🚀 go-pugleaf

Our information security folks recently put out a policy for the root
user that includes the following:

1) the $PATH not contain '.'

2) The root user should issue ALL commands with the full path, eg.
'/bin/ls' instead of 'ls'

Number one I can see.  It's only a little silly and it's easy enough to
type './command_in_current_directory' if that's what I want.

Number 2 is dangerous and silly IMNSHO for the reasons I lay out below. 
I would appreciate any critique of my reasoning, so that I can make a
stronger argument, or avoid embarassing myself if I've missed anything.

A) No unix/linux/bsd sysadmin in the history of the world has ever
followed or will ever follow this policy (correct me if I'm wrong).

B) It is not needed to ensure commmand security, if a file integrity
checker is run on all files in root's $PATH  (files in /etc and subdirs
thereof should probably be included).

C) It is not sufficient to ensure command security if a file integrity
checker is NOT run on all files in root's $PATH

D) One can observe the letter of this law by simply issuing 'which
<command>' then issuing whatever is returned, without having increased
security one iota.  In fact, it could be issued as `which <command>` to
save time.  (Oh all right, `/usr/bin/which <command>`).

E) It's inconsistent, since no such policy has been promulgated to WinNT
domain admins, and those pretty icons could point at *anything*.


If for some reason you don't wish to resond her, leas email me at 'bob
at bob dash n dot com'.