🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <21382@rpp386.lonestar.org> jfh@rpp386.cactus.org (John F. Haugh II) writes:
[ ... ]
>The definition which I have always used for "covert channel" is the one
>straight out of the Orange Book - "covert channel - A communications
>channel that allows a process to transfer information in a manner that
>violates the system's security policy."  If you are permitted to change
>the mail headers, doing so cannot violate the system's security policy.

I believe this definition intends -- although I see it doesn't state --
that all system access controls and other security checks are functioning
correctly.  In other words, process A and process B _are_ obeying all of
the individual security rules imposed by the system, but somehow process
A manages to send, and process B to receive, information that the overall
system security policy would not permit to be sent directly.  (That's why
its "surprising to the authorities" <1992Aug15.162611.24659@sctc.com> :-)