🚀 go-pugleaf

sjmz@otter.hpl.hp.com (Stefek Zaba) writes:
>For example: a wannabe sysadmin leaves their home directory world-writeable.
>This allows the attacker to plant a .rhosts file which will allow them in.
>However, the authentication mechanism requires that .rhosts be owned by
>the user.  If you find a world-writeable root-owned file on the same volume,
>you can now ln it to /root/wannabe/.rhosts...

hmmm... ok then, I think my argument may only apply to filesystems on which
you can chown files away.  On a SysV filesystem, you could just create that
/.rhosts file and then chown it to root anyway.

But anyway, it's an extremely serious security hole to have "/" be world-
writable.  The /.rhosts problem is a negligible portion of this problem.
Just rename /etc and the system will let you login to root without asking
for a password anyway.