🚀 go-pugleaf

>From:    microsoft!c-rossgr@uunet.uu.net

>If the seed is entered by the user, then there might well be problems
>of getting "pre-installed" copies within an organization that al share
>the same seed.

Ross: we seem to be cross communicating. In our shop we do not use "pre-
      installed" copies, no two machines are alike anyway & we are running
      everything from DOS 2.0 up. On installation, the package we use takes
      3-5 minutes to take a "snapshot" of the PC and record every executable
      on it during installation.

>And if they have the seed stored on the system anywhere -- sorta
>required in order for it to work! -- then the bad guy can find it just
>as easily as my own code can.

Only if the "bad guy" knows where it is stored and if the offsets are
the same on every machine - one of the drawbacks to
"pre-installation". If you cannot ensure the physical integrity of the
machine all bets are off. It would take a complex and specifically
targetted piece of software to be able to determin that you were there
(and not some other routine) and bypass it - not for an amateur. One
of the problems is that at present there is a single criteria for
judging PC protection programs: the number of viruses it detects.  In
actuality, this is one of the lesser threats that a full package
should take care of.

>If you want RACF on a PC, you'll have to change operating system, I
>think.  It looks like you're speaking of authenticity and access
>control -- these must be considered important *parts* of an anti-viral
>package.  But not the whole thing.

a) RACF is the only product that I have seen that will tell a user where its
   holes are (LISTDSD command).

b) I am but authentication of the system/programs, not of the user.

c) Thats what I said - see multilayer "model" of a few months ago.

The points made should still be targets, possible but not necessarily easy.
BTW all my cars are Pontiacs.

					Warmly, Padgett