🚀 go-pugleaf

"LarryLook" <Larry@noemail.com> wrote in message 
news:Fvidnek4-ODmL_HbnZ2dnUVZ_oernZ2d@comcast.com...
>
>>
>> But I'm not concerned about the animals killed to serve my needs, animals 
>> killed only counts against vegans who claim to believe that it's immoral 
>> to kill animals.
>
> You don't think it's immoral to kill animals unnecessarily?

No, because I don't accept the definition of necessity you're proposing. My 
diet is necessary to me, and I define what goes into, nobody else. Arguably 
a person who killed no animals unecessarily might have the moral standing to 
make such a request of me, but even if such a person existed I probably 
would ignore him.

> If it could be proven that certain vegetatian diet killed many less, you 
> wouldn't be in favor of it?

Not for myself, not unless the diet suited me in other respects. I'm happy 
to encourage others to try it though, vegetarian diets are fine.

> You do have choices of what to eat.  You can get by without eating beef 
> you know.

So what? I can get by without imported lettuce or bananas too, I can get by 
with half the calories I currently consume, well, not me because I don't eat 
much, but most people could. So why focus all the attention on meat? It's a 
scam. All things considered I am perfectly comfortable with animals being 
killed so meat can be a part of my diet. Since I eat reasonably none of this 
applies to me.

>> His guilt is warranted if he indeed believes that it's wrong to kill 
>> animals to obtain food. We're simply reflecting his own attempts to 
>> project guilt back at him.
>
> It's wrong to kill them (or better not to kill them) if one can get by on 
> a different diet.

There are plenty of different diets that kill fewer animals (than what?) but 
still include meat. Mine for example, which is based on a very low number of 
calories per day, for one thing.

> Why not try to kill less.

Go ahead, I'm not that worried about it. The point is, stopping meat 
entirely is not the only way to cut down on animal deaths, that's a fallacy 
promoted by vegans. Eat half the amount of food you currently eat, but eat 
the same types and you would likely do better than a person who becomes a 
vegan and eats the same amount of calories, and you'd likely be healthier.

> Acknowledging that some deaths are unavoidable with modern life does not 
> mean that one cant attempt to minimize this.

Nobody is suggesting that you can't or shouldn't, we're saying that a) 
veganism is not the only way to accomplish it, and b) vegans do not have the 
moral standing to tell anyone what they must do on this matter in order to 
be moral humans. You for example eat shellfish right? What gives you the 
right to make that personal choice? Vegans say that shellfish have the right 
to live their lives without being agressed upon by humans. Vegans are 
bullies.


>>>>> He can't be proud of his diet since Rick and Dutch won't let him be. 
>>>>> He's been labeled sanctimonious without ever getting to know him.  How 
>>>>> outrageous!
>>>>
>>>> Sanctimony is easy to spot Larrry.
>>
>> You like the idea of a scaled valuation of animals larry? So do I. Read 
>> this. http://folk.uio.no/jonw/moralstat99.doc
>
> Any possibility of cutting and pasting this?  I have a rigid policy on "no 
> downloads".

You download stuff every time you log on to a discussion group, or surf the 
net.. If I pasted it all here you'd still have to download it. It's too 
large to paste, 156kb, Here's the beginning, once you read it you may 
reconsider your policy.

<quote>

THE MORAL STATUS OF BEINGS WHO ARE NOT PERSONS;
A CASUISTIC ARGUMENT

JON WETLESEN

Department of Philosophy
University of Oslo
0315 Oslo, Norway

ABSTRACT: This paper addresses the question: Who or what can have a moral 
status in the sense that we have direct moral duties to them? It argues for 
a biocentric answer which ascribes inherent moral status value to all 
individual living organisms. This position must be defended against an 
anthropocentric position. The argument from marginal cases propounded by Tom 
Regan and Peter Singer for this purpose is criticised as defective, and a 
different argument is proposed. The biocentric position developed here is 
related to that of Albert Schweitzer and Paul F Taylor, but rejects their 
assumption of equal inherent value for all living organisms. It argues 
instead for equal moral status value for moral persons and agents, and 
gradual moral status value for nonpersons, depending on their degree of 
similarity with moral persons. Mary Ann Warren�s recent book on Moral Status 
is also discussed. The argument is  constructed as a casuistic argument, 
proceeding by analogical extension from persons to non-persons. The 
meta-ethical question of its pragmatic validity is discussed.
Keywords: moral status, inherent value,  casuistic argument, strong versus 
weak cognitivism, pragmatic validity

1. The question about moral status
The underlying question I shall discuss is this: Who or what can have a 
moral status in the sense that we have direct moral duties to them, such as 
the duty not to cause avoidable harm to them?
There are many competing answers to this question. They may be broadly 
divided into anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric alternatives. 
Anthropocentric positions assume that moral status should be confined to 
humans only, some or all. In the Western cultural area this kind of view has 
been prevailing. We find it among the Greeks and Romans, such as Plato, 
Aristotle and the Stoics; we find it in the Western Church, such as in 
Augustine and  Thomas Aquinas; and we find it among modern secular 
philosophers such as Spinoza and  Kant, and many others. Nonanthropocentric 
positions assume that moral status can be extended to include other 
individual living organisms as well, some or all; or even to 
supra-individual wholes such as species or ecosystems. This view has also 
occurred in the Western cultural area, but only among minorities and 
subcultures. In other parts of the world, however, it has occasionally had a 
much broader following. This pertains especially to Jainism and Buddhism in 
the Indian cultural area, as well as in those areas where Buddhism spread: 
Southeast Asia, East Asia, and over the last century in the West.
In the following I shall argue for a biocentric answer to the main question. 
This is an individualistic version of a nonanthropocentric position. It 
ascribes moral status to all individual living organisms; humans, other 
animals, plants, and micro-organisms. This position is congenial to Albert 
Schweitzer�s �reverence for life�. To me it has a strong appeal with both 
philosophical and religious overtones.
On the other hand, I do not accept Schweitzer�s assumption that all living 
organisms should be ascribed an equal moral status value. Such a strong 
assumption seems to be counter-intuitive, and besides, unnecessary. Instead, 
I shall argue for a grading of moral status value, as well as of the 
strength of our corresponding duties to moral subjects. There will be one 
exception from this grading, however, pertaining to human beings. They are 
ascribed the highest moral status value, not because they are humans but 
because they are moral agents or moral persons. This will be a 
universalistic and egalitarian view of human dignity and basic human rights. 
Other living beings are ascribed degrees of moral status value depending on 
their degree of relevant similarity to moral persons. Presumably, animals 
with self-consciousness or consciousness and sentience have a higher moral 
status value than nonconscious and nonsentient organisms. Even so, however, 
the organisms with a lesser moral status value are not devoid of moral 
status, and for this reason we do have a prima facie duty not to cause 
avoidable harm to them. Or if we cannot avoid harming them in order to 
survive ourselves, then we have at least a subsidiary duty to cause the 
least harm. If we accept that plants have a lesser moral status value than 
animals, this may turn out to be an argument for vegetarianism. <end quote>

Interesting huh?