🚀 go-pugleaf

Submitted-by: jmcarli@srv.pacbell.com (Jerry M. Carlin)

In article <15ibqsINNc3a@ftp.UU.NET> toon@moene.indiv.nluug.nl (Toon Moene) writes:
>.. We allow "normal" users to change  
>ownership of their files (though this may not be possible in the future),  
>but not to SETUID their files, since, in the future, neither of these may  
>be possible.
>
>Short question: Why is it considered a security risk when people give away  
>their own files (by chown'ing them to someone else) or setuid 'user' their  
>own executables (OK, they have to be careful here) ?

A lot of our internal environment requires users to be able to chown
files typically during installation of software. Forcing people to run
as root is DUMB and violates least privilege, a fundamental security precept.
It appears as though we're mandating insecurity here not security. This
also applies to setuid. 

Effectively what is going on is to try to protect the ignorant from
themselves but the problem that the solution causes is to set up an 
environment that either has lots more people knowing the root password
or some poor, harried administrator running around doing chown's.

-- 
Jerry M. Carlin	(510) 823-2441 jmcarli@srv.pacbell.com
Alchemical Engineer and Virtual Realist


Volume-Number: Volume 28, Number 73