🚀 go-pugleaf

>  From: Chris Riddick <cjr@simpact.COM>
>
>  There is a way to render the dictionary attack ineffective.  That is the use
>  of one-time passwords.  With a onetime password, even a TGT that was stolen
>  simply by eavesdropping during login would not be useful.  The password that
>  was extracted via the dictionary attack (other other cryptanalysis) was only
>  good for that login (i.e., TGT).  The next time the user logs in, a 
>  different password will be required.

	No.  "One-time passwords" (this is really the wrong term for
this, but I know what you mean from the previous time you explained
yourself), do NOT by themselves render the dictionary attack
ineffective.  If the user chooses his/her own master password, the fact
that one-time passwords are generated from it will not make the attack
impossible.  [The details of how to alter the attack to deal with this
are left to the reader.]

	However, forcing the user to use a randomly generated password
will render the dictionary attack useless.  Granted, this is
particularly easy to do when the user already has to carry a one-time
password generator device around with him/her.


> From: "Jon A. Rochlis" <jon@MIT.EDU>
>
>   All you need to do is eavesdrop on X logging in once.
> 
>That is *much* harder than simply asking for a ticket in somebody
>else's name and therefore even though it's only a partial solution, it
>add significant value.  Security is a world of tradeoffs.
>
>		-- Jon

	Jon's point above is important, however.  Just because you can't
protect against the attack, doesn't mean you can't make it harder.
I don't remember off hand if krb5 actually prevents you from doing a
dictionary attack without eavesdropping or setting off alarms.

						- Mark Lillibridge