🚀 go-pugleaf

In article <1992Apr21.005644.28531@access.digex.com> cherry@access.digex.com (Cherry Poptart) writes:
>In article <1992Apr15.185144.22032@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>>In article <1992Apr12.224207.5445@access.digex.com> cherry@access.digex.com (Cherry Poptart) writes:
>>>In article <92101.174906CGAVER@auvm.american.edu> Cynthia S. Gaver <CGAVER@auvm.american.edu> writes:
>>>First, how can you use the terms "Oprah Winfrey" and 
>>>"sentient beings" in the same sentence?  She would
>>>be as bad as Geraldo, except that he has a dick ;-)
>>>
>>>Seriously, ~consciousness raising" and "chickens"
>>>in the same sentence?  Either you dont know much  
>>>about chickens or you dont know much about conciousness.
>>
>>Yep, those darn chickens don't feel no pain at all, nope. 
>>
>>- michael
>>
>>("Cherry Poptart"?!  Honestly...) 
>
>Great, another one of these people who 
>think that there should be no pain for 
>anyone or anything in life.  Did I say
>that they don't feel pain?  Is feeling 
>pain evidence of "conciousness"?  Most 
>one celled animals react to external 
>stimulation by trying to get away from
>it.  Is that pain?  Does that constitute
>"conciousness"?  
>
>Draw the line somewhere, and then get a life.
>
>Cherry
>(yeah, Cherry Poptart)

Cherry, I am not the wooly-headed sentimentalist you make me out to be.
I have degrees in both philosophy (emphasis on ethics) and psychology,
so I am not as purely "emotional" about this issue as you seem to feel
vegetarian are.

With the imposing credential out of the way, let's address your above
posting.  In all of the above I never claimed that "there should be no
pain for anyone or anything in life."  My suggestion was merely that
the experiencing of pain makes an entity more worthy of moral concern than
an entity which is incapable of such experiences.  This position is by
no means radical - it goes back at least to the Utilitarians, and
many modern formulations of ethics draw this distinction. 

As far as feeling pain requiring consciousness, of *course* it does.  The
whole notion of consciousness *entails* being able to experience.  If an
entity can feel pain, it is conscious in some way (and similarly if it can
see, hear, or have any other sensory experience).

I do not know what the experiences of one-celled animals, or trees, or
rocks for that matter, are like.  These things have very different
makeups from our own, and all of the above listed things do not have a 
central nervous system, which, as far as we know, is necessary for the
experiencing of pain.  Chickens, on the other hand, have nervous systems
very similar to ours, and it appears certain that they are capable of
feeling pain.  This makes them more worthy of moral concern than amoebas,
trees, or rocks.

As far as drawing the line, I have.  I choose as a moral principle to avoid
inflicting pain as much as possible on sentient (conscious) beings.
This being the case, I only eat or otherwise kill organisms which do not
have this capability.

- michael