living organisms are not automata
> because they have minds.  Human living organisms also have physiology

I fear it is not I who misunderstand Descartes, and I'll stake several
years of graduate study in philosophy of mind and several readings of
the Meditations, Discourse on Method and Descartes' commentators on it.

> which was considered to be automata by Descartes and that was precisely
> what I was talking about: they biological foundation of Cartesian
> school of thoughts.  Of course he argued that humans have something 

Descartes is quite explicit that thoughts are *not* biological in origin.

> more (i.e. mind) but the point is that this was not the issue brought
> up in my posting.  It's really astounding to see this kind of sidetrackig.
> Read what's written, as is.  Don't free associate random concepts with

You should take your admonition to heart in reference to Descartes' works.

> particular key words.  
> Follow-ups to talk.philosophy.misc please.

Nothing further from me in this series; I've grown tired of trying to
correct your misunderstandings.  

-- 
Richard L. Shelby                    rshelby@ms.uky.edu
Department of Health Services        rshelby@ukma.BITNET
University of Kentucky               {rutgers,uunet}!ukma!rshelby