🚀 go-pugleaf

Fred Gilham writes:

>I interpret Searle's argument as follows:
>
>There is something we (humans) do, called understanding.  We usually
>know when we do it, and we can often say when others do or do not
>understand.  We can also give examples of..."not understanding" ...
>
> [stuff deleted]
>[Suppose] someone emulates this system by hand, ... [who]
>doesn't understand Chinese, yet [can] follow the rules and produce
>the desired results.  [The only]
>physical apparatus existing is the books, paper, and the person who
>doesn't understand Chinese.  The question is, what understands
>Chinese?  Searle claims that there is nothing there to understand
>Chinese.
>

I'm sorry to belabor the point, but I still am not convinced after
months of patiently following this argument.  What follows is not
a counter, but rather is intended to be an honest desire to clarify
my 'understanding' of the concept to a level enabling me to not
only say I understand, but prove it to some objective logician.


We believe Searle-in-the-box when he claims to not-understand.  

Why?  Don't we have an objective definition of "understanding?"
Why don't we have an objective definition of understanding?
Why do we have to ask Searle whether or not he understands, in order
to ourselves decide whether or not he understands?

How can a proof be based upon a definition which is subjective to
an element of the proof itself?  

Assume instead Searle-in-the-box says he does understand.  Are we
to believe him then?  Saying it doesn't make it so.  Yet, then
according to the argument, the Room would understand. 

If we ask the Chinese Room itself whether it understands, 
(in Chinese, of course, so Searle-in-the-box will not understand 
the query) and by some fluke in the rules it somehow answers "Yes"  
... Now what?  Why not believe the box's reply?  

I don't think it is decidable whether to believe the Chinese Room
if it says it understands, based upon the subjective definitions 
given so far.    Suppose we did not know whether Searle was Searle; 
suppose it were possible he were indeed a Chinese Room - we know not
which - on what basis do we decide whether to believe 
him when he says he does understand?  Because, apparently, we have
the "ground rules" laid out such that there is no way the room can
understand if Searle-inside does not. So, if Searle says he 
understands, but then we find out Searle is not Searle, but is 
instead a Chinese Room with another Searle inside, Searle-2, and
Searle-2 "does not understand" - because he says so --- is this 
not a contradiction??  But wait, what if Searle-2 really has a
Searle-3 inside, who DOES understand?  Somebody save me. 

I am not biased against Searle's basic point: (IMHO)
that the implementation matters.  I just don't see the logic
behind the counter to the systems reply, and would like to 
hear it expressed in objective terms.  

Prove to me the Chinese Room does not understand, without
resorting to asking Searle-inside whether (or not) he does.