🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1gkpsmINNn05@iraul1.ira.uka.de> s_titz@ira.uka.de (Olaf Titz) writes:
>In article <1992Dec14.211255.15839@lambda.msfc.nasa.gov> palmer@Trade_Zone.msfc.nasa.gov writes:
> ^^^^^^^^
>You see that the following applies largely to government/military only?

>>>The main job of security is to stop the user from getting his work
>>>done.

>>I disagree, security is not a win/lose scenario...granted when the
>>security officer takes the easy way out when fixing a problem, the end
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

>I really don't know about installations where the security people are
>officers...

Personally, I don't think that you know about any installation where
there is any need for security, period.

>>user usually loses functionality or useability.  But when the careful
>>security officer carefully considers the situation, there is almost
>>always a win/win solution.

>...but here (academic) every "security" effort has always been
>inevitably a lose/lose situation. More hassle to deal with on one
>side, less usability on the other.

>You run into this as soon as you start thinking, "the less I allow to
>the users the less damage can/will they do", which is wrong, imho.

>But if the changes involve (e.g.) hiding an
>entire subnetwork behind a firewall, this *does* affect the users. And
>if you argue, "these particular users have all data they ever have to
>deal with on their local machines and may not do anything else", well,
>you're talking government, I'm talking academic. But we (academic)
>have to live with people and OSs who confuse security and unusability,
>too.

Olaf, do you really believe that an academic site should put computers
that students can access on the same network as the ones containing
grades, financial data, and medical records without putting in major
firewalls between the networks?

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I am not an official Oracle spokesman.  I speak for myself and no one else.