Security of the RDMS in a C/S environment?

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3 total messages Started by Laurence Chiu Wed, 02 Nov 1994 05:39

#238

Author: Laurence Chiu
Date: Wed, 02 Nov 1994 05:39

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I am puzzled by the following and hope that those who are into C/S
development can help me. Coming from an IBM mainframe environment
and DB2, security of the data in DB2 was never an issue. If you
wrote an application to manipulate the data in a DB2 table(s) the
entire application would be accompanied by a PLAN which is an
encapulation of all the accesses to the tables that this application
would make. A user who wished to access this data would need to be
granted execute authority on this PLAN (an DB2 entity) before he
could run the appliation and potentially update the data. He could
not use any adhoc tools to even view that data if no explicit access
rights had been granted.

In the C/S world as I understand it, if a user signs onto to the
database and then runs an application, that user has to be
explicitly given the access rights the application needs (read,
write, update etc.) so there is no theoretical reason why that user
could not use some query tool to retrieve or update records outside
of the application. I am discounting stored procedures here - would
they make a difference?


----------------------------------------------------------------------
     Laurence Chiu                    Walnut Creek, California
     Tel: 510-412-4730(wk)            Internet: lchiu@crl.com

Re: Security of the RDMS in a C/S environment?

#239

Author: Lee Sailer
Date: Wed, 02 Nov 1994 17:13

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In article <pbpjkK5QQROK072yn@crl.com>, Laurence Chiu (lchiu@crl.com) wrote:

> In the C/S world as I understand it, if a user signs onto to the
> database and then runs an application, that user has to be
> explicitly given the access rights the application needs (read,
> write, update etc.) so there is no theoretical reason why that user
> could not use some query tool to retrieve or update records outside
> of the application. I am discounting stored procedures here - would
> they make a difference?

I'm not a security wizard, but I play one on TV 8-)

It is not necessary to give the user privileges, though that is often
the best way.  Instead, create a "user" (sometimes called a principal)
for the application itself.  Give the application RDBMS privileges
needed to perform its work.  When the application runs, it runs as
itself, not as the human user.  The user needs privileges that allow it
to run the application.

--
lee

Re: Security of the RDMS in a C/S environment?

#240

Author: Bill Manry - Oracle Corporation
Date: Sat, 05 Nov 1994 02:12

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Laurence Chiu (lchiu@crl.com) wrote:
[...]
>In the C/S world as I understand it, if a user signs onto to the
>database and then runs an application, that user has to be
>explicitly given the access rights the application needs (read,
>write, update etc.) so there is no theoretical reason why that user
>could not use some query tool to retrieve or update records outside
>of the application. I am discounting stored procedures here - would
>they make a difference?

You are correct that most client/server implementations use dynamic
SQL interfaces which are weak from a security perspective.  But that's
not a fixed attribute of c/s interfaces.  IBM's DRDA, for example,
supports the same encapsulation you described for non-c/s: an
application's SQL statements can be bound to the server and become the
entity to which (execution) access is granted.  It is, however, harder
to maintain a reliable binding between a remote client application
program and it's server appendage.

Stored procedures and other forms of RPC access do provide a similar
benefit although the problem of client program integrity remains.

A more profound problem in client/server security is authentication
of the client, particularly in a wide network.  SNA provides security
mechanisms at both the connection and conversation levels but quality
of SNA implementation varies from system to system.  "Real" security
over a network means using a 3-party system like Kerberose.

/b
----------
Bill Manry
Oracle Corp.  /  Mainframe & Integration Technologies  /  BManry@us.oracle.com
#include <disclaimer.usual>

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