🚀 go-pugleaf

NOOOBODY@clark DOTT net   (PeterW att clark .net) said:
> 
> guillaum@allege.ens.fr (Florent Guillaume) writes:
> >In article <32b2868f.79162799@news.alt.net>,
> >Zachary Bedell <aramis@capital.net> wrote:
> >> >You don't.  MS-Wind'95 has no software that will recognize any Linux-
> >> >native file system.
> >> 
> >> Yeah, but it's doable.  My programming isn't good enough, but you
> >> could do a Win95 Installable File System to give complete support for
> >> ext2.
> >
> >I'd start to do it immediately if I could get some documentation about
> >IFS and Win95 drivers...  Unfortunately this seems to be only available
> >to subscribers of the MSDN, which cost money.
> >
> >Anyone has some documentation ?
> 
> No, but here's a Feature Request:
> 
> I think all such software should insist on being given the address for the
> /and ought to know about /etc/passwd, /etc/group, /etc/shadow, and any
> nifty PAM stuff that creeps up. When you want to attach to _any_ ext2 part
> it ought to prompt for username/passwd and verify this before mount. After
> mount it should only allow access that that user would have under Linux.
> Hopefully it would allow mounting non-root parts also, e.g. mount /home as
> "peterw", and not mount / at all so I can use my Linux files under the
> hostile OS, whether NT, OS/2, 95, or whatever.
> 
> These fs drivers only make me wish even more that the whole blasted 
> filespace was encrypted somehow. The simplest way to do this would 
> then make it difficult to boot/reboot without a pass phrase... any thoughts?

There is not much of a point in making secure fs drivers for nonsecure
OSs (DOS, OS/2, Windoze^H^Hws 95, whatever).  It is a simple matter to
get to the physical disk, and do whatever is needed there.  The best
(IMHO) method to secure a Linux computer from these OSs is:

A - don't tell LILO about any DOS drives
B - disable floppy boot in the CMOS
C - put on a BIOS setup password
D - disable the power switch/reset button, just in case
E - physically secure the machine (to make sure no one
    disconnects the CMOS battery, or unplugs the machine)

On the system I run, I have done all but E.  I would do that, but
the lock on the machine (which blocks off the FD from physical
access, and tries to keep the case from being removed) is not very
effective.  It is also kind of hard to keep something from having
power cut, especially when the shunt trip (BRS) for the room is
easily accessible.

I know that a BIOS boot password would be even better, but this
is a networked server, which should come back up without manual
intervention should their be a blackout (can't afford a UPS)

The moral of this message is, your security is *completely* blown
of someone can run an unsecure OS on your system.  Be careful.
They *are* all out to get you  :)
-- 
-Neil Moore          http://www.sfhs.floyd.k12.ky.us/~amethyst
(finger amethyst@valjean.sfhs.floyd.k12.ky.us for my Geek Code)