🚀 go-pugleaf

From perry@vu-vlsi.UUCP (Rick Perry) Mon Feb  2 11:48:49 1987
>>
>>> Below is included a nice little feature program, it can be used as an
>>> alternative to su(1) or in conjunction with it.
>>
>>  Here at rutgers we have a local hack that is called slide.  Slide
>>is a program that can be as simple as
>
>Both of these programs (performing password-free su) seem dangerous
>to me- if one of the authorized users were to accidently leave themself
>logged on, anyone could come along and su from their terminal.  Also,
>it makes the knowledge of an authorized sus/slide users password
>equivalent to knowing the root password.


	Here at Rutgers we only give out group `slide' (the group
which one must belong to for successful completion of "slide") rather
sparingly (but maybe not sparingly enough ...).  However, it is well
known by anyone in this group that leaving a terminal in any public
place unattended will result in loss of this group access (as well as
job termination in some cases).
	However, I'd like to think that we could trust these people
not to give out their passwords (strictly verboten), and chose good
enough passwords such that they aren't easily guess-able. I think that
this beats allowing a position where the person might write down the
root password (if you only need to be root twice a year ...).  Also,
it is a lot easier in terms of maintanance (wanna notify some 20 users
every time you change the password?)
	In addition, for security reasons, we have at least one
password change for slide users per year.  Any time there is a even a
*hint* of password leakage (is there a better term?), all slide group
membership is taken away from everyone until their password has been
confirmed as changed.
	As with any type of root access, there are security holes, but
we feel we have minimalized them. What better to trust? Giving out the
root password (to be written down, forgotten, changed) or to trust a
person to not leave a logged in job unattended?
	Of course, the truly best way to do this would be to not allow
root access to anyone -- or to allow root access to everyone.


					tp.
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