🚀 go-pugleaf

On 2007-07-01 19:27:52 -0400, Mike Smith <mws@wt.net> said:

> On Sun, 1 Jul 2007 13:28:48 -0400, Slim <slim@pickins.com> wrote:
> 
> 
>> 
>> NO WOMD found. Bush Lied.
>> 
>> 
>> NO WOMD found. Bush Lied.
>> 
>> 
>> NO WOMD found. No Yellowcake found. Bush Lied.

http://www.warandpiece.com/blogdirs/000930.html

For the moment, let's set aside discussion of the relative merits - or 
not - of the claims regarding whether Iraq did or did not in fact seek 
uranium in Niger and in DR Congo in the 1999-2000 time period, to ask a 
different question. [After all, neither the SSCI report nor the Butler 
report ever establish that Iraq did in fact seek uranium from Africa 
since 1998. They say, the claims were not in their opinion disproven 
[e.g. absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. But it's not 
evidence of a positive, either...] Further, it's important to point 
out, neither report even begins to contend that Iraq actually succeeded 
in acquiring any uranium . . .]

As I said, let's set that discussion aside for the moment to ask 
something different. That is: what specifically were the other alleged 
sources for the claim Iraq sought to discuss acquiring uranium in 
Niger, other than the reports Britain and the US received from Sismi 
that were discredited upon the discovery that Sismi's report was based 
on the counterfeit Niger uranium documents?

As I have previously noted, the Butler report asserts that the UK had 
"multiple" sources for the claim, while obscuring what those sources 
actually were. The IAEA, for one, has asked Britain to clarify the 
other sources it claims to have, which it has yet to do.

So what do we know about the nature of the reputed other sources? The 
most specific references to be found come from the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence report. Here are all the references to 
reputed other sources from the Senate report I could find:

* Several analysts interviewed by Committee staff also pointed out that 
information in the second intelligence report matched [redacted] 
reporting from 1999 which showed that an Algerian businessman, Baraka, 
was arranging a trip for the Iraqi Ambassador to the Vatican, Wissam 
al-Zahawi, to visit Niger and other African countries in early February 
1999. [Redacted]. [Cited from page 38 of the Senate report]

[ . . . ]

* The intelligence report indicated that former Nigerien Prime Minister 
Ibrahim Mayaki was unaware of any contracts that had been signed 
between Niger and any rogue states for the sale of yellowcake while he 
was Prime Minister (1997-1999) or Foreign Minister (1996-1997). Mayaki 
said that if there had been any such contract during his tenure, he 
would have been aware of it. Mayaki said, however, that in June 1999, 
[redacted] businessman, approached him and insisted that Mayaki meet 
with an Iraqi delegation to discuss "expanding commercial relations" 
between Niger and Iraq. The intelligence report said that Mayaki 
interpreted "expanding commercial relations" to mean that the 
delegation wanted to discuss uranium yellowcake sales. The intelligence 
report also said that "although the meeting took place, Mayaki let the 
matter drop due to the UN sanctions on Iraq." [page 43]

[ . . . ]

* ([Redacted]) On November 25, 2002, The Naval [redacted] issued a very 
brief report Alleged Storage of Uranium Destined for Iraq [redacted] 
that a large quantity of uranium from Niger was being stored in a 
warehouse in Cotonou, Benin. The uranium was reportedly sold to Iraq by 
Niger's President. The report provided the name and telephone numbers 
for the individual, a West African businessman, who was responsible for 
coordinating the alleged uranium transaction and indicated that he was 
willing to provide information about the transaction. CIA's DO told 
Committee staff that the businessman has never been contacted and the 
DO has not made an effort to determine whether this individual had any 
useful information . . . The Defense Humint Service (DHS) and the Navy 
also told Committee staff that they did not try to contact the 
businessman . . . The DHS told Committee staff that because the DHS 
examined the warehouse on December 17, 2002 and saw only what appeared 
to be bales of cotton in the warehouse, they did not see a reason to 
contact the businessman. . .[Pages 59-60]

[ . . . ]

* On March 8, 2003, the DIA provided an info memo (TS-99-177-03) to the 
Secretary of Defense in response to a March 8, 2003 Washington Post 
article, "Some Evidence on Iraq Called Fake." The memo said, "we 
believe the IAEA is dismissing attempted Iraqi yellowcake purchases, 
largely based upon a single set of unverified documents concerning a 
contract between Niger and Iraq for the supply of 'pure uranium.' The 
[memo added that the] USG had not shared other [information] with the 
IAEA that suggested a Nigerien uranium deal with Iraq." The other 
intelligence referenced in the memo is the CIA intelligence report on 
the former ambassador's trip, which described the Nigerien Prime 
Minister's belief that an Iraqi delegation was interested in uranium, 
the Navy report from November 2002 which said uranium destined for Iraq 
was being stored in a warehouse in Cotonou, Benin, and a fax from late 
2001 found in the possession of a Somali businessman which described 
arrangements for shipping unidentified commodities in an amount that 
appeared similar to the amount in the Iraq-Niger yellowcake deal. The 
fax, however, did not mention uranium, Iraq, or Niger. [pages 69-70]

[ . . . ]

* On April 5, 2003, the [National Intellience Council] NIC issued a 
Sense of the Community Memorandum (SOCM), Niger: No Recent Uranium 
Sales to Iraq, (NIC SOCM 2001-12.) The SOCM said, "we judge it highly 
unlikely that Niamey has sold uranium yellowcake to Baghdad in recent 
years. The IC agrees with the IAEA assessment that key documents 
purported showing a recent Iraq-Niger sales accord are a fabrication. 
We judge that other reports from 2002 - one alleging warehousing of 
yellowcake for shipment to Iraq, a second alleging a 1999 visit by an 
Iraqi delegation to Niamey - do not constitute credible evidence of a 
recent or impending sale." . . .

(•) On June 12, 2003, the DIA sent an information memorandum to Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, in response to questions about 
Iraq's nuclear program. The memo said, "while the Intelligence 
Committee agrees that documents the IAEA reviewed were likely 'fake,' 
other unconfirmed reporting suggested that Iraq attempted to obtain 
uranium and yellowcake from African nations after 1998." The other 
reporting mentioned was the Navy report from November 2002, which said 
uranium destined for Iraq was being stored in a warehouse in Cotonou, 
Benin.[pages 70-71]

So, let's review. The universe of other sources, at first glance, 
appears to include:

1) An Algerian businessman, Baraka.

According to the Senate report, Baraka was reported to be involved in 
arranging the trip for the then-Iraqi Ambassador to the Vatican, Wissam 
al-Zahawi, to Niger and three other African countries in early February 
1999.

Where did this report of Baraka come from? The Senate report says 
Baraka was mentioned in the CIA Directorate of Operation's "second 
report" on the Niger uranium subject, issued on February 5, 2002. From 
the Senate report, p. 37:

Reporting on the uranium transaction did not surface again until 
February 5, 2002 when the CIA's DO issued a second intelligence report 
[redacted] which again cited the source as a "[foreign] government 
service." Although not identified in the report, this source was also 
from the foreign service. The second report provided more details about 
the previously reported Iraq-Niger uranium agreement and provided what 
was said to be "verbatim text" of the accord.

From what I know from other reporting, the foreign government source 
for this second intelligence report was not Britain, but Italy's Sismi. 
The timing is right around the time a high ranking Sismi official 
briefed a high ranking CIA official in Washington in February 2002 on 
the Niger uranium claims.

And as you can see from the section excerpted above, the obvious source 
for the "verbatim text" the "foreign service" gave to the CIA in 
February 2002 was lifted from the documents which we now know to have 
been the counterfeit Niger uranium documents. In any case, Baraka is 
not described so much as an independent source on the deal, but as 
someone described by the foreign government service to the CIA as part 
of the deal. Nevertheless, the larger context for the Baraka claim to 
the CIA appears to be the counterfeit Niger uranium docs.

More alleged sources for the claim:

2) A "[redacted] businessman."

The Niger prime minister and former foreign minister Mayaki 
said..."that in June 1999, [redacted] businessman approached him and 
insisted that Mayaki meet with an Iraqi delegation to discuss 
'expanding commercial relations' between Niger and Iraq...The 
intelligence report also said that 'although the meeting took place, 
Mayaki let the matter drop due to the UN sanctions on Iraq.'"

Who is this businessman? The timing alluded to here suggests he is not 
the Algerian businessman, because the Algerian businessman referred to 
above was reportedly trying to broker the meeting between the Iraqi 
ambassador to the Vatican and the Niger authorities back in February 
1999, not in June 1999.

I'll reserve a hypothesis for now until I can get more information. But 
one thing to note is this is a pretty uncompelling allegation. The 
Niger prime minister is saying that the redacted businessman was trying 
to set up a meeting which he admits occurred, but says that he didn't 
allow uranium to be discussed.

3) The West African businessman.

"...The Naval [redacted] issued a very brief report Alleged Storage of 
Uranium Destined for Iraq [redacted] that a large quantity of uranium 
from Niger was being stored in a warehouse in Cotonou, Benin. The 
uranium was reportedly sold to Iraq by Niger's President. The report 
provided the name and telephone numbers for the individual, a West 
African businessman, who was responsible for coordinating the alleged 
uranium transaction.

This would seem to be the strongest example of a genuine potential 
"other source" to be found in the report on the Niger uranium issue, to 
my mind. And yet, no one ever interviewed him, so he clearly is not 
much of an independent source. And when the USG did check out the 
warehouse supposedly involved, it didn't find any yellowcake.

Here is mention of someone who is alleged in a Navy report to actually 
be involved in the coordination of a deal. It's also worth noting that 
this section on the Navy report is different from citations of "other 
sources" in the Senate report because it does not appear to be 
originally sourced from a foreign government at all. At least the 
Senate report doesn't indicate the Navy got this from a foreign 
government service (or where the Navy got this information at all).

In any case, a month after the Navy report is issued in November 2002 
mentioning the West African businessman, US sources did get check out 
the Cotonou, Benin warehouse alleged in the Navy report to be the 
transit point for yellowcake, and it turns out to hold bales of cotton. 
Subsequently, according to the Senate report, there's no US government 
effort to follow up and interview the businessman.

I basically agree with the SSCI report admonition that the US 
government should have at least tried to interview this West African 
businessman - which none of the three US intel agencies, including the 
Defense HUMINT agency, did. If his identity can be ascertained, some 
journalist should try to go interview him.

But it's hard to see how the West African businessman ultimately 
amounts to a real other source for the Niger uranium claims, by virtue 
of the fact, no one ever interviewed him. If someone leaves a 
journalist a voice mail with his name and phone number and says on the 
message, I know about X, Y, Z, one simply can't include him in one's 
article as a source, without interviewing him. What's more, if the 
journalist checks out what the person said he's involved in, and it 
appears to be false, it wouldn't be enough to base a story on. So even 
this West African businessman, the potentially strongest inkling of 
another source from the SSCI report, seems to be deeply problematic at 
best.

4) A fax from late 2001 found in the possession of a Somali 
businessman, "that appeared similar to the amount in the Iraq-Niger 
yellowcake deal. The fax, however, did not mention uranium, Iraq, or 
Niger."

It's hard to know what to make of this, the mention is so cryptic, and 
seems to evaporate from further reporting. How the fax alluded to was 
obtained, and how the Somali businessman upon which it was found came 
to the US's attention, remain steeped in mystery. This would seem to 
likely be a potential British other source, but until Britain makes 
clear what or who it provided, it's hard to know.

I will point out that among the forged Niger uranium documents is a fax 
reporting that quantities of something chemical being transported from 
Niamey to Cotonou Benin from August 2001. Check out this one.

However, this does not appear to be the fax in question, because it is 
a fax from the Niger Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the fax mentioned 
in the SSCI report is described as having no mention of Niger, Iraq, or 
uranium.

In any case, the research so far suggests the fax found on the Somali 
businessman is the closest hint we have to what Britain's other source 
may be. Secondly, some news reports have suggested Britain's "other 
source" had been obtained by signals intelligence, and a fax would 
potentially seem of that nature.

So, where are we?

It seems to me the only potential "other sources" left standing are the 
Somali businessman and potentially the West African businessman, who 
the US never interviewed. That said, there is evidence pointing against 
the fact that the transaction with which the West African businessman 
was alleged to have been involved actually transpired. There was no 
yellowcake found in the Cotonou warehouse, and -- oh yeah -- there was 
no new uranium found in Iraq.

It seems the Somali businessman is the strongest contender for a 
"British other source." But then again, he is the source ultimately of 
a fax that mentions no Niger, no Iraq, and no uranium. It's not quite 
the kind of evidence one would want to take a country to war on.

I'm obviously not an intelligence expert. But it seems to me the CIA's 
judgment, described below from the Senate report, makes sense:


(U) On June 17, 2003, nearly five months after the President delivered 
the State of the Union address, the CIA produced a memorandum for the 
DCI which said, "since learning that the Iraq-Niger uranium deal was 
based on false documents earlier this spring, we no longer believe that 
there is sufficient other reporting to conclude that Iraq pursued 
uranium from abroad."

When you compare the other sources described in the Senate report with 
the forged documents themselves, and the fact that no WMD have been 
found in Iraq (a crucial point), they seem largely to evaporate, and 
appear rather to be elements of a fictional transaction recorded in 
what all investigators have agreed are counterfeit documents.

But we won't know for sure unless and until Britain clarifies what its 
independent sources for the uranium from Africa claims were. Why it 
doesn't begs the question, what does it have to hide? Is it ashamed its 
claimed "other sources" aren't more credible, or is there some other 
explanation?



>> 
>> 
>> NO WOMD found. Bush Lied.
>> 
>> Raygun adn Rummsey supplied "our ally" Saddam --->with WOMD<--- that 
>> was used on the Kurds.
>> 
>> Raygun and Rummsey sat back and watched the slaughter without a peep.

Arming Iraq: A Chronology of U.S. Involvement
By: John King, March 2003

What follows is an accurate chronology of United States involvement in 
the arming of Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war 1980-88. It is a powerful 
indictment of the president Bush administration attempt to sell war as 
a component of his war on terrorism. It reveals US ambitions in Iraq to 
be just another chapter in the attempt to regain a foothold in the 
Mideast following the fall of the Shah of Iran.

Arming Iraq and the Path to War
A crisis always has a history, and the current crisis with Iraq is no 
exception. Below are some relevant dates.

September, 1980. Iraq invades Iran. The beginning of the Iraq-Iran war. [8]

February, 1982. Despite objections from congress, President Reagan 
removes Iraq from its list of known terrorist countries. [1]

December, 1982. Hughes Aircraft ships 60 Defender helicopters to Iraq. [9]

1982-1988. Defense Intelligence Agency provides detailed information 
for Iraq on Iranian deployments, tactical planning for battles, plans 
for air strikes and bomb damage assessments. [4]

November, 1983. A National Security Directive states that the U.S would 
do "whatever was necessary and legal" to prevent Iraq from losing its 
war with Iran. [1] & [15]

November, 1983. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro of Italy and its Branch in 
Atlanta begin to funnel $5 billion in unreported loans to Iraq. Iraq, 
with the blessing and official approval of the US government, purchased 
computer controlled machine tools, computers, scientific instruments, 
special alloy steel and aluminum, chemicals, and other industrial goods 
for Iraq's missile, chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs. 
[14]

October, 1983. The Reagan Administration begins secretly allowing 
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt to transfer United States 
weapons, including Howitzers, Huey helicopters, and bombs to Iraq. 
These shipments violated the Arms Export Control Act. [16]

November 1983. George Schultz, the Secretary of State, is given 
intelligence reports showing that Iraqi troops are daily using chemical 
weapons against the Iranians. [1]


Donald Rumsfeld -Reagan's Envoy- provided Iraq with
chemical & biological weapons
December 20, 1983. Donald Rumsfeld , then a civilian and now Defense 
Secretary, meets with Saddam Hussein to assure him of US friendship and 
materials support. [1] & [15]

July, 1984. CIA begins giving Iraq intelligence necessary to calibrate 
its mustard gas attacks on Iranian troops. [19]

January 14, 1984. State Department memo acknowledges United States 
shipment of "dual-use" export hardware and technology. Dual use items 
are civilian items such as heavy trucks, armored ambulances and 
communications gear as well as industrial technology that can have a 
military application. [2]

March, 1986. The United States with Great Britain block all Security 
Council resolutions condemning Iraq's use of chemical weapons, and on 
March 21 the US becomes the only country refusing to sign a Security 
Council statement condemning Iraq's use of these weapons. [10]

May, 1986. The US Department of Commerce licenses 70 biological exports 
to Iraq between May of 1985 and 1989, including at least 21 batches of 
lethal strains of anthrax. [3]

May, 1986. US Department of Commerce approves shipment of weapons grade 
botulin poison to Iraq. [7]

March, 1987. President Reagan bows to the findings of the Tower 
Commission admitting the sale of arms to Iran in exchange for hostages. 
Oliver North uses the profits from the sale to fund an illegal war in 
Nicaragua. [17]

Late 1987. The Iraqi Air Force begins using chemical agents against 
Kurdish resistance forces in northern Iraq. [1]

February, 1988. Saddam Hussein begins the "Anfal" campaign against the 
Kurds of northern Iraq. The Iraq regime used chemical weapons against 
the Kurds killing over 100,000 civilians and destroying over 1,200 
Kurdish villages. [8]

April, 1988. US Department of Commerce approves shipment of chemicals 
used in manufacture of mustard gas. [7]

August, 1988. Four major battles were fought from April to August 1988, 
in which the Iraqis massively and effectively used chemical weapons to 
defeat the Iranians. Nerve gas and blister agents such as mustard gas 
are used. By this time the US Defense Intelligence Agency is heavily 
involved with Saddam Hussein in battle plan assistance, intelligence 
gathering and post battle debriefing. In the last major battle with of 
the war, 65,000 Iranians are killed, many with poison gas. Use of 
chemical weapons in war is in violation of the Geneva accords of 1925. 
[6] & [13]

August, 1988. Iraq and Iran declare a cease fire. [8]

August, 1988. Five days after the cease fire Saddam Hussein sends his 
planes and helicopters to northern Iraq to begin massive chemical 
attacks against the Kurds. [8]

September, 1988. US Department of Commerce approves shipment of weapons 
grade anthrax and botulinum to Iraq. [7]

September, 1988. Richard Murphy, Assistant Secretary of State: "The 
US-Iraqi relationship is... important to our long-term political and 
economic objectives." [15]

December, 1988. Dow chemical sells $1.5 million in pesticides to Iraq 
despite knowledge that these would be used in chemical weapons. [1]

July 25, 1990. US Ambassador to Baghdad meets with Hussein to assure 
him that President Bush "wanted better and deeper relations". Many 
believe this visit was a trap set for Hussein. A month later Hussein 
invaded Kuwait thinking the US would not respond. [12]

August, 1990 Iraq invades Kuwait. The precursor to the Gulf War. [8]

July, 1991 The Financial Times of London reveals that a Florida 
chemical company had produced and shipped cyanide to Iraq during the 
80's using a special CIA courier. Cyanide was used extensively against 
the Iranians. [11]

August, 1991. Christopher Droguol of Atlanta's branch of Banca 
Nazionale del Lavoro is arrested for his role in supplying loans to 
Iraq for the purchase of military supplies. He is charged with 347 
counts of felony. Droguol is found guilty, but US officials plead 
innocent of any knowledge of his crime. [14]

June, 1992. Ted Kopple of ABC Nightline reports: "It is becoming 
increasingly clear that George Bush Sr., operating largely behind the 
scenes throughout the 1980's, initiated and supported much of the 
financing, intelligence, and military help that built Saddam's Iraq 
into [an aggressive power]." [5]

July, 1992. "The Bush administration deliberately, not inadvertently, 
helped to arm Iraq by allowing U.S. technology to be shipped to Iraqi 
military and to Iraqi defense factories... Throughout the course of the 
Bush administration, U.S. and foreign firms were granted export 
licenses to ship U.S. technology directly to Iraqi weapons facilities 
despite ample evidence showing that these factories were producing 
weapons." Representative Henry Gonzalez, Texas, testimony before the 
House. [18]

February, 1994. Senator Riegle from Michigan, chairman of the Senate 
Banking Committee, testifies before the senate revealing large US 
shipments of dual-use biological and chemical agents to Iraq that may 
have been used against US troops in the Gulf War and probably was the 
cause of the illness known as Gulf War Syndrome. [7]

August, 2002. "The use of gas [during the Iran-Iraq war] on the battle 
field by the Iraqis was not a matter of deep strategic concern... We 
were desperate to make sure that Iraq did not lose". Colonel Walter 
Lang, former senior US Defense Intelligence officer tells the New York 
Times. [4]

This chronology of the United States' sordid involvement in the arming 
of Iraq can be summarized in this way: The United States used methods 
both legal and illegal to help build Saddam's army into the most 
powerful army in the Mideast outside of Israel. The US supplied 
chemical and biological agents and technology to Iraq when it knew Iraq 
was using chemical weapons against the Iranians. The US supplied the 
materials and technology for these weapons of mass destruction to Iraq 
at a time when it was know that Saddam was using this technology to 
kill his Kurdish citizens. The United States supplied intelligence and 
battle planning information to Iraq when those battle plans included 
the use of cyanide, mustard gas and nerve agents. The United States 
blocked UN censure of Iraq's use of chemical weapons. The United States 
did not act alone in this effort. The Soviet Union was the largest 
weapons supplier, but England, France and Germany were also involved in 
the shipment of arms and technology.



References:
Washingtonpost.com. December 30, 2002
Jonathan Broder. Nuclear times, Winter 1990-91
Kurt Nimno. AlterNet. September 23, 2002
Newyorktimes.com. August 29, 2002
ABC Nightline. June9, 1992
Counter Punch, October 10, 2002
Riegle Report: Dual Use Exports. Senate Committee on Banking. May 25, 1994
Timeline: A walk Through Iraq's History. U.S. Department of State
Doing Business: The Arming of Iraq. Daniel Robichear
Glen Rangwala. Labor Left Briefing, 16 September, 2002
Financial Times of London. July 3, 1991
Elson E. Boles. Counter Punch. October 10, 2002
Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988. Iranchamber.com
Columbia Journalism Review. March/April 1993. Iraqgate
Times Online. December 31, 2002. How U.S. Helped Iraq Build Deadly Arsenal
Bush's Secret Mission. The New Yorker Magazine. November 2, 1992
Grolier Multimedia Encyclopedia: Iran-Contra Affair
Congressional Record. July 27, 1992. Representative Henry B. Gonzalez
Bob Woodward. CIA Aiding Iraq in Gulf War. Washington Post. 15 December, 1986
Case Study: The Anfal Campaign. www.gendercide.com


-- 
"Naturally the common people don't want war: Neither in Russia, nor in 
England, nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood. But, after 
all, IT IS THE LEADERS of the country who determine the policy and it 
is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a 
democracy, or a fascist dictatorship, or a parliament, or a communist 
dictatorship. Voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to 
the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is TELL 
THEM THEY ARE BEING ATTACKED, and denounce the peacemakers for lack of 
patriotism and exposing the country to danger. IT WORKS THE SAME IN ANY 
COUNTRY."
 
--Goering at the Nuremberg Trials