Article View: comp.bugs.sys5
Article #993Re: setuid (euid) after setuid (uid) on System 5
From: Dale Talcott
Date: Sat, 25 Mar 1989 05:29
Date: Sat, 25 Mar 1989 05:29
20 lines
1401 bytes
1401 bytes
> It shouldn't work for root because they decided not to make it work for > root. Does anyone know what security holes are plugged by this behavior? We have some applications where it would be nice to be able to bounce back and forth between root and a given user. Before I change the kernel, though, it would be prudent to know what I'm letting us in for. From looking at the source, it seems as if the only processes which end up with curtailed permissions because of the SYS V behavior are the current process (which has root permission already until it setuid()'s to something else) and its children, until they exec(). Protecting one part of a program from other parts of itself doesn't make sense to me, so there must be a backdoor I am missing. Can someone shed some light? Dale Talcott, Purdue University Computing Center aeh@j.cc.purdue.edu, j.cc.purdue.edu!aeh, aeh@purccvm.bitnet
Technical Details
Message-ID:
<9213@j.cc.purdue.edu>Path:
arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!purdue!mentor.cc.purdue.edu!j.cc.purdue.edu!aehReferences:
<123@cat.Fulcrum.BT.CO.UK> <280@cbnewsc.ATT.COM> <1196@auspex.UUCP>Show Full Headers
Complete Article Headers
Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!purdue!mentor.cc.purdue.edu!j.cc.purdue.edu!aeh From: aeh@j.cc.purdue.edu (Dale Talcott) Newsgroups: comp.bugs.sys5 Subject: Re: setuid (euid) after setuid (uid) on System 5 Summary: why? Message-ID: <9213@j.cc.purdue.edu> Date: 25 Mar 89 05:29:55 GMT References: <123@cat.Fulcrum.BT.CO.UK> <280@cbnewsc.ATT.COM> <1196@auspex.UUCP> Reply-To: aeh@j.cc.purdue.edu (Dale Talcott) Organization: Purdue University Lines: 20