Article View: comp.security.misc
Article #252Covert channel
From: Hilarie Orman
Date: Wed, 12 Aug 1992 23:44
Date: Wed, 12 Aug 1992 23:44
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In article <1992Aug12.204649.4110@osf.org>, karger@osf.org (Paul A. Karger) writes: > Covert channels involve illicit communications between two processes, > a transmitter process that is running a Trojan horse, and a receiver > process that belongs to a spy. You seem to imply that it can't be a covert channel without intent. I've always relied on the notion of information flow - if the writer of the transmitter program did not specify the information as an output, and if a receiver program can detect the information, then you have a covert channel, a concept further divided into storage and timing channels. If you don't agree, what alternate term would you use to describe the password inference problem originally described?
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Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!sparky!uunet!gatech!news.ans.net!cmcl2!arizona!ho From: ho@cs.arizona.edu (Hilarie Orman) Newsgroups: comp.security.misc Subject: Covert channel Message-ID: <20477@optima.cs.arizona.edu> Date: 12 Aug 92 23:44:17 GMT References: <71269183717599@juju.mcs.anl.gov> <61350002@otter.hpl.hp.com> <1992Aug12.204649.4110@osf.org> Sender: news@cs.arizona.edu Organization: U of Arizona, CS Dept, Tucson Lines: 15