🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1jrgcdINNgm9@cronkite.cisco.com> ohansen@europe.cisco.com (Ove Hansen) writes:
>In article <9302314.5488@mulga.cs.mu.OZ.AU> carl@montebello.ecom.unimelb.EDU.AU (Carl Brewer) writes:
>|>In article <1jotp8INNiu@matt.ksu.ksu.edu> probreak@matt.ksu.ksu.edu (James Michael Chacon) writes:
>|>>senetza@sigma.uleth.ca (Len Senetza) writes:
>|>>
>|>>>this assumes that root has . in its path, and how many root accounts
>|>>>out there do?
>|>>
>|>>A scenerio like this assumes that the sysadmin is a pretty trusting person
>|>>and probably already has large security holes in the system.
>|>
>|>a scenario like this assumes that the sysadmin should not be a sysadmin.
>
>Now, Remember that the majority of sysadmins are part-timers who have better
>things to do in their company than tighten up the security holes that the
>vendors leave in the systems they sell. In most small companies I have seen
>where there are just a few Unix, VMS, OS/2, DOS, Mac or-whatever-boxes the
>least computer-illiterate person is usually the person who is expected to
>spend a couple of hours a day looking after the systems. It's unfair saying
>that this sysadmin shouldn't be a sysadmin just because the vendors can't
>be bothered making the systems more secure. Tell me the following: when I
>install my shining new Sun desktop server option, is there a '.' in root's
>path? Is there any access control on exported file systems? Is there a '+'
>in /etc/hosts.equiv? The default security in a new installation should be
>high, it then would be up to the sysadmin to open up his system to suit his
>needs, instead of running the risk of having the system full of holes because
>he hasn't known of them. If the system then was full of large security holes
>I would agree with your statement, now you're shooting the pianist because
>the piano-vendor sold the bar-owner a crap piano.
>

Actually, I think  the system  should come as it comes. If  a computer  was to
come with high security, the same  computer-iliterate  sysadmin  would  hardly
ever bother to open it.  Niether would  (s)he  ever  figure out  how to export
directories  to clients. Or how to allow  users  to  rsh  from one  client  to
another  without a password. Or why ping won't  run after cd /usr/etc (about .
in $PATH). 

Of course, closed, "secure" system is easier to manage. But most computers are
bought for users,  not  for managers  :) And I  bet  that there are many sites
where users would  rather have insecure but functional system. After  all,  if
you only have local area  network and just several users \n is probably a good
root password.

Having said that I agree that it would be nice if manufacturies gave us some
hints about how to make system more secure if needed (or perhaps even shell
scripts to do the convertion). 

Oleg