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From: The Arms-D Moderator (Harold G. Ancell) <ARMS-D@MIT-MC.ARPA>


Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 3 : Issue 29
Today's Topics:

			 Background on SDI
		       Unreliable Information
			 KGB and Influence
			       Agents
	Request for where to get State Dept Special Reports
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Note from Moderator: Pardon this late digest; MC was having problems
last night.

					- Harold

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Date: Mon, 6 May 85 13:06:20 pdt
From: ihnp4!uw-beaver!ssc-vax!eder@Berkeley (Dani Eder)
Subject: Re: Arms-Discussion Digest V3 #27

In order to provide the net with some information on SDI, I submit
herewith a presentation made to the Royal Aeronautical Society,
New Zealand Division, Christchurch, New Zealand, 8 March 1985, by
Peter Downey, who was then Director of Preliminary Design, Research
and Engineering Division, Boeing Aerospace Company.  Preliminary
Design is where SDI work is being done at Boeing.

     The words are Mr. Downey's.  My own opinions do not necessarily
agree.  [My comments will appear in brackets such as these].
--------------------------------------------------------------------

	The Strategic Defense Initiative and Space

		Peter Downey	March 8, 1985

     The historical approach to strategic nuclear warfare has been to
develop larger numbers of more sophisticated offensive weapons.  The
awesome destructiveness of even a small percentage of these weapons
could ruin the whole world if the nuclear winter theory of Sagan and
others (Turco, R. P., O. B. Toon, T.P. Ackerman, J.B. Pollack, and
C. Sagan. "Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Nuclear Explosions."
TTAPS Report, Science, 23 December, 1983.) holds true.  President
Reagan's announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in
March 1983 signaled a fundamental change in this historical approach.
The promise of SDI was expressed by Lieutenant General Abrahamson,
director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO):
"The United States has set a goal --to achieve, through measures that
are defensive, as well as through arms control, deep reductions in
nuclear offensive forces" (Department of Defense.  The Strategic
Defense Initiative: Defensive Technologies Study, U.S. Government
Printing Office, April 1984.).  To achieve this goal, SDI must protect
allied people and military forces from offensive nuclear weapons
(Department of Defense.  Defense Against Ballistic Missiles: An Assessment
of Technologies and Policy Implications, U.S. Government Printing
Office, April, 1984.).  The first, ongoing step of this initiative
is to study defensive system technologies that could intercept
ballistic missiles and reentry vehicles.

     Once proven, these technologies could provide the basis for an
effective defense system that will --
o  Eliminate the ability of ballistic missiles to support preemtive
   nuclear strikes.
o  Create an environment conducive to negotiated force reductions
   by negating the value of ballistic nuclear missile forces.

     This paper reviews the historical evolution of offense and defense
and relates this to the current use of space for offensive nuclear
weapons.  From this perspective, the broad requirements for strategic
defense and the options for meeting these requirements are defined and
evaluated.  Though it is early to select an approach from the many
possibilities, the intent of this paper is to show that near-term
concepts of reasonable technical risk can fulfill the promise of SDI.

    [TO BE CONTINUED ---]
 
------------------------------

Date: Wed 8 May 85 01:01:27-EDT
From: Rob Austein <SRA@MIT-XX.ARPA>
Subject: unreliable information

Jeff,

Two things you have posted recently are bothering me.  One has already
been mentioned by a number of people (the zero sum game assumption), so
I won't elaborate on it since you will probably already have responded
to it by the time I get this.

The other one is from your comments on the low quality of information
available to the public (as opposed to the intel community).  I won't
argue with your assertion that what is available to the intel
community is superior; I had already come to the conclusion that the
general public doesn't really have access to much real information on
intel matters.  What bothers me is the what seems to be the
inescapable conclusion of your argument, namely, that since the
general public doesn't have access to real information, we should not
be forming opinions on these matters and should certainly not be
acting on these opinions.  I just don't see this as a viable
alternative.  I may well be reading something into your position that
you didn't put there; if so, please tell me where I am erring.

			--Rob <sra@mit-xx.arpa>

------------------------------

Date: Wed,  8 May 85 01:50:36 EST
From: Christopher C. Stacy <CSTACY@MIT-MC>
Subject:  KGB and Influence

    Date: Mon,  6 May 85 18:33:12 EST
    From: Herb Lin <LIN>

    Please give an example of "influence" that does NOT include selling
    secrets.

Often people don't start out selling secrets, but are worked up to it
gradually.  They start out making a seemingly hamrless mistake, and
then are intimidated (ie., their jobs threatened) into actual illegal
activities.  Probably Mr. Miller can come up with some better examples,
but here is a (rather simple and blatant) scenario which has
been used to directly subvert persons working in classified areas.

First, you are identified and targeted as a new operative.
Your security access, personal, professional, and finiancial
status is evaluated.  You are approached in a public social
setting, say at a bowling alley, by a friendly KGB agent
claiming to be a salseman of some kind. Acquaintances are made
and so forth.  You are talked into obtaining for the agent
some unclassified information (say, a list of people you work
with.)  While the initial and subsequent conversations are
going on, you are unknowingly photographed with the agent.

As time goes by, more unclassified information of various sorts is
obtained for the agent.  Sometimes you might even be paid or otherwise
compensated for the trouble he has gone to.  The agent starts asking
for sensitive unclassified material.  Eventually he works his way up
to asking for actually classified material.  Somewhere along the way
you realize (at least to some extent) what is going on, and objects.
When pressed, the agent explains that he is a KGB agent and that you
have been working for him, and that you are going to continue to do so
one last time.  He presents you with photos showing you and he
talking, you passing him (supposedly "classified") documents of some
sort or another, and possibly even being paid for your services.  
He threatens to expose your espionage activities to the authorities if
you don't do this last job.  You do the last job.  Now he's really got
you, and can use you any time he wants.  Probably regularly.  You may
possibly be reimbursed for your services.If you have been targeted 
for the long term, they may decide new job moves they wish you to make 
to get to the material they want. Etc.

------------------------------

Date: Wed,  8 May 85 06:25:51 EST
From: Herb Lin <LIN@MIT-MC>
Subject:  KGB and Influence
To: CSTACY@MIT-MC

Your example is a good one, and if I were KGB or CIA that is how I
would do it.  Still, it ultimately involves revealing secrets, and I
think most of us would agree that a person who does such things is
doing wrong things.  What I still don't understand one way or the
other is what "being influenced" means (as contrasted to being an
operative as I think you described).

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 8 May 85 14:05:04 EDT
From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TOI 4675 <jmiller@apg-1>
Subject: Soviet Intelligence

Dear Don,
     Just a couple of points on your letter in the last digest.
I don't know what to tell you about reconciling intel facts and 
what elected officials release. I would suggest that rather than 
expecting to be told intel secrets so as to select your leaders, 
( who decides what intel to divulge, and how much?), vote 
carefully for the leaders you trust the most to act responsibly 
with our state secrets.


     I'm not advocating that people shouldn't read works such as 
Cockburn's book, if you go back to my original comments on Jong's 
review, you will see that my objection is to the use of that work 
in criticizing defense policy. The conclusions in the book about 
Soviet weaknesses are based on some very superficial intelligence 
on Cockburn's part. I can't criticize the author for the quality 
of intelligence - I have a good idea of what is available to a 
civilian doing research - nor would I criticize conclusions 
written from a standpoint informing the reader that those 
conclusions are based solely on the scratched surface of intel on 
the Soviet military. I feel Cockburn goes too far. Even Suvarov 
conveys a hesitancy to make any major pronouncements about the 
strengths or weaknesses of the army he'd served.


     Also; regarding your comments on KGB:

     1) I personally use the yardstick that what is bad for the 
US is wrong. I read Morganthau and believe in the pragmatism of 
Realpolitik. We have to, because the USSR operates that way.

     2) The KGB doesn't care about your opinions, nor the 
opinions of any followers of any movements that they have seen 
fit to use. In a Democratic society, all opinions are valid. 
(Theoretically.) The aims of the KGB have little to do with the 
aspirations of the groups infiltrated. Their aims are to find 
ways to increase conflict between the groups and the target 
government, utilizing all means of "Active Measures" to escalate 
the conflict, alienate the public from the government, and 
pressure government officials to adopt policies shaped by public 
demand which was in turned shaped by manipulation.


     If you are an individual who espouses the beliefs of the 
freeze movement, I have no quarrel with you.
     If you are a member of a freeze group, I have no quarrel 
with you, but I would attempt to suggest you monitor well your 
membership.
     If you are a member of a freeze group and either refuse to 
believe that Soviet intelligence might use you to their own ends 
because your ego won't permit, or claim that KGB support and 
activities are OK as long as they help you, I'm an opponent.

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 8 May 85 14:54:06 EDT
From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TOI 4675 <jmiller@apg-1>
Subject: KGB

For Kevin Saunders - ( whose address as given proves indigestable 
                       to the system.)

     Sometimes I wish the intelligence services could waste taxpayers' money 
and create a full-time group to screen intelligence for purposes of release to 
the public.
     
     ( If you are personally affronted by "...this agents of influence 
twaddle", I suggest you contact the nearest Soviet embassy.  It was they who 
coined the phrase Agent of Influence, as well as Active Measures. We simply 
make use of the translation.)

     I suppose we could publish the information gleaned from known KGB 
operations in the US - there might be an argument in favor of compromising our 
own counterintelligence operations conducted when hostile collectors or agents 
are detected - just so that some comfortably ensconsed civilians, with nothing 
personally at stake, might have nice topics for discussion.
     The most insipid whining I hear comes from those who, from armchairs 
well-distanced from the sharp edge, bitch and moan that the nasty government 
has no right to deprive them of secrets, regardless of danger to lives or 
painstakingly constructed intelligence and counterintelligence programs.



        > If you feel I'm saying YOU are an "enemy agent" or disloyal
          because the KGB finds your pet cause useful...you don't read well.
        > If you are mad because someone points out that the KGB finds your 
          pet cause useful,......tough.
        > If you really believe the KGB uses any cause it "espouses" to 
          promote world peace...I'll know you've never had business with them.  


     By the way, note that I make no argument with your assessment of the 
military-industrial-government complex. I'm an intelligence professional. I 
try not to argue about those things I'm not qualified to argue about.

      



- J. MILLER

------------------------------

Date:  9 May 85 16:37 PDT
From: Tom Perrine <tom@LOGICON.ARPA>
Subject: References

Where are the State Dept Special Reports available from? How about the
House committee hearings minutes? Should I try my local library or
write to someplace in D.C. ?

Thanks,
Tom Perrine

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[End of ARMS-D Digest]