🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <3ghioe$q83@trance.helix.net>,
Eric Gisin <ericg@trance.helix.net> wrote:
>$ finger @direct.ca
>[direct.ca]
>           Thank you for connecting to Internet Direct.
>
>The service you attempted to connect to on this host is for the 
>internal use of Internet Direct only.  We ask that you do not 
>attempt to connect to it again.  
>
>All connection attempts are logged.  If unauthorized connection 
>attempts continue from a single source CERT/RCMP/CIA/Scotland Yard 
>will be informed.
>
>Thanks for your co-operation.
>
>-----
>Who do these people think they are?
>Finger is a *public* service, there is nothing "unauthorized" in using it.

Untrue. Finger is a 'standard' service, but the bottom line is that the
owner(s) of a machine are the ONLY people that matter when it comes to
determining who may or may not connect to the machine. If they say you
can't connect, you can't connect, and continued attempts to do so can be
legally prosecuted (at least, so say the lawyers I've talked to).

Remember, NOTHING on a machine is EVER public unless declared so. A machine
offering a service is NOT the same as a someone giving you authorization to
access it.

>If they don't want the outside world to use it, they should just disable it.

Why? Keeping track of attempted connections to a machine is a good way to
catch first glimpse of a possible attack.

>Would CERT even listen to Internet Direct?

Oh, they'd listen, point them at their documentation, maybe bounce off
a message to the sysadmin of the "attacking" system, but that's about it.
CERT has -no- authority to actually -do- anything. 

									-WW