Article View: comp.unix.shell
Article #1508Re: Beware xargs security holes
From: Timothy L. Kay
Date: Tue, 16 Oct 1990 18:18
Date: Tue, 16 Oct 1990 18:18
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tif@doorstop.austin.ibm.com (Paul Chamberlain) writes: >In article brnstnd@kramden.acf.nyu.edu (Dan Bernstein) writes: >> find / -name '#*' -atime +7 -print | xargs rm >>lets a malicious user remove every file on the system. >If I understand, to do this a user would have to create a file >with a '/' in its name. Is this possible on some systems? >The most malicious thing I can do with the above command is >remove a file that doesn't start with '#' that's in a >writable directory. Let me see. If I create a directory named directory\n and create a file in there called vmunix, then find will spit out a file .../directory\n/vmunix\n which xargs will see as .../directory and /vmunix Tim
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Path: arc1-ca.pugleaf.net!utzoo!attcan!uunet!jarthur!nntp-server.caltech.edu!ggumby!tim From: tim@ggumby.cs.caltech.edu (Timothy L. Kay) Newsgroups: comp.unix.shell,alt.security Subject: Re: Beware xargs security holes Message-ID: <tim.656101080@ggumby> Date: 16 Oct 90 18:18:00 GMT References: <63404@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu> <1990Oct9.172621.13484@cbnews.att.com> <271653D6.1CE8@tct.uucp> <4062:Oct1518:22:1290@kramden.acf.nyu.edu> <3876@awdprime.UUCP> Sender: news@nntp-server.caltech.edu Organization: California Institute of Technology, Pasadena Lines: 30 Nntp-Posting-Host: ggumby.cs.caltech.edu